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RE-THINKING ACCESS TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CANADA: A
CRITICAL REVIEW OF NEEDS AND
RESPONSES*
Patricia Hughes, Mary Jane Mossman"
This paper provides a critical assessment of some current issues about access to justice in
Canada, with a special focus on criminal justice. The paper identifies recent trends in the
literature about criminal justice in Canada and in related common law jurisdictions,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand; and the
development of restorative justice processes to augment or replace traditional approaches to
criminal justice. Overall, the paper is intended to provide a review of selected literature with
critical commentary about current trends in criminal justice, and to offer suggestions about
empirical and other research initiatives designed to assess future needs.
In Chapter I, the paper provides a conceptual framework for re-thinking access to criminal
justice in Canada, linking scholarly work on access to justice from a number of different
jurisdictions over the past few decades to current issues and developments in Canada. This
chapter provides a contextual framework for assessing these issues with respect to: the
relationship between civil and criminal justice issues; the goals of the criminal justice
process, of punishment and of sentencing, and the goals of restorative justice. The
conceptual framework also includes an assessment of the public and private dimensions of
criminal justice through an examination of the idea of "community" in the context of
individual relationships of power; and an exploration of the potential for achieving social
change within restorative justice programmes. As well, the paper reviews critical literature
about the impact of criminal justice processes on norms of equality and social justice.
Chapter H provides a critical assessment of literature about the "needs" of participants in
relation to criminal justice. Although the literature on legal needs is extensive, it is mainly
focussed on needs in the context of civil law actions rather than in criminal justice. The
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views expressed are those of the authors.
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paper examines the "needs" of three groups of participants in criminal justice processes:
aboriginal offenders and their communities; criminal justice offenders, including women and
visible minorities; and victims and communities. The paper explores issues about the
relationship between "needs" and "rights" in criminal justice processes, and some
fundamental issues - including relationships of power - among those involved in criminal
justice. In doing so, this chapter identifies concerns about traditional and restorative justice
practices in balancing "rights" and "needs "for participants in criminal justice.
Chapter III of the paper provides an assessment of restorative justice principles, including a
detailed examination of the theoretical goals and methods which have been identified in
different contexts and jurisdictions. As the chapter explains, restorative justice has been
described as "a revolution in criminal justice" / and "a paradigm shift. " 2 Chapter 3
examines the relationship between restorative justice practices and traditional criminal
justice in Canada, and assesses how restorative justice responds to "needs" of participants in
the criminal justice system. In doing so, the paper reviews a number of different restorative
justice initiatives in Canada and in other jurisdictions, and particularly the three main kinds
of programmes; victim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, and circle sentencing
and other initiatives in aboriginal communities.
In Chapter IV, the paper offers some reflections on restorative justice and its challenges.
Recognizing the limits of current criminal justice processes, and the "needs" of criminal
justice participants, the paper provides a critical assessment of restorative justice
alternatives. It raises concerns about the identity of community, the potential for conflict
between victims and communities, whether restorative justice programs are more a form of
downloading of government services than an attempt to develop radical new approaches to
criminal justice, the relationship between the mainstream criminal system and restorative
justice practices and whether restorative justice practices are sufficiently cognizant of
structural imbalances of power and the impact of gender, race and class on victims and
offenders. As well, the paper identifies directions for further research to enable us to better
assess the potential use of restorative justice principles in practice in Canada, with particular
emphasis on general evaluation of restorative justice programs and the need to assess
programs to determine whether they satisfy equality principles.
Cet article fourni une 6valuation critique de certaines questions courantes au sujet de 'acc~s
6 la justice, en se concentrant sur la justice criminelle. Cet article identifie les directions
rcentes quant 6 la justice criminelle, dans la littdrature canadienne et d'autres juridictions
de droit commun, comme les Etats-Unis, le Royamme-Uni, l'Australie et la Nouvelle ZMlande.
Cette direction est de dvelopper les processus de la justice restorative afin d'augmenter ou
de remplacer les approches traditionelles de la justice criminelle. En totalit6, cet article a
l'intention de fournir une revue de la litt&ature traitant de ce sujet avec un commentaire
critique, et d'offirir des suggestions concernant les initiatives de recherches empiriques ou
autrement cr es pour valuer les besoins dufuture dans ce domaine.
I National Institute of Corrections, as quoted by Zehr H. (1997) "Restorative Justice: The Concept," 59 (7)
Corrections Today 68.
2 M. Umbreit & R. Coates, Muticulturallnplicationsfor Restorative justice (Washington: U.S. Department of
justice, 2000) [hereinafter Umbreit & Coates 2000].
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Dans le premier chapitre, 1 'article fourni un squelette conceptuel pour repenser 1 'accis 6 la
justice criminelle au Canada en reliant les oeuvres scholastiques rcents au sujet de I 'accis 6
la justice de nombreuses juridictions aux questions et d~veloppements courants au Canada.
Ce chapitre cr~e un contexte pour addresser ces questions en ce qui est la relation entre la
justice criminelle et civile, les objectifs des peines dans le systme criminel et les objectifs de
la justice restorative. Il y a aussi une 6valuation des dimensions publiques et privies de la
justice criminlle en examinant l'id~e de la "communaut6" dans le contexte des relations
individuelles de pouvoir, et une exploration du potentiel pour achever un changement social &i
I 'intrieur des programmes dejustice restorative.
Le deuxi~me chapitre fourni une valuation critique de la littgrature au sujet des "besoins"
des participants en relation avec la justice criminelle. Quoique la littirature concernant les
besoins ligaux est extensive, elle vise sur les besoins dans le contexte d'actions civiles plut6t
que la justice criminelle. Trois groupes de participants ont leurs besoins d~lin s; les
contrevenants aborigines et leur communauts, les contrevenants de la justice criminelle,
incluant les femmes et les minorities visibles, et les victimes et leurs communaut~s. Les
questions explorant les relations entre les besoins et les droits dans le processus de la justice
criminelle sont explores ainsi que certains points fondamentaux, incluant les relations du
pouvoir, de ceux qui participent dans le systime criminel. En faisant cela, ce chapitre
identifie les inqui~tudes des pratiques dans la justice traditionelle et restorative en tentant de
balancer les droits et les besoins des participants dans lajustice criminelle.
Le troisi~me chapitre fourni une examination des principes de la justice restorative, incluant
les objectifs thoriques et les mthodes qui ont 6t identifis dans diffirents contextes et
juridictions. Comme explique le chapitre, la justice restorative est dcrite comme une
r~volution dans la justice criminelle et une alteration d'un paradigme. Ce chapitre examine
les relations entre les pratiques de la justice restorative et celle de la justice criminelle
traditionelle au Canada, et value comment la justice restorative r4pond au besoins des
participants dans le systime criminel. En particulier, I'article examine un grand nombre
d'initiatives traitant de justice restorative au Canada et dans autres juridictions, notamment
les trois principaux types de programmes: la m~diation entre victime et contrevenant, les
conferences avec le groupe familial et les sentences en cercle et d'autres initiatives dans les
communautes aborigines.
Le quatri~me chapitre offre des reflections au sujet de la justice restorative et les d~fits
qu 'elle pose. En reconnaissant les limites des processus du systime criminel qui existent
pr~sentement et les besoins de ses participants, cet article fourni une critique des alternatives
de la justice restorative. On addresse les inquidtudes avec l'indentit6 de la communaut , si
les programmes dejustice restorative sont plut6t une dilgation de services gouvernementaux
qu 'une alternative de d~velopper des nouvelles approches i la justice criminelle, les relations
entre le systime criminel courant et les pratiques de justice restorative et si celles-ci sont
suffisament connaissantes des imbalances structurales du pouvoir et l'impacte du sexe, la
race et classe sociale sur les victimes et les contrevenants. En plus, 1'article identifie les
directions qui n&essitent plus de recherche afin de mieux d6terminer les usages potentiels
des principes de la justice restorative au Canada, avec une accentuation sur une ivaluation
gtn~rale des programmes de justice restorative et le besoin d'valuer les programmes pour
dterminer si elles satisfient les principes d' galit6.
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I. THE CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FROM
ACCESSTO JUSTICE TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE
A. Introduction
... But I know of no way of assessing to what extent "justice" was done in
a sample of cases whether civil or criminal. The question is too elusive,
too complex to unravel. It would require knowledge of too many
unknowable facts. The concept of justice in legal cases I suspect is too
deep for any research project.3
Professor Zander's comments at the beginning of the Hamlyn Lectures in
1999 suggest a need for caution in discussions about the meaning and processes of
justice. Describing himself as "an academic lawyer who for many years has been a
student of the workings of the legal system and in particular of the system's
pathology," Zander examined recent changes in civil justice, criminal justice, and
the protection of human rights in the United Kingdom. Although his lectures
focussed on the legal system and the courts rather than on more fundamental ideas
of "justice," he offered a trenchant critique of the new Access to Justice Act, 1999'
in the UK and its potential to undermine the accomplishments of the Legal Aid
Act, 1949, enacted fifty years earlier. In spite of the title of the 1999 legislation,
Zander concluded that the Access to Justice Act heralded major restrictions on
access to justice. As he stated bluntly:
The truth is that the [1999] reforms spring not from a desire to improve
access to justice but from the Treasury's need to control the budget. The
entire new system flows from the decision to cap the budget. This will
infect the whole enterprise....'
Zander's comments reveal the complex social, political and legal contexts
within which current discussions about justice occur. Although he confined his
comments to the legal system and the courts in the United Kingdom, and the
extent of access to existing legal proceedings, Zander's analysis demonstrates how
political goals of limited spending may affect the definition of access to justice
goals and their achievement in both courts and other legal contexts.6 As he
3 M. Zander, The Stale ofJustice, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000) [hereinafter Zander] at 2.
4 (U.K.), 1999, c.22.
5 Zander, supra note 3 at 24.
6 In his lecture on criminal justice in the UK, Zander began by noting that Home Office figures for 1999
revealed that of 100 offences committed against individuals and their property, only 45 get reported to
the police, 24 are recorded by the police, five are cleared up by the police, and two result in a
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suggested, definitions of access to justice in the legal context may have important
consequences for social justice as well. Beyond the context of courts and legal
proceedings, moreover, Zander's insights about how social and political contexts
shape ideas about access to justice are important in assessing current efforts in
Canada to envisage justice as "transformative." 7
This chapter provides an overview of some aspects of the context and
concepts for this re-thinking of access to justice. It focuses on the challenges
identified in the literature about how to seek justice in Canada, rather than merely
improving access to current legal processes: that is, how to promote justice rather
than merely enable better access to the legal system. The chapter focuses on three
aspects of this analysis:
the context of access to justice developments, including the relationship
between civil and criminal justice, and recent initiatives in criminal
justice;
the public/private dimensions of justice, including issues about resources,
capacities, and power; and
the concept of equality in promoting social justice.
B. The Context of Recent Access to Justice Developments
Ideas about access to justice in Canada have been significantly influenced
by the work of the Florence Access-to-Justice Project, a comparative assessment of
initiatives worldwide, which has contributed to more broadly-based conceptions
of access to justice. According to Cappelletti and Garth, there were three "waves"
of access to justice reforms: the "first wave" of the movement involved provisions
for legal aid; the "second wave" was a group of substantive and procedural reforms
which enabled legal representation for more "diffuse" interests including
environmental and consumer protection. By contrast, the "third wave" was
labelled by Cappelletti and Garth the "access to justice" approach because of its
aspirations to attack barriers more articulately and comprehensively; in their 1978
conviction. As he concluded, "the criminal courts touch only the fringes of the problem of crime"
[Zander supra note 3 at 511. The lecture provided analysis of recommendations of the Runciman Royal
Commission and other recent "improvements" in criminal justice, all "indications of a concern
regarding at least the appearance of justice. But knowing how to improve the quaiqy of justice is much
more difficult" [Ibid at 55]. For Zander, economy and efficiency are important goals for the criminal
justice system, but the primary concern must be "the right balance between the proper interests of the
prosecution and the proper interests of the defence" [Ibid at 75].
7 Law Commission of Canada, From Restorative Justice to Transformative Justice: Discussion Paper, (Ottawa: Law
Commission of Canada, 1999) [hereinafter Law Commission 1999].
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article in the Buffalo Law Review, they described the "third wave" as building
upon the achievements of earlier reforms, but expanding both the goals and the
means of achieving them:
This "third wave" of reform includes but goes beyond advocacy, whether
inside or outside of the courts, and whether through governmental or
private advocates. Its focus is on the full panoply of institutions and
devices, personnel and procedures, used to process, and even prevent,
disputes in modern society.
[The "third wave" encourages experimentation with a wide range of
reforms,] including changes in forms of procedure, changes in the
structure of courts or the creation of new courts, the use of lay persons
and paraprofessionals both on the bench and in the bar, modifications in
the substantive law designed to avoid disputes or to facilitate their
resolution, and the use of private or informal dispute resolution
mechanisms.9
Although the focus of the Florence Access-to-Justice Project was civil
justice, it is possible to identify similar "waves" of developments in the criminal
justice context. Thus, recent decades have witnessed "first wave" changes to make
legal representation of accused persons more effective (such as legal aid for accused
persons); as well as "second wave" changes which have provided improvements to
criminal trials (such as requirements of prosecutorial disclosure), a broader range
of sentencing options (such as formal cautions and conditional sentences), and
some recognition of the impact of criminal activity on victims and communities
(such as victim impact statements).' In such a context, recent developments in
restorative justice for criminal law matters appear to be "third wave" reforms:
efforts to use the "full panoply of institutions, devices, personnel and procedures"
and experimentation with a wide range of reforms." Moreover, beyond criminal
8 M. Cappelletti & B. Garth, eds., Access to Justice: A World Survey, vol. 1 (Milan: Sijthoff and Noordhoff-
Alphenaandenrijn, 1978) [hereinafter Cappelletti & Garth 19781 at 223.
9 Ibid. at 225.
10 A. Crawford, "Alternatives to Prosecution: Access to, or Exits from Criminal Justice?" [hereinafter
Crawford] in R. Young & D. Wall, eds., Access to Ciminal Justice: LegalAid and the Defence of Liberoy
(London: Blackstone Press, 1996) [hereinafter Young & Wall] at 313;J. Roberts & D. Cole eds., Making
Sense of Sentencing, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) [hereinafter Roberts & Cole].
11 Albert Eglash is credited with creating the term "restorative justice" in 1977, although restorative
conceptions of justice "claim their roots in both Western and non-Western traditions" 0. Llewellyn &
R. Howse, "Restorative justice - A Conceptual Framework" (1998), online: Law Commission of
Canada <http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/papers/howse.html> (date accessed: 1 December 2000)
[hereinafter Llewellyn & Howse] at 4). Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11, adopted the analysis of Van
Ness and Strong that restorative justice theory was influenced by five movements: the informal justice
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justice, it has been suggested that there is "the possibility of using the substance of
conflict as a means of exploring options and establishing responses that are not
only acceptable to all parties but develop and strengthen relationships among those
involved" in other kinds of conflict. 2 From this perspective, new developments in
restorative justice in the criminal law context appear linked to "transformative
justice" - processes which take account of broader concerns, including traditional
civil law matters. In this way, the early insights of the Florence Access-to-Justice
Project are connected to new developments in both criminal and civil justice.
a. The context of civil and criminal justice
This analysis of access to justice initiatives in civil law and criminal law
contexts suggests a need to reassess the continuing validity of distinctions between
these categories. To what extent should we theorize criminal law and civil law as
two quite separate categories of justice responses - or is it more appropriate to
think of them as points on a continuum? This question is critical to any
assessment of new developments in civil law and criminal law for settling disputes.
One response is that actions should be characterized as "criminal" (1) when they
involve socially proscribed wrongdoing, that is, when the conduct is such that the
community should take a shared and public view, and claim normativity over its
members; and (2) when there is someone who is a wrongdoer, a criminal agent,
who can be held responsible, that is, who can be called by the community to
movement; movements to meet the needs of victims through restitution; the victim's rights movement,
enabling victims to participate in legal processes; movements to adopt victim-offender mediation and
family group conferencing; and social justice movements [D. Van Ness & K. H. Strong, Restoring Justice
(Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 1999) [hereinafter Van Ness & Strong].
According to Llewellyn & Howse:
Restorative justice is fundamentally concerned with restoring social relationships, with establishing or re-
establishing social equality in relationships - that is, relationships in which each person's rights to equal
dignity, concern and respect are satisfied. As it is concerned with social equality, restorative justice
inherently demands one attend to the nature of relationships between individuals, groups and
communities [Llewellyn & Howse at 11].
12 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7 at 40. According to the LCC Discussion Paper, "Transformative
justice, as a general strategy for responding to conflicts, takes the principles and practices of restorative
justice beyond the criminal justice system" to environmental disputes, labour matters, landlord-tenant
issues, etc:
Taking a cue from restorative justice, a transformative approach to dispute resolution would begin with a
commitment to transforming the relationships between parties to the conflict .... A transformative
approach to conflict resolution would encourage accommodative relationships between groups with
competing interests. The conflict situation would be transformed from one in which groups are in
competition with one another to one in which groups recognise their mutual interests in arriving at
workable solutions (at 39).
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answer for that wrong." Using this approach, there is a crucial distinction in the
processes used to respond to criminal, by contrast with civil, wrongs. In the civil
process, the victim is in charge; by contrast,
A "criminal" model puts the community (the state) in charge. The case is
investigated by the police; the charge is brought by [the state]; whether it
is brought, and how far it proceeds, is up to the prosecuting authority; it
is not for the victim to decide whether any decision it produces is
enforced.... [There] are two aspects to the criminal model. On the one
hand, the victim receives more support from the community than she
might under the civil model: she is not left to bring the case by herself.
But, on the other hand, she loses control of it: it is no longer hers to
pursue or not as she sees fit.'4
Using the concrete example of rape, Marshall and Duff argued that the
wrong done to the victim should be regarded, at the same time, as a wrong done to
"us". That is, the wrong is shared by all members of the community:
The wrong does not cease to be "her" wrong: but it is also "our" wrong
insofar as we identify ourselves with her. The point is not just that we
realise that other members of the group are also vulnerable to such
attacks, or that we want to warn other potential assailants that they
cannot attack members of the group with impunity...: it is that the attack
on this individual victim is itself also an attack on us - on her as a member
of the group and on us as fellow members. "
For Marshall and Duff, it is not appropriate to assert that the community
has "stolen" the victim's case; they disagree with Nils Christie's classic argument
that a victim is rendered mute in criminal proceedings, "reduced to the triggerer-
off of the whole thing."' 6 Yet, to the extent that ideas of restorative justice create
opportunities for greater involvement by victims in criminal justice processes, and
more substantial connection between victims and offenders, it is important at the
outset to understand how these developments tend to blur existing distinctions
between criminal and civil law processes.7
13 S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff, "Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs" (1998) 11:1 CanJ. L. &Jur. 7.
14 Ibid at 15.
15 Ibid at 19.
16 N. Christie, "Conflicts as Property" in A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, Principled Sentencing.- Readings on
Tbeog & Poig, 2.d ed. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) [hereinafter Christie] at 312.
17 In a review of criminal law reforms in the decade after the 1983 Report of the Federal-Provindal Task Force on
Justice for Victims of Crime (which recommended amendments to the Criminal Code to permit the
Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues
This conclusion does not mean that there will no longer be distinctions
between "private" and "public" harms, but it does reveal the necessity for careful
attention to the details of the processes18 designed to promote greater access to
justice. Moreover, as will be explored more fully later in this paper, the choice of
different examples may affect our conclusions about whether justice goals are
achieved. For example, it may be relevant that the rape example used by Marshall
and Duff in their analysis of criminal justice processes involves a victim who is
female. By contrast, in Christie's analysis of societal conflicts, the pronoun used
for the victim is generally male: Christie described the victim in terms of how "he
[has] suffered, lost materially, or become hurt," and how "above all he has lost
participation in his own case."' 9 Whether, and to what extent, gender may be
relevant in assessments of traditional criminal justice or restorative justice
practices2 ° are questions addressed later in this paper.
b. The context of goals for criminal justice, punishment, and sentencing
The literature on criminal justice reflects differing perspectives on the
goals of criminal justice, perspectives which are important for understanding the
context in which current claims for restorative justice are presented. One
significant (now classic) analysis of criminal procedure in the trial context was
enunciated by Herbert Packer in 1964: the competing models of "crime control"
and "due process."'" Packer's model sought to identify the spectrum of policy
choices in the criminal process: according to Packer, the crime control model
favoured efficient, unhindered decision-making to achieve the dominant goal of
repressing crime, while the due process model provided greater protection for an
individual accused by limiting and constraining official power.2 As early as 1970,
introduction of victim impact statements in relation to sentencing), Steven Skurka examined the
questions included on the forms used for such statements in different Ontario cities. Skurka cautioned
that courts must "prevent an infusion of unwarranted prejudice and ... keep victim impact evidence
within the strict parameters ... legislatively mandated" [S. Skurka, "Two Scales of Justice: The Victim as
Adversary" (1993) 35 Crim. L.Q. 334 at 346]. See also the response to Skurka's concerns in A. Young,
"Two Scales of Justice: A Reply" (1993) 35 Crim L.Q. 355.
18 See also B. Etherington, Review of Multiculturalisn and Justice Issues: A Framework for Addressing Rejarm
(Ottawa: Dept. of Justice Research Section, 1994) [hereinafter Etherington] at 83: "The criminal justice
system does not exist in isolation and many of the barriers to access to justice faced by minorities
originate in institutions which are generally perceived to be extrinsic to the criminal justice system."
"9 Christie, supra note 16 at 314.
20 See also L. Snider, "Feminism, Punishment and the Potential of Empowerment" (1994) 9 Can J. L. & Soc.
75; and N. Cahn, "Policing Women: Moral Arguments and the Dilemma of Criminalization" (2000) 49
DePaul L.R. 817 [hereinafter Cahn].
21 H. Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process" (1964) 113 U. Pa. L.R. 1. at 153.
22 See also H. Packer, The Limits of/he riminalSanction, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968) at 149-73.
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however, John Griffiths suggested that both of Packer's models represented
different forms of the same model, a "battle model" of criminal justice, and
Griffiths then went on to formulate a "family model" of criminal justice.
According to Griffiths, the "family model" recognized explicitly that criminal
activity means that an individual has violated a community-defined norm, but that
the violation should not therefore result in demonizing the individual as a
"criminal;" rather, a family model of criminal justice focusses on "what the nature
of the process accomplishes as well as with the process' fitness to achieve its
object."23 As Kent Roach has argued, Packer's efforts to promote a model of due
process was significantly limited when later empirical research demonstrated that
"in most cases, the criminal process operates as a crime-control assembly line
culminating in the guilty plea."24 As well, Roach argued that due process may
actually operate at the level of ideology to provide support for a model of crime
control. Moreover, Packer's models presupposed that interests of individuals were
always opposed to those of the state; by contrast, Roach suggested that Griffiths'
family model "assumed that the state and the accused, like a parent and child, had
common interests if only because they continued to live together after
punishment." Significantly, Roach went on to state that the family model, used
most often in juvenile justice, was later discounted because of concerns about both
due process and crime control; however, he suggested that it is now "being
reconceived through family conferencing, restorative justice, and reintegrative
shaming.26 As well, Roach noted that both Packer and Griffiths were writing
before the rise in concerns about victims' rights, a development which has had a
significant impact on processes now being used in the context of both traditional
and restorative justice initiatives. In this way, some current practices of restorative
2
3J. Griffiths, "Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third 'Model' of the Criminal Process" (1970) 79:3
Yale L.J. 359 at 391.
2
4 K. Roach, "Changing Punishment at the Turn of the Century: An Overview of the Issues" (1999), online:
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference <http://www.ciaj-
icaj.ca/sentencing/roach.html> (date accessed: 1 December 2000) [hereinafter Roach 1999] at 21,
quoting McBarnet.
See also statistics that 90 percent of Criminal Code violations that come to the attention of the police are
non-violent: National Council of Welfare, LegalAid and the Poor (Ottawa: Min. of Supply and Services,
1995) [hereinafter National Council of Welfare 1995] at 3.
The Toronto Star recently reported that "Between 70 per cent and 80 per cent of tens of thousands of cases
in Toronto's provincial courts each year are plea bargained - an increase of 10 per cent over the past
decade .... The provincial court system would grind to a halt without plea bargains" ["Closed Doors:
Justice by Plea Bargain," Toronto Star (10 March 2001) at Al and A26].
25 Roach 1999, ibid. at 25.
26 Ibid. quotingJ. Braithwaite, Cime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
[hereinafter Braithwaite 1999a].
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justice appear to be linked to earlier debates about appropriate models for criminal
justice."
In addition to differences in theoretical approaches to criminal justice
procedures, there are also differing theories of punishment and sentencing. Von
Hirsch and Ashworth have suggested that during the first six decades of the
twentieth century, "rehabilitation was supposed to be an important aim of
sentencing. Sometimes, it was said to be the primary aim."2  In addition to
rehabilitation, however, deterrence goals were also emphasized in relation to
sentencing, with the objectives of both deterring individual offenders from
reoffending (specific deterrence), and also deterring other citizens who might be
tempted to commit crime out of fear of the penalty (general deterrence). Goals of
rehabilitation and deterrence share the idea that "punishment is warranted by
reference to its crime-preventive consequences;' 29 in this way, they are "forward-
looking" theories of punishment. By contrast, since the 1970's, some sentencing
theorists have embraced the idea of "just deserts" as the basis for punishment: the
idea that "the seriousness of crimes should, on grounds of justice, be the chief
determinant of the quantum of punishment."3 This approach assumes that it is
possible to order the seriousness of crimes, and that it is the crime committed, not
the offender's need for rehabilitation or deterrence, which should determine the
nature of punishment; that is, there should be proportionality so that "the amount
of punishment must reflect the degree of harm committed.""t In addition, unlike
goals of rehabilitation and deterrence which take account of the future actions or
motives of the offender (and others), the "just deserts" theory of sentencing
focusses on the offender's criminal action in the past. Proponents of the "just
deserts" theory of sentencing have argued that it conforms to "everyday
conceptions of crime and punishment" and that it is closely linked to liberal
27 According to Braithwaite, imprisonment was initially seen as a "civilizing" enterprise, systematic and
rational. He also asserts that "prior to the 1970's, the crime debate had been much more about finding
constructive prevention strategies than about punishment," but that "subsequently the experts' focus
has been on methods of determining the appropriate penalty for wrongdoing..." J. Braithwaite, "A
Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?" (1999) 46 UCLA L.R. 1727 at 1737
[hereinafter Braithwaite 1999b].
28 A. von Hirsch & A. Ashworth, PrindpledSentencing: Readings on Theory & Poky, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1998) [hereinafter von Hirsch & Ashworth] at 1.
29 Ibid at 44.
30 Ibid at 141.
3 1J. Roberts & D. Cole supra note 15 at 10.
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political theory with its insistence on limiting state power and its conception of
autonomous individuals who exercise choices."
At the same time, however, others have suggested that a theory of "just
deserts" sentencing in an otherwise "unjust society" increases punishment for
those who are least able to conform to the ideal of autonomous individuals
exercising free choices:
These very robust notions of free will and choice seem far from the mark
when one considers the people who fill our courts. Women shoplifting
groceries or not declaring to the social service authorities their earnings
from early morning cleaning jobs; young burglars who have never had
the chance of a job; young mothers who turn a blind eye to the
provenance of the money these young men give them to provide for their
children; even the joyriders for whom performing in a car may be the
only free source of excitement and esteem - the offences may be
dangerous, over-prevalent and may destroy the quality of life for their
victims, but it is difficult to imagine the perpetrators as making positive,
unconstrained choices to be criminal. If given a choice between a "real
job" and crime, the majority would undoubtedly take the job.33
Such a view raises questions about the extent to which the "just deserts"
theory of punishment fails to acknowledge sufficiently the extent to which crime
and punishment - and the process of defining and processing those who commit
crimes - have political and social dimensions, not just legal definitions. As
Cappelletti and Garth concluded in their earlier study of access to justice, "a real
32 von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 28 at 148. In their edited collection, Reform and Punishment, Michael
Tonry and Franklin Zimring addressed a number of issues about sentencing reforms. For example,
Louis Schwartz analysed options for sentencing guidelines, suggesting that the objective of short prison
sentences is deterrence; the objective of medium lengths of imprisonment is rehabilitation; and the
goals of lengthy periods of imprisonment are retribution and incapacitation: see Schwartz "Options in
Constructing a Sentencing System: Sentencing Guidelines under Legislative or Judicial Hegemony" in
M. Tonry & F. E. Zimring eds., Reform and Punishment: Essays on Criminal Sentencing (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1983) at 71.
As well, John Coffee and Michael Tonry assessed research about the impact of sentencing guidelines,
particularly in relation to plea bargaining: seeJ. Coffee, Jr. & M. Tonry "Hard Choices: Critical Trade-
Offs in the Implementation of Sentencing Reform through Guidelines" in ibid at 155. The collection
also focuses on sentencing of offenders who are mentally ill: see N. Morris "Sentencing for the
Mentally I1l" in ibid. at 125. See also Patti Bregman "Special Legal Needs of People with Mental
Disabilities" in J.D. McCamus, Chair, A Blueprintfor Public# Funded Legal Serices, 3 vols. (Toronto:
Report of the Ontario Legal Aid Review, 1997) [hereinafter McCamus] at 373. See also A. Ashworth
and M. Wasik, eds., Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) [hereinafter
Ashworth & Wasik]; and Young & Wall, supra note 10.
33 B. Hudson, "Mitigation for Socially Deprived Offenders" in von Hirsh & Ashworth, supra note 28
[hereinafter Hudson 1998] at 206.
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understanding of access to justice ... cannot avoid some political perspective."34
Thus, in attempting to shape appropriate ways of responding to the challenge of
ensuring access to justice now, it is arguable that we need to take account of
current trends to increase criminalization," especially for the poor: panhandlers,
squeegee kids, homeless persons,36 welfare mothers, 37 and poor families.38 To what
extent do principles and processes of restorative justice respond to these kinds of
"criminal" activities? How will new sentencing options such as conditional
sentencing affect actual rates of incarceration or public perceptions of rates of
criminal activity? As Doob argued in a related context, if only aboriginal
offenders with ties to a community could access sentencing circles: "what does this
mean for the offender who is simply a visitor in the community? Do visitors
automatically deserve harsher sentences than those offenders who have ties to the
community?"39 Although the concept of community has been recognized as
broader than geography,4" its scope nonetheless remains somewhat discretionary.
Overall, therefore it is hard to disagree with the assertion that ideas about crime
and punishment are complex, requiring difficult decisions of public policy.'
According to Cooper and Chatterjee, the current criminal justice system in
Canada is still premised on the idea of punishment for wrongdoing, and a variety
of justifications have been suggested: deterrence, maintenance of the social order,
reinforcement of state or societal values, denunciation, the promotion of public
safety, the need to remove the individual from society for a period of time,
rehabilitation, social control, retribution, and ensuring that the offender knows
34 M. Cappelletti & B. Garth, "Access to Justice as a Focus of Research" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B. Access Just.
ix at xvi [hereinafter Cappelletti & Garth 1981].
35 A. Young, "Legal Aid and CriminalJustice in Ontario" in McCamus supra note 32 at 666.
36 L. Sossin, "The Criminalization and Administration of the Homeless: Notes on the Possibilities and
Limits of Bureaucratic Engagement" (1996) 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 623 at 623.
37 Cahn, supra note 20 at 817.
38 A.B. Vreeland, "The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York City: Sparing the Child or Spoiling the
Family?" (2000) 27 Fordham Urban L. J. 1053 at 1053.
39 A. Doob, "Sentencing Reform: Where Are We Now?" in supra note 36 [herinafter Doob] at 353.
40 In this context, Judge Barry Stuart, a pioneer in the use of circle sentencing in the Yukon, has stated that
"A community is not a place, it is people." See B. Stuart, Building Community Justice Partnerships:
Community Peacemaking Circles (Ottawa: Aboriginal Justice Learning Network, Justice Canada,
1997)[hereinafter Stuart 1997]. In a review of circle sentencing practices, Luke McNamara cited cases
in which aboriginal offenders' requests for circle sentencing were met even though they were not living
in aboriginal communities: see R v. SEH [1993] BCJ 2967; and R v. Cheekinew (1993), 80 CCC (3d) 143.
See L. McNamara "The Locus of Decision-Making Authority in Circle Sentencing: The Significance of
Criteria and Guidelines" (2000) 18 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 60 [hereinafter McNamara 2000].
41 Doob, supra note 39 at 350.
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that he or she has done wrong.42 This traditional approach to criminal justice is
significantly different from the concept of restorative justice, which assumes that
wrongdoing reflects disassociation with the community, and that the appropriate
response is to try to reintegrate the offender into the community by re-establishing
a positive relationship. According to Braithwaite, imprisonment has a negative
impact on offenders: prisoners not already immersed in a criminal sub-culture or
versed in criminal skills are introduced to both during terms of imprisonment, and
they may become embittered or angry, give in to feelings of despair, and find
themselves distinctly disadvantaged in finding employment after they are released.
As a result, imprisonment does not result in the internalization of appropriate
community-centred norms.43 In this context, Cooper and Chatterjee identified a
need for a new kind of justice, one that offers:
... fair, insightful and respectful participation of and treatment to all
stakeholders that maximally benefits and satisfies the people in
communities. Justice in this paradigm is no longer synonymous with loss
or pain inflicted by the state. [Restorative justice] measures success [of
the justice system] differently; rather than how much punishment has
been inflicted, it measures how much harm has been repaired and
prevented.44
A restorative justice approach thus recognizes a relationship between
offenders and the societal context in which they offend; as John Braithwaite
argued, the traditional emphasis on punishment in response to wrongdoing
represents "a failure of imagination."45 He supports a return to the period prior to
the 1970's when the crime debate focussed more on prevention strategies than
punishment, and a search for solutions which reduce "hurt" to individuals. and
their communities; these approaches are more likely to aid in crime prevention.
Braithwaite asserts that strategies of restorative justice (circle sentencing, family
conferencing, and victim/offender mediation) are designed to provide
"reassurance" to communities in relation to the commission of criminal acts. This
emphasis on justice that "restores" offenders, their victims, and communities"
42 C. Cooper &J. Chatterjee, "Punishment at the Turn of the Century: The RCMP Perspective" (1999),
online: Canadian Institute for the Administration ofJustice Conference http://www.ciaj-
icag.ca/sentencing/Cooper.htm (date accessed: 1 December 2000) at 2 [hereinafter Cooper &
Chatterjeel.
43 Supra note 27 at 1739.
44 Supra note 42 at 4; citing Van Ness and Strong supra note 11 at 42.
45 Supra note 27.
46 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
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thus offers a solution to those who believe that the greatest failure of Canada's
criminal justice system has been its persistent and fruitless use of imprisonment as
an instrument to deal with criminal behaviour."
c. The context of restorative justice in Canada
Restorative justice featured prominently in proposals to reform the
criminal justice system in the last decades of the twentieth century, both in
Canada and elsewhere. At the same time, proponents of restorative justice
practices have claimed that they represent a return to much earlier conceptions of
crime and criminal processes, particularly processes for more significantly
involving the victim. Thus, Martin Wright explained how victims may have fared
better in the Middle Ages, when they were more directly involved in the process
with the offender; as well, victims were entitled to receive specific compensation
(the "b6t") from the offender, while the King or other lords might claim the "wer"
or "wite."4 In later centuries, with the centralization of criminal law processes,
the state's increasingly central role in prosecuting offenders for their criminal
activity substantially limited the victim's role in relation to both conviction and
sentencing of the offender.49 As a result, many of those who support restorative
justice as a means of achieving the goal of greater victim involvement in the
process and victim entitlement to restitution characterize restorative justice as a
more recent manifestation of earlier forms of English justice."0 Proponents also
point to comparative law; for example, the French Civil Code has long permitted
victims to join their tort action against an offender to the state's criminal action.
Although this approach limits the victim's participation, in theory, to issues of
restitution, it has been suggested that the procedure allows victims to participate in
all critical stages."'
47 T. Quigley, "Has the Role of Judges in Sentencing Changed ... Or Should It?" (1999) online: Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference <http://www/ciaj-
icaj/ca/sentencing/quigley.html> (date accessed: 1 December 2000) [hereinafter Quigley].
48 M. Wright, "Can Mediation be an Alternative to Criminal Justice?" B. Galaway & J. Hudson, eds.
Restorative Justice: International Perpectives. (New York: Criminal Justice Press, 1996) [hereinafter Galaway
& Hudson] at 11-19.
49 Christie, supra note 16 at 312.
50 Llewelyn & House, supra note 11.
511 . Waller, Role of Victim in Sentencing and Related Processes. (Ottawa: Canadian Sentencing Commission
Research Reports, 1988) at 11, citing Vouin "L'Unique Action Civile" (1973) Receuil Dalloz 54.
See also Waler's comprehensive list of earlier Canadian reports about participation by victims in criminal
processes. See also the report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian
Approach (Ottawa: Min of Supply and Services, 1987).
Vol. XIII
Re-Thinking Access to Criminal Justice
Another strand of restorative justice characterizes the commission of crime
in terms of interpersonal or community conflict, so that the goal of restorative
justice is the resolution of the conflict. In such a context, the consent of victims,
offenders and community members to engage in discussion to find a solution to
the conflict clearly operates to bind all of the participants to the outcome;
restorative justice proponents often link goals of non-recidivism to the use of these
procedures which operate by consent rather than (as in the traditional criminal law
context) by coercion. In using mediation and negotiation to resolve disputes,
rather than traditional criminal law processes, restorative justice provides
opportunities for participation and empowerment for those involved in criminal
law, just as alternatives to traditional civil law disputes may similarly provide
opportunities for parties to engage in more consensual problem-solving. 2 Clearly,
the use of methods of dispute resolution outside the court system illustrate
additional connections between civil law and criminal law processes, although they
may also raise questions in these differing contexts. 3 As well, restorative justice
procedures also frequently involve arrangements for providing ongoing support to
both offenders and victims, using measures that might have been adopted in
earlier decades of the twentieth century to achieve rehabilitative sentencing goals.
This analysis suggests that ideas about restorative justice are not wholly
new to debates about crime, punishment and access to justice. In considering its
current manifestations, therefore, it may be important to understand restorative
justice within its historical context. Moreover, the term "restorative justice" may
be used to encompass a variety of practices, including arrangements which provide
for victim participation, community involvement in dispute resolution,
rehabilitative goals, restitution, etc. - but not necessarily all of these features in any
one process. In this way, there is a need to consider the social and legal context
within which particular restorativre justice programmes operate, and the precise
consequences of the blurring of boundaries between processes of criminal and civil
justice in individual cases. In addition, the cultural context of restorative justice is
critical. That is, it is important to recognize that the strongest impetus for
restorative justice processes in Canada derived from concerns about the
application of Eurocentric ideas of crime and punishment to First Nations
52 According to the Law Commission of Canada's Discussion Paper, "the framework and principles of what
is called alternative dispute resolution suggest that many of the concerns expressed by victims and
offenders about the criminal justice process have parallels in the civil justice system," supra note 7 at 37.
53 As the Law Commission of Canada's Discussion Paper explained, the role of community might be quite
significant in environmental disputes, or family but much less clear in disputes about bankruptcy law,
ibid at 38.
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offenders and communities, 4 and the extreme over-representation of aboriginal
men and women in prisons." Significantly, processes of restorative justice are
often identified as "aboriginal justice" processes: they involve circles which bring
together the offender, the victim, their families and their communities with the
objective of "healing" all of the participants. 6 The process is not dominated by
professionals but by community elders, and there is no premium on efficiency and
finality; as well, "because there is no binary verdict, the offender's past
victimization and present disharmony can be recognized as the reason for an
offence without denying the needs of the immediate victim or the responsibility of
the offender."" The aboriginal justice approach thus recognizes the need to
address both past abuses and future prevention measures.
In concluding this overview of literature on access to justice, crime and
punishment, there are two further cautionary comments. First is the need to
examine how well reform goals are actually implemented in practice, particularly
in a context where there are pressing needs for immediate evidence of change; the
possibility of "gaps" between reform goals and their implementation in practice"8
may also be exacerbated by pressures of instrumentalism. s9 Especially in the
context of high volumes of offenders and minor offences, processes of restorative
justice may be vulnerable to the same pressures to demonstrate efficiency and
effectiveness (in terms of numbers and outcomes) which now apply to criminal
courts. As the Law Commission's Discussion paper concluded, the use of
restorative justice programmes may reduce court congestion and decrease the
numbers of offenders who are incarcerated, thereby reducing costs. Yet, while
these features are consequences of restorative justice for its proponents, "for
governments these consequences become goals."6 As a result, there is a need to
assess the impact of restorative justice programmes, not only in terms of their own
54 McNamara 2000, supra note 38 at 61.
ssJ. Rudin, "Legal Aid Needs of Aboriginal People in Urban Areas and on Southern Reserves" in McCamus
supra note 32 [hereinafter Rudin] at 441.
56 As McNamara explained, there have been some efforts to differentiate "healing circles" from "sentencing
circles" in aboriginal justice processes [Supra note 38 at 81]. See also L. Chartrand, "The
Appropriateness of the Lawyer as Advocate in Contemporary Aboriginal justice Initiatives" (1995) 33
Alta. L.R. 874 [hereinafter Chartrand].
57 Braithwaite 1999a, supra note 29 at 251.
58 D. Nelken, "The 'Gap Problem' in the Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Review" (1981) 1 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 35.
59 R.A. Macdonald, "Theses on Access to Justice," (1992) 7:2 Can. J. L. and Soc. 23 at 39.
60 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7 at 65.
Vol. XIII
Re-Thinking Access to Criminal Justice
objectives but also in relation to their impact on broader goals of access to justice
for Canadians.
Second, there is a need to be somewhat wary of the goal of community
harmony in the context of restorative justice. As Nader has argued in the
American context:
For those spearheading control policies harmony is an ideology of
pacification and a way to civilize populations.... [It] is by means of
harmony, a harmony based on the belief that everyone should share the
same goals, [that] goals that are central to the contemporary large-scale
institutions [are achieved]. Harmony and efficiency ideologies are tools,
used to create different cultural forms.61
In the same way, Crawford expressed concern about "alternatives" to
traditional criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom, both because of their
abandonment or dilution of procedural protections, but also because of the limited
extent to which they can realistically guarantee voluntariness, agency and voice to
the parties, features which are central to their normative appeal and to the goal of
achieving harmony and reconciliation among participants. According to
Crawford, the increasing "managerialism" of criminal justice, which stresses
efficiency, effectiveness, economy and the smooth management of increasing case-
loads, means that these fundamental goals of restorative justice models may be
undermined or substantially distorted.62 In this context, issues about models of
criminal law as "crime control" reappear, at the same time as traditional
protections of "due process" may be more difficult to assert or enforce. Thus,
concerns about the underlying values of community harmony must be addressed
in any analysis of emerging trends in access to justice; they also signal important
issues about public and private conceptions of justice, and about equality in
relation to social justice. These issues are addressed in the next sections.
61 L. Nader, "The ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform" (1988) 8 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 269 at 285.
62 Crawford supra note 10 at 313. Ironically, as Crawford explained, the emphasis on efficiency,
effectiveness, and economy means that forms of diversion are attractive options for the management
of criminal justice: "Given the managerialist appeal of diversion and the administrative ethic from
which it draws much of its support, the difficulty - for those committed to extending
mediation/diversion because of its reparative appeal - is to ensure that its normative potential is not
undermined by the need to dispose of large numbers of cases as quickly and cheaply as possible" (Ibid
at 343). Such a view suggests that bureaucratic goals may dilute the goal of harmony in restorative
justice practices.
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C. Public and Private Dimensions of Justice
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to
judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and indiscriminate
basis. It should be treated instead as a highly problematic technique for
streamlining dockets. Settlement is for me the civil analogue of plea
bargaining: Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by
someone without authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders
subsequent judicial involvement troublesome; and although dockets are
trimmed, justice may not be done. Like plea bargaining, settlement is a
capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither
encouraged nor praised.63
This classic statement by Owen Fiss about settlement and its drawbacks in
the civil law context, contrasted with plea bargaining in criminal procedure,
reveals many of the concerns about "private" dispute resolution in both contexts:
concerns about coercion, a lack of accountability for the decision, and the absence
of procedural protections provided in a "public" trial all contribute to his fear that
"justice may not be done." Fiss' critique is part of a more general assessment in
the literature of informal justice which identifies both benefits and also limits for
"bargaining in the shadow of the law."'64 Although some restorative justice
processes may include features which overcome many of Fiss' concerns, there may
nonetheless be symbolic aspects of this "privatization of justice" which should be
confronted in designing public policies for the justice system.
a. The requirement of "community"
The literature comparing informal justice practices in pre-capitalist and
modern societies suggests that, to a very great extent, there is a need for
"community" to support informal justice practices. For example, Sally Engle
Merry conducted comparative studies of the mediation of disputes in four small-
scale societies, and drew conclusions for the adaptability of these practices to
urban America.65 Among other conclusions, Merry identified the need for "the
existence of a cohesive, stable, morally integrated community whose powers of
63 O.M. Fiss, "Against Settlement" (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073 at 1075 [hereinafter Fiss].
64 R. Mnookin, "Divorce Bargaining: The Limits of Private Ordering" J.M. Eekelaar & S.N. Katz, eds., The
Resolution of Fami# Conflict (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984).
65 S.E. Merry, "The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies: Implications for Informal
Community Justice in America" in R.L. Abel, ed., The Politics of Informal Justice, vol. 2 (New York:
Academic Press, 1982) [hereinafter Abel] at 17.
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informal social control can be harnessed to informally achieved settlements."66
Yet, as she concluded, because American mediation centres were often located
within large metropolitan areas, community pressures necessary to induce
disputants to accept a compromise settlement were likely to be absent:
Disputants [in the USA] are rarely embedded in a close, cohesive social
system where they need to maintain cooperative relationships. Even
when disputants come from the same neighbourhood, unless they are
integrated into a unitary social structure their conflicts in one relationship
do not have repercussions for others.67
More recently, in the Journal of Law and Society, Barbara Hudson also
succinctly identified this problem of the need for "communities" in western
society: "without the community, restorative justice is reduced to the competing
perspectives of the victim and the perpetrator.""
Yet, although the need for "community" may create problems for some
informal justice practices, it may work well in others. Thus, for example, there
has been positive evaluation of practices of circle sentencing within aboriginal
communities in Canada, 9 where it is more often possible to find a community
which meets Merry's requirements of being "cohesive, stable, and morally
integrated," and which may also exercise powers of informal social control. As
McNamara suggested, the concept of "community" for purposes of aboriginal
circle sentencing may be quite expansive; quoting from Grotsky, J. in R v.
Cheekinew, he suggested that "the term 'community' ought to receive a wide and
liberal construction as the term 'community' may be ... a term capable of different
interpretations depending on the residence ... of the particular offender .... "70 As
well:
The availability of a community for the purpose of circle sentencing
involves more than just being able to define the existence of a group,
whether geographically or personally. Community capacity, willingness
and preparedness to participate in criminal justice decision-making (and
66 Ibid at 34.
67 Ibid.
68 Supra note 33 at 251.
69 Stuart 1997, supra note 40; B. Stuart, "Circle Sentencing: Turning Swords into Ploughshares" in Galaway
& Hudson, supra note 48 [hereinafter Stuart 1996].
70 McNamara 2000, supra note 38 at 83.
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to oversee follow up) is a prerequisite for the success of community-based
justice, whether in the form of circle sentencing or otherwise."
Significantly, some informal justice practices, such as circle sentencing, are
closely linked to traditional aboriginal "healing" processes.7  As a result,
minimizing the role of the Crown in circle sentencing in aboriginal communities
can represent an acknowledgement of the' appropriateness of traditional aboriginal
justice - it may even suggest informal recognition of aboriginal self-government;
73
by contrast, minimizing the presence of the Crown in other contexts may subtly
suggest that the state has little interest in the concerns of the victim, the offender
or the community. Thus, as McNamara argued, it is necessary to take account of
all the subtle meanings in the use of circle sentencing:
That the circle carries philosophical, spiritual and cultural significance for
many First Nations in Canada is widely recognized. What has been more
controversial is whether the circle sentencing is appropriately seen as a
product of First Nations' legal cultures based on "traditional" methods of
dispute resolution and decision-making in Aboriginal communities, or
alternatively, whether circle sentencing is more accurately characterised
as the creation of a progressive minority within the Canadian judiciary? 4
Two additional concerns have been identified in relation to ideas about
"community" in the context of restorative justice practices. One is the need for
community members and community resources to be allocated to informal justice
processes. While no one disputes that involvement in the justice system is an
important aspect of a community's life, it may be less clear how to determine the
relative importance of restorative justice practices, compared to other needs for
scarce resources, within communities. These concerns are relevant to aboriginal
circle sentencing as well as to programmes for family group counselling and
victim-offender mediation - in all of these cases, both community members and
71 Ibid.
72 See McNamara 2000, supra note 38 for discussion of some differences between "sentencing circles" and
"healing circles." According to Mary Crnkovich, it is important to recognize that there are differences
among aboriginal communities. For example, she asserted that community-based initiatives are not
rooted in Inuit culture: "adult diversion and circle sentencing are not Inuit traditions" (Crnkovich 1996:
174, quoted in McNamara 2000, supra note 38 at 77).
73 Chartrand, supra note 56.
74 McNamara 2000, supra note 38 at 75 explored some of the "contradictions" of circle sentencing in relation
to aboriginal decision-making. As well, he identified problematic assumptions about the
appropriateness of family group conferencing, devised according to the tenets of Maori culture in New
Zealand, for First Nations communities in Canada (McNamara 2000, supra note 38 at 81, quoting R v.
McKay [1997] 7 WWR 496).
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other community resources are claimed by the needs of restorative justice, and, as
a result, they may not be available for other needs within a community.
Moreover, as Abel argued, "informalism can easily deteriorate from a mechanism
for 'making rights effective' into a process of diversion whose primary goal is to
curtail state expenditures devoted to enforcing ... rights."" Since restorative
justice, and the involvement of communities in its processes, may appear to be less
expensive than formal justice precisely because of the use of communities'
resources (rather than those of the state), there may be pressures on communities
to engage in restorative justice practices primarily for economic reasons.76
The other concern about "community" relates to questions of power
within communities. To the extent that restorative justice processes rely upon
communities to exercise social control, there is a need to unpack the idea of
"community" and to examine its internal power relations. As Lacey explained, to
the extent that community processes are formalized, they may tend to create their
own hierarchies.77 Moreover, as Marshall argued, these internal power relations
may need to be challenged:
The desire to dispute may itself conflict with the community's desire to
suppress such altercation, and reconciliation may represent the
dominance of the interests of the local 'establishment' over those of
disadvantaged litigants. The greater the power differentials within a
community, the greater such problems become. For all its faults, the law
can be seen to be protecting individual freedom and rights, which might
be threatened by community-based procedures controlled by local
majority interests.
This concern may not be of great significance in the context of circle
sentencing in aboriginal communities, where the exercise of community power is
likely to correspond to traditional authority and thus, is likely to be widely-
accepted within the community. As McNamara noted, for example, there is
evidence that circle sentencing reflects practices in some aboriginal communities
which have existed for 500 years.79 Yet, even in aboriginal communities, there
7 Abel, supra note 65 at 8.
76 As Crawford supra note 10 at 343 put it, "The fear remains that outcome pressures, in an increasingly
managerial age, will undermine normative process-oriented goals."
77 L. Nicola, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values (London: Routledge, 1988).
78 T.F. Marshall, Alternatives to Criminal Courts (Hampshire: Gower Publishing. 1985) at 53.
79 McNamara 2000, supra note 38 at 77. See the statement of Morris Little Wolf from the Peigan band in R v
C(LM)(1995) 41537374Y101101.
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may be unequal power relationships which need to be addressed in restorative
justice programmes. As Lorraine Berzins suggested, in some of these
communities, there may be:
...power imbalances and socio-economic inequities in communities, and
communities when left on their own have a history of scapegoating the
vulnerable, abusing the rights of the disadvantaged. We could be caught
in a tug of war between those who want more power given to
communities, and those who don't trust communities with that power -
unless we see clearly that it does not have to be a "one-size-fits-all"
solution (emphasis added)."0
b. Individuals and power relationships
A frequently-voiced concern about informal justice practices, including
restorative justice, is the extent to which they offer insufficient procedural
protections." For example, victims and offenders, as well as community
participants, may have differential access to economic, psychological or other
aspects of individual capacity - and these differences may affect their ability to
engage in restorative justice programmes effectively. Particularly in relation to
victim-offender mediation, Crawford has similarly suggested that there may be
differential power relations between the parties which, if they remain unchecked,
may influence settlements. 2 As well, Joseph suggested that domestic abuse cases
might not be appropriate for mediation, in part because of the difficulty of
ensuring equal bargaining power between an offender and victim in this gendered
context.8 3 And, while recognizing that formal criminal justice processes may also
fail to overcome inequality of power between an offender and a victim - or
between an offender and the state - concerns have been expressed that the
existence of multiple and inconsistent goals in restorative justice programmes may
themselves create problems of inequality of power and the potential for abuse:
[Many schemes] seek to meet multiple normative and administrative
aims, including the promotion of attitude change in offenders, greater
involvement of the victim in the process of justice, cutting of cost to the
80 L. Berzins, in P. Healy and H. Dumont, eds., Dawn or Dusk in Sentencing. (Montral: Canadian Institute for
the Administration of Justice/Les Editions Thmis, 1997) [hereinafter Healy & Dumont] at 213.
81 A. Ashworth, "Restorative Justice and Victims' Rights" (2000) March New ZealandL J. 84 [hereinafter
Ashworth].
82 Crawford, supra note 10 at 340.
83 K.L. Joseph, "Victim-Offender Mediation: What Social & Political Factors Will Affect its Development?"
(1996) 11 Ohio St. J. Dispute Resolution 207 [hereinafter Joseph].
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public purse, reduction in court congestion, promotion of restorative
justice, and destigmatisation. Perversely, while multiple aims enable
diversionary schemes to draw upon a wide and diverse audience for
support, they also constitute their Achilles heel. In seeking to meet the
divergent aims that they proclaim, these schemes - particularly mediation
and reparation - are pulled in different, and often competing, directions as
they attempt to satisfy the divergent demands of their different
constituents (emphasis added). 4
Andrew Ashworth also identified some special problems for restorative
justice in the relationships which it fosters between victims and offenders
(particularly in the context of victim-offender mediation). For Ashworth, the
opportunities presented by restorative justice practices to permit offenders to
understand, through the participation of the victim, the human consequences of
what they have done may create a distortion of the process. As he explained, it is
just a short step from such assertions to claims that greater victim involvement is
for the benefit of the offender and of the wider community, especially as
evidenced by reconviction rates:
The danger is clear: for some people, there has been a slippage between
the starting point, which was to support victim-oriented initiatives and
restorative justice by reference to the interests of victims, and the idea of
judging these initiatives on the basis of what they do for offenders. The
danger is that victims are being used in the service of offenders."
For Ashworth, the apparent neglect of victims for much of the twentieth
century means that there may well be a need to reconsider the involvement of
victims in criminal justice processes, including both traditional and restorative
justice programmes. At the same time, he cautioned that there is also
a need for a principled approach and for sound evidence in the formulation of
criminal justice policies.86 Ashworth's comments link these concerns about victims
as individual participants in restorative justice practices to broader, more
ideological, concerns about the underlying messages of restorative justice
practices.
84 Crawford, supra note 10 at 343.
85 Ashworth, supra note 81 at 88.
86 For another formulation of the relationship between victims and offenders in relation to principles of
sentencing, see M. Wasik "Crime Seriousness and the Offender - Victim Relationship in Sentencing" in
Ashworth & Wasik,, supra note 32. See also Sandra Bacchus "The Role of Victims in the Sentencing
Process" in Roberts & Cole supra note 10 [hereinafter Bacchus]; and Barbara Hudson "Restorative
Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence" (1998) 23:2 JournalofLaw and Sodety 237.
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c. Privatization of justice: ideology and social change
Unlike the penal-welfare strategy [rehabilitation], which was linked into a
broader politics of social change and a certain vision of social justice -
however flawed in conception and execution - the new penal policies have
no broader agenda, no strategy for progressive social change and no
concern for the overcoming of social divisions. They are, instead, policies
for managing the danger and policing the divisions created by a certain
kind of social organization, and for shifting the burden of social control
on to individuals and organizations that are often poorly equipped to
carry out this task. 7
David Garland's analysis of strategies of crime control in the United
Kingdom at the end of the twentieth century identified how state policies have
adapted to the idea that "crime is a normal, commonplace, aspect of modern
society, ... an event - or rather a mass of events - which requires no special
motivation or disposition, no pathology or abnormality, and which is written into
the routines of contemporary social and economic life.""8 According to Garland,
the state's response includes the "responsibilization strategy": abdication of direct
intervention (through police, courts, prisons, social work, etc) and adoption of
indirect action through non-state agencies and organizations which are encouraged
to take responsibility, preventing opportunities for crime to occur (including, for
example, Neighbourhood Watch programmes, retail and apartment security
guards, security devices for homes and cars, etc.) "In effect, central government is
... operating upon the established boundaries which separate the private from the
public realm, seeking to renegotiate the question of what is properly a state
function and what is not." 9  As Garland also noted, increasing rates of
incarceration reveal the politicization of the state's "law and order" agenda, with
the state continuing to remain responsible for punishment of crime, whilst
diffusing into the community responsibility for crime control. In such a context, it
is important to examine the goals and methods of restorative justice: might they
represent, at least in some cases, examples of "responsabilization"? If so, is this a
matter of concern? Or not?
Some of the issues raised by Garland appear similar to concerns
traditionally expressed about the problematic nature of state control in the
diversion of civil claims from courts to community settings. A number of scholars
87 D. Garland, "The Limits of the Sovereign State," (1996) 36 The British Journal of Criminology 445 at 466.
88 Ibid. at 450.
89 Ibid. at 453.
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have argued that the creation of less formal alternatives to courts masks how the
state continues to control these new settings; it is not a question of the state
withdrawing from dispute management, but rather one of transforming the
dispute and rendering the state's role less visible.9" Similarly, Friedman argued
that while "lay justice tends to be cheap and informal, ... one of its major vices ... is
that it can be used as an instrument of state power, a means of extending central
control into every nook and cranny of society."91  And Cain and Kulcsar have
suggested that the use of dispute resolution processes may simply involve "a new
form of state-controlled adjudication which is not accountable via the usual
democratic representative and parliamentary processes."92 All of these comments
appear to suggest, in different contexts, concerns about invisible shifts in public
and private responsibilities for dispute resolution; these are similar to the concerns
which Zander identified in the Hamlyn lectures about the extent to which the
Treasury now defines access to justice in the United Kingdom.93 In this way,
Garland's analysis of "responsabilization" may be linked to broader concerns
relating to access to justice, including concerns about "downloading" of the costs
of criminal justice.94
Garland also identified another aspect of privatization in recent
developments in criminal law: the ways in which greater recognition of victims'
"rights" may contribute to political goals of law and order by individualizing
(privatizing) the victims of crime rather than recognizing "the public" as a whole:
The crime victim is no longer an unfortunate citizen who has been on the
receiving end of a criminal harm, and whose concerns are subsumed
within "the public interest" that guides prosecution and penal decisions.
The victim is now, in a certain sense, a much more representative
character, whose experience is taken to be common and collective, rather
than individual and atypical.... Whoever speaks on behalf of victims
speaks on behalf of us all -or so declares the new political wisdom of high
crime societies.... This vision of the victim as "Everyman" (and above all
"Everywoman") has undermined the older notion of "the public," and has
90 C.B. Harrington, Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutionalization ofAlternatives to Court. (Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1985) at 35.
91 L.M. Friedman, "Access to Justice: Social and Historical Context" in M. Cappelletti &J. Weisner, eds.,
Access to Justice: Promising Institutions, vol. 2 (Milan: Sijthoff and Noordhoff - Alpenaandenrijn, 1978) at
24.
92 M. Cain & K. Kulcsar, "Thinking Disputes: An Essay on the Origins of the Dispute Industry," (1981-82)
16:3 Law and Sotiey Review 375 at 393.
91 Zander supra note 3 at 24.
94 Crawford supra note 10 at 313.
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helped redefine and disaggregate that collective identity. It is no longer
sufficient to subsume the individual victim's experience in the notion of
the public good: the public good must be individuated - broken down
into individual component parts. 5
For Garland, this focus on victims reveals new social trends in our ideas
about crime and insecurity, and a "reworked relationship between the individual
victim, the symbolic victim, and the public institutions that represent their
interests and administer their complaints."9 6 Such a critique raises issues about the
extent to which restorative justice practices may represent privatized notions of
victimization and criminality, and practices which avoid traditional protections for
offenders within a public system for the administration of justice. Without
ignoring the significance of the principles and goals of restorative justice, there is a
need to take account of the ways in which they may be adapted, even transformed,
by state interests in "downloading" the cost of justice to communities and in using
victims to justify increased levels of policing and incarceration.
D. Equality and Social Justice
Traditional accounts of access to justice have linked its fundamental goals
to norms of equality and efforts to achieve social justice, issues which are more
fully explored in chapter 2. However, the relationship between claims about
access to justice and more systemic goals of social justice is also relevant to the
context of a re-assessment of ideas about access and justice. To some extent at
least, a fundamental tenet for those who focus on issues of access to legal
proceedings is the idea of the rule of law. Thus, for example, David Dyzenhaus
argued that the basic normative justification for legal aid flows from the state's
commitment to the rule of law, a commitment which he argued requires more
than protections for "negative liberty".97 Yet, commitment to the rule of law may
not, by itself, achieve substantive justice. As Alan Norrie suggested, particularly
in the criminal law context, adherence to the rule of law may simply reinforce
existing (unequal and perhaps unjust) class relationships:
When it came to developing the law, criminal law was the last area in
which adherence to rational legal principle occurred.... To be sure, where
9 D. Garland, "The Culture of High Crime Societies," (2000) 40 The BritisbJournalof Cuiminologv 347 at 351
[hereinafter Garland 2000].
96 Ibid. at 352.
97 D. Dyzenhaus, "Normative Justifications for the Provision of Legal Aid" in J.D. McCamus, supra note 32
at 475.
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it was a matter of the rights of the middle class and landowners to private
property, the lawyers spoke loud and clear, but when it came to the rights
of those who confronted private property as a limit upon their actual
freedom and social equality, things were different.... [The] rule of (the
criminal) law is primarily a mechanism for protecting the property of
those who possess it from those who do not, and, more generally, of
maintaining a level of social control over those whose position in society
makes them victims at the same time as they victimize others.....8
These views about the rule of law reveal the tensions in traditional
criminal law processes between form and substance in relation to equality goals.
Similarly, in the context of designing priorities for legal aid services, Douglas
Ewart argued that there is a need for lawyers to be aware of the subtle ways in
which offenders may experience multiple forms of discrimination in daily life and
how these experiences shape their effective participation (and substantive access to
justice) in traditional criminal proceedings:
... An example is the situation of black men frequently stopped or
arrested by the police. When faced with a criminal charge, they may not
necessarily need a black lawyer, but they may very well need a lawyer
who, through training or related experience, can appreciate what it is like
to be denied opportunities because of your race, to be part of a frequently
targeted community, to have been frequently stopped and questioned by
the police, and to face a courtroom in which yours in the only black face.
That appreciation is not just helpful to improving client confidence in the
service being provided; it is vital for a variety of "traditional"
purposes......
Although Ewart is focussing on the form of legal representation here - and
the complexity of decisions about access to legal aid services - his comments reveal
how substantive justice concerns may often interact with formal entitlements to
legal representation. At the same time, Ewart's views do not call into question the
fundamental inequality of the criminal justice system in the ways identified by
Norrie. Thus, to the extent that restorative justice practices may relinquish formal
procedural protections, including legal representation, it is important to assess
whether and how they meet goals of substantive social justice. Even assuming that
98 A. Norrie "The Limits of Legal Ideology," in von Hirsch & Ashworth, supra note 28 at 368.
99 D. Ewart, "Hard Caps; Hard Choices: A Systemic Model for Legal Aid," in F.H. Zemans, P.J. Monahan
& A. Thomas, eds., A New LegalAid Plan for Ontario: Background Papers (Toronto: York University
Centre for Public Law and Public Policy, Osgoode Hall Law School, 1997) [hereinafter Zemans,
Monohan & Thomas] at 15.
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such goals are met, however, Norrie's question about whether these procedures
address - or perhaps exacerbate - issues of fundamental inequality may remain."]"
Proponents of restorative justice practices also claim that these processes
empower participants in ways that traditional criminal courts cannot. In this
sense, empowerment per se represents a goal of equality and social justice. A
decade ago, David Trubek identified the "empowered self" as an inherent feature
of alternative dispute resolution for civil claims in the American context;
moreover, he suggested that the rise of ADR processes offered a new and
important critique of earlier ideas of access to justice, ideas which were embedded
within legal liberalism. According to Trubek, the earlier access to justice
movement foundered precisely because there is a "limit to how far one can go in
achieving justice through enhancing what legal reformers call 'access'. '' °  In
looking to alternative dispute resolution practices instead, Trubek argued that it
presented a fundamental questioning of "liberalism's individualistic, rights-based
notion of self-empowerment;" rather, the proponents of alternative forums
envisaged "possibilities for greater community, new sources of law, and a different
understanding of self-empowerment":
For these radical voices, what was wrong with traditional civil procedure
was not just its monetary costs, but the fact that it presumed that the
enforcement of legally defined rights was both necessary and sufficient to
ensure self-empowerment. These radical ADR proponents sought
procedures that would both employ and develop community norms and
values, allow the development of normative agreement through open
dialogue, and be sensitive to the importance of social relationships in the
maintenance and enhancement of self.1
0 2
Whilst recognizing the aspirations of the ADR movement, however,
Trubek concluded that, at least in some cases, traditional legal institutions had
already captured and co-opted the new movement, employing its rhetoric to
relieve court congestion but without making civil justice more accessible "either in
monetary or existential terms. And certainly they have no radical or
100 The National Council of Welfare 1995, supra note 24 at 78, for example, recommended that:
Governments should recognize the strong links which exist between poverty, child abuse and neglect,
unemployment, inequality and crime, and should give their unqualified support to measures which will
correct these problems, such as programs to reduce child poverty and abuse and to provide meaningful
activity, challenge and hope to adolescents and young adults.
101 D.M. Trubek, "Critical Moments In Access to Justice Theory: The Quest For The Empowered Self" in
A.C. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 108.
102 Ihid at 122.
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transformative content."' 3 All the same, he suggested that ADR represented not
just another quest to achieve justice within liberalism, but a tentative effort to
expand our ideas of self and empowerment beyond its intellectual confines.
Yet, the difficult challenge of translating these challenging goals into
concrete action was revealed in empirical research reported by Joel Handler in
relation to client-patient empowerment: in the context of privatized health care, in
community care for the elderly, and in worker safety programmes. These
concrete circumstances demonstrated the complexity of relations of "power" and
"empowerment," and the need to understand empowerment as more than just
participation:
Participation is usually justified in process terms - autonomy, dignity,
and respect. These are values in and of themselves. But I think that
something more is necessary; there have to be substantive benefits from
co-operation - reciprocal, concrete or material incentives. Because the
power relationship is so unequal when dependent people are dealing with
large-scale public agencies, unless there are strong, reciprocal, concrete
incentives, including financial incentives, I don't believe that the
humanistic values of mutual respect, altruism, and professional pride
would be enough to sustain equal moral agency .... 
In the criminal law context, these comments raise important questions for
restorative justice practices, and the extent to which they must be particularly
attentive to issues of substantive equality and social justice in relation to claims
about empowerment.' In a recent assessment of restorative justice and social
justice, for example, John Braithwaite confronted the apparent dichotomy between
them. Recognizing that both offenders and victims in the criminal justice process
are often poor and powerless, Braithwaite argued that "if both victims and
offenders get some restoration out of a restorative justice process, that has
103 Ibid. at 127 (emphasis added).
104 J. Handler, "The Politics of Structure: Decentralization and Empowerment," (1993) 13 Windsor Yearbook
ofAccess to Justice 239 at 262. See alsoJ. Handler, "Dependent People, the State, and the
Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community," (1988) 35 UCLA Law Review 999.
105 Lorraine Berzins has suggested:
First of all, the main question for restorative justice is not whether to put someone in prison or not.
The main question is what justice process and what sentence can best deliver safety and healing for real
people who must ultimately continue to live with each other, by and large, in our various communities
across the country: positive goals for which we need to provide positive tools, an assortment of social,
economic and health services for victims, for offenders, for the ripple effect in their communities ...
not "one size fits all" (Berzins, supra note 80 at 213).
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progressive rather than regressive implications for social justice."' 6  Such
arguments clearly invoke the need to examine carefully how equality and social
justice are defined, and demonstrate the need for empirical research about the
effectiveness in practice of claims about restorative justice practices. For example,
Richard Delgado has suggested that victim-offender mediation (VOM) may "upset
social expectations by casting a wider net of state control than we expect."
10 7
Referring to minor cases which would ordinarily have been dismissed in the
traditional criminal justice system, but which may now receive "full-blown
treatment" under restorative justice practices, Delgado suggested that failure to
make restitution as required might result in higher rates of incarceration for
offenders.' 8
As well, Delgado identified the problem for restorative justice practices:
the absence of potential for social transformation:
No advocate of VOM, to my knowledge, suggests that the middle-class
mediator, the victim, or society at large should feel shame or remorse over
the conditions that led to the offender's predicament. Of course, many
offenders will be antisocial individuals who deserve little solicitude, while
many victims will have well-developed social consciences and empathize
with the plight of the urban poor. But nothing in restorative justice or VOM
encourages this kind of analysis or understanding. In most cases, a vengeful
victim and a middle-class mediator will gang up on a young, minority
offender, exact the expected apology, and negotiate an agreement to pay
back what she has taken from the victim by deducting portions of her
earnings from her minimum-wage job. Little social transformation is likely
to arise from transactions of this sort ... Mediation treats the victim
106 J. Braithwaite, "Restorative Justice and Social Change" (2000) 63 Saskatchewan Law Review 184 at 194
[hereinafter Braithwaite 2000]. Braithwaite also confronted feminist critiques about the use of
restorative justice practices for domestic violence cases, reporting on the positive outcomes revealed in
Joan Pennell's research on family group counselling cases for domestic violence in Newfoundland 0.
Pennell & G. Burford, "Attending to Context: Family Group Decision Making in Canada," in Hudson
et al, eds. Famiy Group Conferences: Perspectives on Poliy and Practice (Annandale: The Federation Press,
1996) at 206.)
Restorative justice advocates [argue] that court processing of family violence cases actually tend to foster a
culture of denial, while restorative justice fosters a culture of apology. Apology, when communicated
with ritual seriousness, is actually the most powerful cultural device for taking a problem seriously,
while denial is a cultural device for dismissing it.... (Braithwaite 2000, ibid. at 189).
For some critiques of "shaming," see T. Massaro, "Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law" (1991) 89
Michigan Law Review 1880; and R. Weisberg, "Criminal Law, Criminology and the Small World of Legal
Scholarship" (1992) 63 University of Colorado Law Review 521.
107 R. Delgado, "Prosecuting Violence: A Colloquy on Race, Community, and Justice," (2000) 52 Stanford
Law Review 750 at 761.
108 Ibid. at 761.
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respectfully, according him the status of an end-in-himself, while the
offender is treated as a thing to be managed, shamed, and conditioned.
Most surveys of VOM programs ask the victim if he felt better afterwards.
By contrast, offenders are merely asked whether they completed their work
order and whether they recidivated. Offenders sense this and play along
with what is desired, while the victim and middle-class mediator participate
in a paroxysm of righteousness. In such a setting, the offender is apt to
grow even more cynical than before and learn what to say the next time to
please the mediator, pacify the victim, and receive the lightest restitution
agreement possible. The offender's cynicism may not just be an intuition; it
may be grounded in reality: Informal dispute resolution is even more likely
to place him at a disadvantage than formal adjudication. 09
In this context, goals of substantive equality and social justice pose hard
questions for restorative justice as well as for traditional processes of criminal
justice in Canada. To what extent can we measure outcomes in terms of
substantive justice? Or, in Zander's words, must we simply accept that "the
concept of justice in legal cases ... is too deep for any research project"? These
questions provide the context and conceptual framework for our discussion of
"needs" and "responses" in the chapters which follow. We return to these
questions in our critique in Chapter V.
II. RE-ASSESSING "NEEDS" IN RELATION TO ACCESS AND JUSTICE
A. Introduction
For anyone trying to explain the historical waves of the "access to justice"
movement by demand factors, the present day policy debate must be a
puzzle. In times of rising unemployment, marginalization of the welfare
population and increasing refugee migration, the "legal needs" of the poor
are clearly growing. Nevertheless, in the very time of growing needs,
welfare spending is coming under pressure including the budgets for legal
aid subsidies. Government spending remains cyclical with the economic
recession where it ought to be anticyclical in order to compensate for
growing poverty."'°
Blankenburg's assessment of the puzzling (lack of) governmental response
to "needs" for access to justice in times of economic recession provides a good
starting point for a re-assessment of approaches to justice, beyond access to the
109 Ibid. at 764.
110 E. Blankenburg, "Private Insurance and the Historical "Waves" of Legal Aid," (1993) 13 Windsor
Yearbook ofAccess to Justice 185 at 201.
Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues Vol. XIII
legal system. As he noted, circumstances such as unemployment, welfare, and
refugee status often result in poverty, and the condition of being poor may well
create legal needs. Yet, while poverty often creates legal needs, it is important to
recognize how the needs of poor clients are seldom congruent with justslegal
needs.""' Interestingly, Blankenburg's concern is with legal aid as a response to
"legal needs;" yet, if legal aid is merely the "first wave" of access to justice
initiatives, as Cappelletti and Garth suggested, it is unlikely to provide a response
which is truly effective." 2 Indeed, as Richard Young and David Wall suggested,
"the present legal aid scheme may not in practice contribute much to social justice,
and may even play a part in perpetuating social injustice.""' 3  Moreover, the
poverty context is complicated; as some studies suggest, current legal aid policies
must take more account of differences within poor communities: "research and
public policies that treat the poverty community as a nondifferentiated
homogeneous population are subject to problematic results." ' 4
In the context of this review of access to justice in the administration of
criminal law, however, Blankenburg's assessment is significant for what it reveals
about the concept of legal "needs": needs which are much more often
conceptualized in the context of civil law, not criminal law. Indeed, it is startling
how many policy studies of "legal needs" seem to focus primarily, or even
exclusively, on ideas about needs for legal services in relation to matters that fall
" S. Wexler, "Practising Law for Poor People" (1970) 79 Yale Lawjournal 1049; S.A.M. Gavigan, "Poverty
Law, Theory, and Practice: The Place of Class and Gender in Access to Justice," in E. Comack, et al,
eds. Poverty Law: Tbeory and Practice. (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999) at 208.
As Gavigan argued, the relationship between legal services and client needs must take account of the extent
to which poverty impacts on all aspects of the lives of poor clients:
To a great many lawyers and legal aid administrators, legal services for the poor mean criminal defence
work, criminal legal aid.... Nevertheless, in its report LegalAid and the Poor, the National Council of
Welfare 1995 (supra note 24 at 9-12) argues that legal aid programs emphasizing criminal legal aid do
not address the legal needs of most poor people, including not incidentally, poor women.... The image
of the poor in these "legal aid" programs becomes blurred and imprecise, and the experience of
poverty becomes abstracted into discrete legal problems or issues. But the lives of poor people do not
lend themselves to simple one-on-one legal solutions. Poverty law lawyers must have and hold onto an
appreciation of the complex and central nature of poverty in the lives of their clients and the need to
acknowledge that the most significant struggles, defeats, and victories in their clients' lives are seldom,
if ever, experienced in the courtroom. When a poverty law lawyer wins a welfare case or a landlord
and tenant case, the best legal result is that the client is still on welfare or is still a tenant. Those
victories are important, but they are hardly "transformative" of the deeper problems of the poor
litigant. The lawyer may win, but the client remains poor (Gavigan at 220-1).
112 Cappelletti & Garth 1978, supra note 8.
13 Young & Wall, supra note 10 at 25.
114 J.W. Meeker, J. Dombrink & E. Schumann, "Attitudes Towards the Legal Profession: The Poor and the
Undocumented" (1996) 6 Windsor Yearbook ofAcess to Justice 141 at 159.
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within the scope of civil law activity. '" As well, while many studies have used
legal categories of claims to assess legal needs, rather than more broadly-based
social indicators of "need,""..6 there is an absence of any discussion in the majority
of these studies about "needs" within the criminal law context. Thus, Johnsen
reported, "civil legal aid appears vulnerable to shifts in both the economy and
political ideology; ... only within criminal legal aid has a broad consensus on
minimum standards developed."" 7 Similarly, Bogart etalexplained in the context
of Ontario's review of legal aid:
Almost all of the studies and the discussion of legal needs in general and
their relevance for legal aid are focused on civil disputes (including, of
course, family issues). Criminal issues almost always receive separate
treatment on a basis that affords those charged with serious criminal
offences highest priority in legal aid schemes. The rationale that has long
been accepted is that being convicted of serious criminal charges can
result in the loss of freedom, the severest sanction."8
Yet, within this consensus about minimum standards for legal aid in
criminal law matters, the fundamental question is whether the provisions of legal
aid actually address "needs" in this context - or whether they simply replicate the
legal categories of the criminal justice process. As Bogart's comment suggests,
policy-makers have tended to assume that "needs" in the criminal justice context
are commensurate with categories of offences and the processes of criminal law
and sentencing. Although the traditional priority accorded to legal aid services for
indigent accused persons is not our primary concern here, there is a need to
examine more carefully the criminal justice context and the "needs" of those who
become involved in it: what are the "needs" of offenders, victims, their families
115 J. Johnsen, "Studies of Legal Needs and Legal Aid in a Market Context" in F. Regan, e/al., eds. The
Transformation of LegalAid (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 205 [hereinafter Johnsen].
Johnsen identfied the legal needs research as vast:
Among the early, well-known studies were Abel-Smith, Zander and Brooke (1973) from the UK; Eskeland
and Finne (1973) from Norway; Messier (1975) from Canada; Cass and Sackville (1975) from Australia;
Schuyt, Gronendijk and Sloot (1976) from the Netherlands; and Curran (1977) from the USA. Among
recent studies are the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study (CLNS) conducted by the American Bar
Association ... and Blacksell, Economides and Watkins (1991) from the UK - although the latter try to
avoid the term 'legal needs' in their analysis.... (ohnsen at 209).
116 M.J. Mossman, "Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid Program in Canada: Exploring the Issues" (1993) 4
Windsor Rev. Leg. & Soc. Isswes I at 17 [hereinafter Mossman 1993]; P. Hanks, SodalIndicalors and the
Delivery of Legal Services, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Services, 1997)
117 Johnsen, supra note 115 at 231.
118 W.A. Bogart, C. Meredith & D. Chandler, "Current Utilization Patterns and Unmet Legal Needs" in
McCamus, supra note 32 at 319.
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and communities, and society at large? Such a question moves beyond the
requirements of legal representation," 9 and even legal aid delivery,' 20 to more
fundamental issues about the criminal justice system. To be sure, there are a few
examples of "legal needs" surveys which do take account of those involved in the
criminal justice system; in New Zealand, for example, needs assessments have
been undertaken in Maori communities to assist in policy-making for
disadvantaged communities in relation to crime and other kinds of legal needs.'2 '
Yet, by focussing close attention on the question of "needs" for those in the
criminal justice system, different kinds of questions emerge. For example,
Barbara Hudson has argued that a focus on "needs" in relation to the sentencing of
offenders raises policy questions about the relevance of "difference," especially for
those who are women and racial minorities:
What is beyond doubt is that responding to difference is the most
challenging of tasks for criminal justice: the ideal of finding a response to
difference which neither represses it, as in the future-oriented strategies
of old-style rehabilitation and new-style incapacitation, nor denies it, as in
oversimplified and unsophisticated proportionality schemes. Whilst
proportionality of penalty to harm is an important element of penal
justice, and whilst fairness and equality of treatment are vitally important
values of law, "justice" involves more than questions of distribution; it
involves moving beyond the "distributive paradigm," towards
acknowledging the demands of alterity, that is to say, of developing
sensitivity to the needs of the "Other," someone who is unlike in
biography and perspective. "Justice" is about recognizing the Other in
her/his individuality and ensuring that what is delivered by law is
appropriate to that individual.'
Such conceptions of criminal justice challenge fundamental issues within
the traditional paradigm of liberal legalism. Moreover, as Trubek argued, the
rigidity of rights-claims in the traditional adversarial system has attracted
considerable criticism; as a result, proponents of restorative justice seek to redefine
the purpose of law as fulfilment of needs rather than protection of rights:.
119 E. Johnson Jr., "Equal Access to justice: Comparing Access to justice in the United States and Other
Industrial Democracies" (2000) 24 Fordham Int/lL J. S83.
120 Ewart, supra note 99.
121 A. Opie & D. Smith, "Needs Assessments: Knowing Disadvantaged Communities" in J. Reilly, J.T.
Jonathan, A.A. Paterson & W.W. Pue, eds., LegalAid in the New Millennium. (Vancouver: Papers
presented at the International Legal Aid Conference, University of British Columbia, 1999) 143.
122 Hludson 1998, supra note 33 at 249.
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A needs-based approach to justice has appeal to many. It seems better
able than legal justice to deal with the complexities of particular conflicts
and to be more responsive to individual concerns. In this sense, it seems
to promise truer or more fundamental self-empowerment than liberal
legalism. 1
Accordingly, as Trubek suggested, a needs-based approach to justice
signalled "not another wave of the quest to achieve justice within liberalism, but
an effort, however tentative, to expand our ideas of self and empowerment."'2 4 In
this way, a focus on individual needs and empowerment has the potential to
achieve individualized justice, by contrast with the emphasis on abstract rights
within liberal legalism. Trubek recognized the vulnerability of these needs-based
justice practices; for example, it is clear that power may be exercised (and even
abused) other than in hierarchical contexts, so that it is necessary to ensure that
participants in restorative justice programmes experience real empowerment, not
merely "the legitimation of their own subjugation or control."'25  Interestingly,
recent poverty law scholarship has similarly focussed on the need to examine
lawyer-client relationships carefully, so as to recognize how the construction of
lawyers' roles may limit client autonomy; or, on the other hand, how poor clients
may sometimes assert "self" and "empowerment" in spite of their lawyers' efforts
to maintain control over the proceedings.'26
In the criminal justice context, some of the implications of these differing
approaches based on "rights" and "needs" were assessed in an exchange between
Daniel Van Ness and Andrew Ashworth in 1993.127 For Van Ness, restorative
justice "seeks to respond to crime at both the macro and the micro level -
addressing the need for building safe communities as well as the need for resolving
123 Trubek, supra note 101 at 125.
124 Ibid at 128.
125 S. Silbey & A. Sarat, "Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to
the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject" (1989) 66:3 Denver U. L Rev. 437 at 457.
126 W.H Simon, "The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in
the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era" (Legal Workshop Series: University of Toronto Faculty of Law,
1995) at 6; L.E. White, "Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the
Hearing of Mrs. G" (1990) 39 Buffalo L Rev. 38.
127 D.W. Van Ness, "New Wine and Old Wineskins: Four Challenges of Restorative Justice" (1993) 4:2
Cim. L Forum 251 [hereinafter Van Ness 1993]; A. Ashworth, "Some Doubts about Restorative
Justice" (1993) 4:2 crim. L Forum 277 [hereinafter Ashworth 1993]; D.W. Van Ness, "A Reply to
Andrew Ashworth" (1993) 4:2 Crim. L Forum 301.
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specific crimes."' 28 Comparing restorative justice programmes to traditional
criminal justice, Van Ness suggestedthat restorative justice:
1. views crime as more than an offence against the state - crime also
causes injuries to victims, the community, and the offender;
2. recognizes that the primary goal of a criminal justice process is to
repair these injuries; and
3. promises a collaborative effort between the state on one hand
and victims, offenders and their communities on the other.'29
As Van Ness explained, "the focus of restorative justice, then, is
intentionally holistic."' 30  In responding to Van Ness, Ashworth's critique
identified the problem of adopting a "harm" basis within criminal law itself. For
Ashworth, the claim that victims have rights to services, such as restitution and
better communication within criminal justice processes, does not necessarily mean
that they should also have procedural rights in the criminal courts. Particularly in
relation to the goal of fairness in sentences among different persons accused of the
same crime, the use of a "harm suffered by the victim" approach may lead to
disparate sentences for the same offence. As well, Ashworth pointed to the
vagueness of the concept of "community harm" in some restorative justice
proposals:
To put the point bluntly, in what sense can restorative justice be applied
to the community? How can the harm to the community be assessed?
What forms of restorative justice should be used? How should their
128 Van Ness 1993, ibid at 253.
129 The distinctions identified by Van Ness between traditional justice and restorative justice have also been
explained in other studies of restorative justice: for example, see Nova Scotia Department ofJustice,
Restorative Justice (Halifax: N.S. Dept. ofJustice, 1998) 2 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Department of
Justice]; and Mark Umbreit, Victim Meets Offender The Impact of Restorative Justice and Mediation (New York:
Criminal Justice Press, 1994) at 3-4 [hereinafter Umbreit 1994]. According to Umbreit, victim-offender
mediation is "the clearest expression of restorative justice," and "represents one of the most creative
efforts to: hold offenders personally accountable for their behavior; emphasize the human impact of
crime; provide opportunities for offenders to take responsibility for their actions by facing their victim
and making amends; promote active victim and community involvement in the justice process; and
enhance the quality of justice experienced by both victims and offenders" (at 5).
130 Van Ness 1993, supra note 131 at 259. Van Ness examined four challenges for restorative justice. He
identified these challenges as 1) the challenge to abolish criminal law (concluding that criminal law
should be maintained for secondary victims, and because it channels retributive emotions in society
and enforces public values); 2) the challenge to rank multiple goals- deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and retribution (concluding that restorative outcomes should be prioritized over
procedural goals); 3) the challenge to determine harm rationally (the need to take account of the
potential inconsistency as a result of differences in victims' experiences of harm); and 4) the challenge
to structure community-government cooperation.
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quantum be assessed? And how does this process differ from that under
a punishment paradigm?.... I find no contradiction in being strongly in
favour of better services and fuller compensation (restitution) for crime
victims, whilst rejecting greater victim participation in the process of
criminal justice and remaining skeptical of many other aspects of
restorative justice.'3
While it is clear that restorative justice proponents view the need for
healing on the part of the offender, the victim and the community - as primary,
more traditional theorists of criminal justice continue to give priority to ideas of
"rights" in criminal procedure and "just deserts" in sentencing. In this context,
there are obviously differing understandings of the "needs" of participants in the
criminal justice system, although these "needs" appear to be more often
determined by reference to abstract principles than by empirical studies.
Similarly, "needs" for legal aid services for accused persons have been defined in
terms of offences in the criminal justice system rather than in relation to accused
persons - that is, "need" means the need for legal representation at different points
of criminal law processes. In such a context, there are undoubtedly many accused
persons, victims, family members and even lawyers who feel a loss of power
within the criminal justice system, so that opportunities for empowerment in
restorative justice processes must appear attractive. At the same time, if we are
serious about pursuing justice, and not merely better access to it, it may be
important to test some of these assertions with empirical research about "needs."
In providing an overview of some of the literature about "needs" in criminal
justice, this chapter examines ideas about needs in relation to areas of criminal
justice where restorative justice practices have been advocated: the "needs" of
aboriginal accused and their communities; the needs of offenders, including young
offenders and those from racial minorities; and the "needs" of victims and
communities.
131 Ashworth, supra note 127 at 294 & 299. In his brief response to Ashworth, Van Ness suggested that "the
major difference between us on this topic is over whether there is actually a need for 'new wine,"'
explaining that Ashworth's commitment to the punishment paradigm is too narrow and fails to
recognize the political context of sentencing policy. Van Ness also asserted that Ashworth -had failed
to recognize the interests of the community, an entity quite different from the state. In their
interchange, Van Ness and Ashworth thus identified a number of key aspects of current debates about
"needs" on the part of those involved in criminal justice processes, by contrast with the "rights-based"
system of traditional criminal justice (Van Ness, ibid.).
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B. Aboriginal "Needs" for Justice: A Need for Aboriginal Justice?
If one follows respect, the conclusion is that no (justice) system is more
valid than the other. But the Euro-Canadian validity is forced upon our
ways. The Euro-Canadians are breaking our laws day in and day out, as
they accuse us of breaking theirs.'32
No one associated with the criminal justice system in Canada can ignore
its impact on aboriginal people. As Carol La Prairie reported, the rate of
incarceration of aboriginal people in some Canadian provinces (especially
Saskatchewan, Alberta and Manitoba) is significantly higher than their proportion
of the population.' 3  Even in provinces such as Ontario, where the rate of
incarceration for aboriginal people is somewhat less dramatic, there are good
reasons to believe that the figures collected by government may underestimate the
numbers of aboriginal people involved with the justice system. As Jonathan Rudin
has argued, individuals usually have to self-identify and produce their status card
or status registration number in order to be included in the statistics; thus, it is
likely that non-status Indians and M~tis may often be excluded from the statistics,
even though their circumstances are similar to aboriginal people who are
included.'34 Beyond the statistics, moreover, it is clear that there is a need to
identify why there are disproportionate numbers of aboriginal people in the
criminal justice system - in order to design appropriate responses.
In his review of legal needs of urban aboriginal people and those on
southern reserves in Ontario, Rudin identified three theories which have been
used to explain the over-representation of aboriginal people in the justice system.
According to Rudin, the "culture-clash" theory is based on the lack of familiarity
of aboriginal people with the system of justice in Canada; thus, there is a need to
assist them to participate in it more effectively. To this end, initiatives such as the
aboriginal courtworker programme, native Justices of the Peace, cross-cultural
training programmes and specialized legal aid services were designed to "assist
Aboriginal persons involved with the law to better understand their rights and the
processes they are involved with."'33  Similarly, as Donald Auger argued, the
justice system must take account of the fact that English (or French) may not be
132 R. Ross, " Restorative Justice: Exploring the Aboriginal Paradigm" (1995) 59 Sask. L Rev. 431 at 432
(quoting an Ojibway Elder) [hereinafter Ross].
133 C. LaPrairie, "Sentencing Aboriginal Offenders: Some Critical Issues" in Roberts & Cole, supra note 10 at
179.
134 Rudin, supra note 55 at 447.
115 Ibid. at 458.
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the first language of most aboriginal accused. Moreover, even with appropriate
court interpreters and glossaries of aboriginal words, the translation of aboriginal
languages to English or French may be difficult because of differing meanings
within cultural contexts:
For example, in the native language there is no way to translate the word
"guilty." In the Ojibwa and Cree language there is a way to say "I did
it," but that has a totally different meaning than saying "I am guilty,"
which would roughly be translated as "I did it and I meant to do it."
Thus the role of the court interpreter is not just interpretation, but also
translation. That is, in addition to getting the client to understand what
the word means in his or her own language, the interpreter must also
provide some translation of what the word means because some of the
words involve whole ideas or sets of ideas and come from a different
philosophical background.... [This creates problems because] there are
not many people ... who can ... translate the meanings of these words for a
person who requires that some translation be provided.'36
As a result of these problems and others, Auger identified aboriginal
people as "the poorest of the pooi' in Ontario, and suggested that their
disproportionate representation in the criminal justice system indicated "a pressing
need for legal services" for them.'
Yet, as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded, these
programmes do not attempt to change the way that the criminal justice system
deals with aboriginal people; they merely attempt to lessen the feelings of
alienation experienced during the interaction.'38 Moreover, as Justice Murray
Sinclair suggested, it may be time to question how the Canadian justice system
deals with aboriginal people: "Perhaps the question should be restated as 'what is
wrong with our justice system that Aboriginal people find it so alienating?")1 39 In
136 D. Auger, "Legal Aid, Aboriginal People, and the Legal Problems faced by Persons of Aboriginal
Descent in Northern Ontario" in McCamus, supra note 32 at 422.
137 Ibid. at 433. Kent Roach also identified the "double disadvantage" of Aboriginal people: being
significantly over represented among both those imprisoned and those victimized by crime. As he
argued "respect for the due-process rights of Aboriginal people is necessary, but it alone will not likely
reduce Aboriginal overrepresentation in prison.... Packer's two models of criminal justice do not offer
much hope for Aboriginal people" [Roach 1999, supra note 24 at 250]. See also Heino Lilles
"Innovations in Aboriginal Justice - Community Justice Update: Yukon" in Healy and Dumont, supra
note 80.
138 Rudin, supra note 55 at 458 [quoting Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide
(Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1996) at 93].
19 Ibid. at 459.
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addition to such critiques, Rudin concluded that the culture-clash theory was not
entirely satisfactory since it did not explain the over-representation in the justice
system of aboriginal people who had lived for many years in urban areas of
Canada. Thus, he concluded that while the theory had some merit, it was not
sufficient on its own to explain the high rate of representation of aboriginal people
in the criminal justice system.
Rudin considered a second explanation: the socio-economic theory.
According to this theory, the over-representation of aboriginal people in the
criminal justice system is directly related to their poverty - that is, the likelihood of
incarceration is greatly increased for those who are poor, and since aboriginal
people are often the poorest of the poor in Canada, 40 they are more likely than
others to be represented in the criminal justice system. Although Carol La Prairie
has suggested that factors such as the relatively higher aboriginal birth rates and
the disproportionate number of aboriginal people currently in the age group most
vulnerable to criminal law intervention also need to be considered, she identified
the socio-economic situation of aboriginal people as a major factor; quoting
Michael Tonry, she argued that:
... group differences in offending patterns are the consequence of
historical experiences and contemporary social and economic
circumstance ... Poverty, disadvantaged childhoods, welfare, educational
deficiencies, and lack of marketable skills are powerfully associated with a
number of social pathologies, including criminality. 4'
Significantly, if poverty is regarded as the explanation for over-
representation on the part of aboriginal people in the justice system, measures such
as culturally-specific justice programming will not respond effectively to these
"needs." La Prairie's concern is that because such indigenization programmes "do
little to address socio-economic marginalization they will not substantively address
problems of over-representation."'42  Instead, initiatives designed to develop
economic self-sufficiency among aboriginal communities, coupled with provision
of legal aid services for aboriginal accused, will be much more effective in
changing the proportion of aboriginal people in the criminal justice system. While
Rudin indicated some agreement with this socio-economic theory to explain the
problems of aboriginal representation in criminal justice processes, he concluded
140 Auger, supra note 136 at 433.
141 La Prairie, supra note 136 at 182 [quoting M. Tonry, "Editorial: Racial Disparities in Courts and Prisons"
(1994) 4 Criminal Behatiour and Mental Health 158].
142 Rudin, supra note 55 at 470.
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that it was ultimately inadequate because it could not explain why aboriginal
people are so poor - indeed, in the words of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, why aboriginal people are "poor beyond poverty."
For Rudin, a third theory was most persuasive: the theory that colonial
policies of assimilation in Canada destroyed the lives of thousands upon thousands
of aboriginal people. Pointing to the Report of the AboriyinalJustice Inquiry of
Manitoba, Rudin argued that "... the relatively higher rates of crime among
Aboriginal people are a result of the despair, dependency, anger, frustration and
sense of injustice prevalent in Aboriginal communities, stemming from the
cultural and community breakdown that has occurred over the past century. 143
Rudin agreed with the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples that the colonial legacy must be taken into account in designing
interventions which can substantially affect the relationship between aboriginal
peoples and the criminal justice system:
While not ignoring the impact of the culture-clash between Aboriginal
and non-Aboriginal society nor the socio-economic realities confronting
Aboriginal people, this report agrees with the conclusions of others before
it, that the experience of colonialism best explains Aboriginal over-
representation.... Without taking away the need for programs that
provide Aboriginal people with assistance in dealing with the court
system, both through courtworkers and counsel, it is hard to see how
reliance on a legal system that is rooted in the colonial system that has led
to the problems faced by Aboriginal people can lead to real change.'"
Thus, in assessing the "needs" of aboriginal accused in the criminal justice
system, and the appropriateness of different kinds of interventions, these theories
or explanations for the current over-representation are critical. If socio-economic
factors affect the rate of aboriginal involvement in the criminal justice system, then
many of the "needs" of aboriginal accused require a focus on the reasons for their
impoverishment. If colonial heritage is the explanation for over-representation of
aboriginal accused in the criminal justice system (perhaps in addition to other
14. Ibid. at 462 [quoting Report of the AboriginalJusice lnquiy of Manitoba (Winnipeg: Government of
Manitoba., 1991) I & 911.
144 Rudin, supra note 55 at 463. According to Judge Murray Sinclair, "the primary meaning of 'justice' in an
Aboriginal society would be that of restoring peace and equilibrium to the community through
reconciling the accused with his or her own conscience and with the individual or family that is
wronged" [M. Sinclair, "Aboriginal People, Justice and the Law" in R. Gosse, J.Y. Henderson, & R.
Carter, eds., Continuing Poundmaker's and Riel's Quest: Presentations Made at a Conference on Aborginal Peoples
and Justice (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing and College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, 1994) at
1781.
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explanations), different "needs" must be met: very likely, "needs" for an
indigenous justice system. In this context, La Prairie has drawn attention to the
need for much better data in Canada, similar to that now collected in other
western countries, in order to be able to assess whether policies respond to the
issues precisely.'45
However, as the literature about Aboriginal people and criminal justice
reveals, a more fundamental "need" has been frequently identified in relation to
aboriginal communities: a need for recognition of their own justice system. As
Auger suggested, such a need does not mean that aboriginal communities would
need to establish their own system: "they merely need to have the existing system
that is already there to be recognized by mainstream society." Such recognition of
aboriginal justice systems would go beyond "diversion programs where Indian
people are allowed to participate in sentencing panels but not in the determination
of guilt and certainly not in determining what the system should look like and
what the laws should be within the community."'46 Similarly, Roach suggested
that recognition of Aboriginal justice could reduce "both incarceration and
victimization" of Aboriginal people:
The holistic approach of Aboriginal justice both promises prevention in
the future and recognizes the need to address past abuses suffered by
offenders and victims. Aboriginal people have been frequently and
grievously harmed by the failures of due process and crime control, but
their own traditions and circle healing initiatives offer the most developed
and inspiring alternative to the linear processes of the due-process
obstacle course and the crime-control assembly line.'47
Others have also criticized traditional processes of criminal justice for
Aboriginal people. As Daniel Kwochka explained, the process of sentencing in
Canada's criminal justice system does not accord with fundamental values of
aboriginal communities and aboriginal justice. As he says, Aboriginals view the
sentencing process as:
(1) based on a foreign goal of punishment, instead of upon the aboriginal
goals of restoration and rehabilitation;
(2) conducted in an improperly adversarial fashion, with sides being
taken, hard-line positions being entrenched, helpful witnesses being
145 La Prairie, supra note 136 at 184.
146 Auger, supra note 136 at 420.
147 Roach 1999, supra note 24 at 251.
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challenged as liars, and the accused being treated as an adversary of his
own community;
(3) based on the belief that a sentence which is imposed by uninvolved,
third-party strangers to the group can be effective, contrary to an
aboriginal belief that solutions must be proposed by all of the affected
parties if they are to have any chance of being carried out by them; and
(4) focused too narrowly on events, when the real issues centre on the
quality of relationships which surround all the effective parties. 
1 48
Kwochka's analysis is similar to those of the Ojibway Elder quoted at the
outset: there is a need for aboriginal justice processes to replace the criminal justice
system. In the past decade or so, there have been a number of initiatives in
Canadian courts to support the need for specialized sentencing processes,
respectful of aboriginal culture;'4 9 as well, it has been suggested that the decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Gladue"' (which confirmed the
interpretation of section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code) "has brought the notion of
healing into the mainstream as a principle that a judge must weigh in every case
involving an Aboriginal person in order to build a bridge between their unique
personal and community experiences and criminal justice.""' In such a context,
the "needs" of the offender in relation to sentencing have been defined explicitly in
accordance with aboriginal culture.
Beyond a focus on sentencing per se, Rupert Ross has recommended a
comprehensive process of aboriginal justice: that is, using aboriginal justice
processes to fully replace the system of criminal justice for aboriginal people.
According to Ross, aboriginal justice has seven important aspects, all of which
differ significantly from those of the criminal justice system:
1. the involvement of all the people who operate in relationships,
not just individual offenders;
148 D. Kwochka, "Aboriginal Injustice: Making Room for a Restorative Paradigm" (1996) 60 Saskatchewan
Law Review 153 at 160 [hereinafter Kwochka]..
149 Stuart 1996, supra note 69 at 193.
150 (1999), 23 CR (5th) 197, 133 CCC (3d) 385, [1999] 1 SCR 688. According to Turpel-Lafond, the decision
in R v. Gladue creates an obligation for the judge, but this responsibility can be discharged only "if
counsel and the supporting agencies in the criminal justice system, such as probation and youth
services, assist the court by providing a full picture of the circumstances of the defendant and the
offence" [M.E. Turpel-Lafond, "Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural
Implications ofR v. Gladue" (1999) 43 Crim. L.Q. 34 at 37].
151 Turpel-Lafond, ibid. at 35.
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2. a recognition that people need help to deal with their incapacities
and to learn skills to avoid future problems, rather than an
emphasis on "choice";
3. a focus on disharmonies in relationships which lead to
inappropriate actions, not just a focus on the actions themselves;
4. a structure which reduces, rather than escalates, tensions (unlike
the adversary system which may increase hostilities);
5. a commitment to convincing people that they are more than
their antisocial actions and to overcoming alienation, rather than
labelling and stigmatizing them;
6. a need to bring the offender to a felt awareness of the impact of
his or her actions on others, to understand the consequences of
the actions, rather than simply providing restitution; and
7. a reliance on people who are connected, rather than on
professional experts. " 2
As is evident, these recommendations are not simply designed to reduce
alienation for aboriginal people in the Canadian justice system. Instead, they
recognize a "need" on the part of aboriginal people to be judged within their own
culture and system of justice. Such a model clearly responds to a felt need on the
part of aboriginal people to return to their own justice systems, abandoning the
idea that traditional criminal justice processes are appropriate for meeting their
needs. In such a context, there would no longer be "culture clash" since aboriginal
people would no longer be involved in the traditional criminal justice system; at
the same time, it is unclear what would be the continuing impact of socio-
economic problems for aboriginal justice processes. In this way, different
understandings of the reasons for over-representation of aboriginal people in the
current justice system impact on choices about appropriate strategies for
confronting this problem. Reflecting the view that aboriginal justice is the
appropriate strategy overall, Griffiths and Hamilton concluded that:
Criminal behaviour is often only a symptom of deeper community and
individual ills.... Aboriginal-controlled justice programs and services,
premised on Aboriginal culture and traditional practices, hold great
promise and can provide models that may be utilized by non-Aboriginal
communities as the search for more effective criminal justice strategies
intensifies.'53
152 Ross, supra note 132 at 432.
153 C.T. Griffiths, C. Taylor & R. Hamilton, "Sanctioning and Healing: Restorative Justice in Canadian
Aboriginal Communities" in Galaway and Hudson, supra note 47 at 189 [hereinafter Griffiths, Taylor &
Hamilton].
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In assessing one example of aboriginal justice, Phil Lancaster suggested a
need for resources to be provided to aboriginal communities for justice initiatives,
and that aboriginal communities should have discretion in the use of funds and in
the distribution of specific justice roles: "Rather than providing funds for police,
probation workers, child and family service workers, courts, judges and others,
funding might be more effectively spent by developing a holistic approach based
on custom to work in the community and with the outside justice institutions.""'
In addition to this literature supporting a general recognition of aboriginal
justice, there are some studies which focus on "needs" in terms of particular kinds
of criminal activity. In particular, there are recent studies about the needs of
aboriginal women in the context of wife abuse and sexual assault. While extolling
the virtues of restorative justice in a number of programmes across Canada, Curt
Taylor Griffiths also noted some critical issues surrounding the involvement of
victims in community justice initiatives."' Significantly, he reported on a 1998
study showing the exclusion or minimization of crime victims in a Winnipeg
project; at the same time, he identified an evaluation of the Hollow Water
programme, also in Manitoba, in which victims seem to have felt "pressured to
have the case heard by the community program rather than in criminal court;
[concerned at] receiving too little information about the process to be followed;
and a lack of support from the community."'' 6 Griffiths also specifically drew
attention to the "competing and conflicting goals in community justice" and the
difficulty of achieving community consensus, quoting the concerns expressed by
La Prairie:
On the one hand, community justice is about autonomy, empowerment,
and control. On the other hand, community justice is about tradition,
and, in contemporary terms, about 'healing' and the transformation of
communities into healthier states of being. The reality, however, is that
the primary goal of community justice is the exercise of social control, the
use of surveillance, and the dispensing of 'justice,' which may or may not
involve punishment ... the potential for community justice to divide
rather than unite people, particularly where communities are small in size
and geographically isolated, is great."'
154 P. Lancaster, "Omaninomowayak: Anishinaabe Justice in Muskrat Dam First Nation" (1994) 14 Windsor
Yearbook ofAccess to Justice 331 at 349.
155 Griffiths, Taylor & Hamilton, supra note 153 at 292 ft.
156 Ibid. at 293.
157 Ibid at 293 (quoting La Prairie, supra note 136 at 127).
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In this context, there have been other expressions of concern about
aboriginal community justice in the context of wife assault; according to Evelyn
Zellerer, "when gender and culture are considered in terms of the responses to
wife abuse, difficult challenges are raised."'' 8  In her study of community
members' perceptions of wife abuse in the Baffin region, including their views
about appropriate strategies for intervention in a community justice context, she
identified several key areas of concern, including recognition (or the lack of
recognition) of family violence as a priority among aboriginal leaders. As she
noted, the Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry in Manitoba concluded that
aboriginal chiefs and councils, as well as aboriginal government leaders, had failed
to deal with issues of domestic abuse.'59 As well, she pointed out the need to take
account of "needs" of victims, as well as of offenders, in community justice; and of
the impact of power relationships within communities: "Care must be taken to
ensure that family networks and power structures do not perpetuate the
victimization of women."'60  Zellerer also expressed concern about conflicts
inherent in traditions of respect for aboriginal elders, when elders do not take wife
abuse seriously enough, as well as the ways in which aboriginal cultural values
might diminish the significance of wife abuse:
Cultural prescriptions against interference and confrontation have
important implications for responses to violence. The data from this
study suggest that Inuit feel uncomfortable participating in a process that
involves community residents passing judgment in a public forum on
another resident. This may hinder the ability of community residents to
mediate and resolve disputes in their own communities and may increase
women's vulnerability. It may mean that an entirely different approach
to crime will be created or recreated from traditional times, one obviously
different from the criminal justice system but perhaps also one different
from our current conceptions of restorative justice.16
Similar concerns were identified by Griffiths and Hamilton, who
suggested that communities might be unwilling to assume responsibility for
offences involving sexual assault and violence, having regard to the needs of the
158 E. Zellerer, "Restorative Justice in Indigenous Communities: Critical Issues in Confronting Violence
Against Women" (1999) 6 Int'l Rev. Viiimology 345 at 345.
159 Ibid at 349.
160 Ibid. at 351. As Roach 1999, spra note 24 at 272 also explained, "stated in the abstract, the conflict
between Aboriginal justice and crime control is great.... Aboriginal-justice initiatives that took on cases
of serious crimes, especially sexual assaults, were vulnerable to public criticism that they did not take
crime seriously enough."
161 Zellerer, ibid at 354.
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offenders and victims, but also the needs of the community. As they concluded,
"Caution must be exercised in expecting or assuming that communities have the
interest and/or expertise to respond, treat and control offenders convicted of acts
involving violence and sexual assault."'62  Interestingly, Jean Lash similarly
criticized the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Gladue for its failure to recognize
the accused as an aboriginal woman, and the victim of wife abuse. 63  In such a
context, the needs of aboriginal women may be equally ignored by both the
traditional criminal justice system as well as in restorative and community justice
initiatives. Thus, while there may be substantial consensus that the "needs" of
aboriginal accused can be met more effectively within a holistic aboriginal justice
system,'64 the "needs"of victims of violence may require careful attention to
underlying values within traditional processes of aboriginal justice.
C. The "Needs" of Offenders in Criminal Justice Processes
The conclusion of those who have studied our criminal justice system is
that it discriminates against the poor and harms as many people as it
helps. Instead of developing effective ways of dealing with conflicts
within our families, our schools and our communities, we dump all our
disadvantaged social misfits into the criminal justice system, where they
are repeatedly warehoused and then thrown back into the street. Instead
of dealing wisely with the near-universal tendency of adolescents
(especially boys) to commit minor criminal offences, we arrest thousands
of low-income young men and lock them up with experienced criminals
who give them advanced lessons in crime. The Canadian criminal justice
system is not only unjust but also an abysmal failure that pushes young
people into crime instead of helping them to stay out of it.'
162 Griffiths, Taylor & Hamilton, supra note 153 at 188.
163 Quoting from the report of Justice Ratushny on the pressures which may force a woman to plead guilty
to a charge of manslaughter when she has killed her abusing male partner, Lash concluded that Gladue
is not sufficiently responsive to the needs of aboriginal women accused in the context of wife abuse. J.
Lash, "Case Comment: R v. Gladue" (2000) 20:3 Canadian Woman Studies 85 [hereinafter Lash].
164 Ibid. at 85. See also Heino Lilies' comments that there have been quite a few community justice initiatives
in Canada, but the great majority have "withered on the vine" for lack of support; since there is "very
little hard information as to how well these initiatives did, as compared to the formal justice system,"
there is a need for proper evaluation: evaluation which can compare "the results with what the formal
justice system would achieve with similar cases" [H. Lilies, "Innovations in Aboriginal Justice -
Community Justice Update: Yukon" in Healy and Dumont, supra note 80 at 246].
165 National Council of Welfare 1995, supra note 24 at 3. In the context of its brief on the issue of mandatory
minimum sentences, the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies stated that "Aboriginal
people, other racialized people, and poor people face a criminal justice system in which discretion is
exercised to their disadvantage at every turn, from the investigatory and charge stage by police, to the
prosecutorial decisions made by Crown attorneys, to the trial and sentence decisions by judges, to the
penal practices, including discipline of prison authorities, through to the parole determinations made
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In its detailed report on issues about policing, bail decisions (including
conditional releases), and sentencing, the National Council of Welfare (NCW)
identified how neutral principles work to effect discriminatory treatment for
accused persons who are poor, and especially for visible minorities who are poor.
At the outset, the NCW's report, Justice and the Poor, suggested that studies
about the propensity for committing crimes remain inconclusive; although some
early studies linked socio-economic background to criminal actions (people from
poor neighbourhoods were more likely to commit crimes), the NCW report
identified two recent Ontario studies which found that money worries played only
a minor role in relation to criminal activity. The studies examined family
characteristics of incarcerated adolescents and found that the most prominent
factors were "physical abuse between the parents and toward the children, family
breakdown with estranged fathers, and excessive drinking by the parents and the
children."'66 Other studies have revealed connections between crime and
unemployment; "kin-based job networks" (family connections which allowed
adolescents to find jobs and build legitimate careers) were identified as "a crucial
factor distinguishing young delinquents who later reformed from those who
continued to commit crimes into adulthood."'67 As well, youth who live on the
street are more likely to be involved in criminal actions because street culture is
often conducive to committing crimes; at the same time, it appears to be significant
that large numbers of young people who end up on the street come from broken
families and have histories of abuse by their parents or foster parents. As Hagan
concluded, "many children abused and neglected by their families are forced out
on the streets where they are then abused by our legal system."'68
In such a context, questions about the needs of those involved in criminal
activity must take account of the broader circumstances of their lives. The studies
suggest that large numbers of young people, especially young men, may engage in
activities which violate the law, and many of them are likely to have little familial
support - and even a history of past familial abuse - as well as no job or much
by the parole board": see Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, Reforming Criminal Code
Defences: Provocation, Self Defence and Defence of Property (Ottawa: CAEFS, 1999) at 9.
166 National Council of Welfare 1995, ibid. at 7 (quoting studies by T.P.M. Ulzen & H. Hamilton, "The
Nature and Characteristics of Psychiatric Comorbidity in Incarcerated Adolescents," (1998) 43 Can. J.
Psychiatry 59; J. Shamsie, H. Hamilton & C. Sykes, "The Characteristics and Intervention Histories of
Incarcerated and Conduct-Disoriented Youth" (1996) 41 Can. J. Prychiatty 213.
167 National Council of Welfare 1995, ibid. at 7 [quoting J. Hagan, "The Social Embeddedness of Crime and
Unemployment" (1993) 31 Ciminolog 4711.
168 National Council of Welfare 1995, ibid. at 9 [quotingJ. Hagan & B. McCarthy "Double Jeopardy: The
Abuse of Punishment of Homeless Youth" in G. Bridges & M. Myers, eds. (Inequalioy, Crime and Social
Control San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994)].
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prospect of obtaining employment. Arguably, their needs include social supports
in terms of education and employment opportunities and a chance to build
trusting relationships. Indeed, as the NCW report noted, lack of employment may
affect an offender's eligibility for bail and their sentence if convicted; and the fact
of a criminal conviction may well affect their subsequent ability to find
employment. In such a context, it is not difficult to conclude that the traditional
criminal justice system may not respond appropriately to the "needs" of the
accused, and that other alternatives which can look at the whole person, not just
the isolated criminal act, may offer more to the accused and perhaps also to the
community. Instead of the usual response of the criminal justice system: arrest, a
bail hearing, and a guilty plea or finding of guilt, and sentencing (including
possibly incarceration), responses may be tailored to the more fundamental
"needs" of the accused.'69 After examining the exercise of police discretion,
decision-making in bail hearings, and sentencing, Justice and the Poor concluded
that there was evidence that poverty systematically disadvantages accused persons
in the traditional criminal justice system. In such a context, it is at least arguable
that restorative justice practices may ameliorate some of these problems, an issue
which is addressed more fully in chapter 3. In relation to proposals for replacing
traditional criminal justice with restorative justice programmes, however, there are
three general issues which are addressed here.
The first issue is the differential enforcement of youth and street crime on
one hand, and white-collar crime on the other. As the National Council of
Welfare reported, white-collar crime is committed primarily by persons with good
educations and good jobs: tax fraud, embezzlement, securities and antitrust
violations, and criminal negligence arising out of violations of occupational health
and safety provisions. White-collar criminals "are responsible for more deaths and
169 Griffiths, Taylor & Hamilton, supra note 153. In one such situation, for example, a man with a record of
youth and adult convictions for assault and break and enter was once again charged with break, enter
and theft. The Crown Attorney wanted a period of incarceration. Instead, the case was handled by a
restorative justice programme, which recommended: a suspended sentence, with supervision to be
carried out by the restorative justice programme; completion of an Interpersonal Communication Skills
Course; completion of an Addictions Foundation of Manitoba assessment and regular attendance at
Alcoholics Anonymous; the completion of conditions as outlined in the mediation agreement; and
literacy training. The plan was accepted by the judge (Griffiths, Taylor & Hamilton, ibid. at 281). This
example shows how the plan adopted by the restorative justice process attempted to respond to the
"needs" of the accused, needs which were arguably much more complex than just the criminal charges
he faced. Although the accused was 32 years old at the time, his record of offending as both a youth
and an adult revealed a pattern of criminal activity, warranting more and more serious responses within
the criminal justice system. By thus "diverting" this case from the court docket, it is arguable that both
the accused and the community benefitted more than by sending the accused to jail; moreover, the cost
of incarceration was also avoided; in this way, restorative justices practices appear to offer considerable
scope for responding to the "needs" of accused persons and communities.
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steal much more money than the poor, but are seldom called criminals and are
seldom condemned by a society in which many people believe that 'greed is
good."' 7 In addition, because poor people are less likely to be able to pay fines,
they are more likely to be imprisoned for non-payment of fines than middle-class
Canadians. In recommending a principle of "equality" for the criminal justice
system, therefore, the National Council of Welfare suggested that the impact of
the criminal justice system should be substantially the same, "regardless of ...
gender, age, race, sexual orientation, national or ethnic origin, religion,
employment or family status, income, social class, physical or mental disabilities or
place of residence within Canada."' 7 ' In particular, the NCW report
recommended the adoption of the system of "day-fines" in which the amount of a
fine is determined by a combination of the seriousness of the offence and the
income available to the accused.' The study also recommended equality of
treatment for white-collar criminals. In exploring how executives who foster life-
threatening working conditions are not so different from bank robbers who panic
and kill someone, and rich men cheating on their income tax are not so different
from poor mothers who cheat the welfare department, justice and the Poor quoted
a story told by Roland Penner, former Attorney-General of Manitoba:
Let's suppose I became philosopher-king and I could make any changes I
wanted. Suppose I decided that minor social control offences and crimes
without victims were to be eliminated from the Criminal Code. Also
suppose that minor property offenders were to be dealt with in the
community rather than in jails. At the same time suppose that I made tax
evasion, knowingly polluting the environment, false advertising,
fraudulent bankruptcy, and price-fixing crimes which carried automatic
jail terms. Now, let's introduce the proverbial "man from Mars" who
always gets into stories like this one. He arrives and I take him on a tour
of (the provincial jail near Winnipeg). What would he say? "You sure
have a problem with your middle-class White people, don't you?'
l 73
Penner's story underlines how the definition of criminal activity, as well as
policies about enforcement - including issues of differential enforcement in
170 National Council of Welfare, "Justice and the Poor" (Ottawa:National Council of Welfare, 2000) at 11
[hereinafter National Council of Welfare 2000],quotingj. Braithwaite, "Poverty, Power, and White-
Collar Crime" in K. Schlegel & D. Weisburd, eds. Wlhie-Collar Crime Reconsidered (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1992) at 82.
17' National Council of Welfare 2000, ibid. at 103.
172 Ibid. at 115.
13 Ibid. at 27 [quoting J. Harp &J. R. Hofley, eds., Structured Inequaliy in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall
of Canada, 1980)].
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relation to the poor - may have dramatic implications for how we define the
problems of offenders in the criminal justice system. In this way, it is important
for both traditional criminal justice processes as well as restorative justice
initiatives to take into account this broader policy context.
The second issue is the connection between "needs" of accused persons
and the definition of criminal activity itself. Before deciding that the most
appropriate response to criminal activity is restorative justice, it may be important
to determine whether there are too many activities which are currently labelled
"criminal." As Ron Levi argued, "often as a result of zero tolerance policies and
other 'get tough' measures, youth are brought before the criminal justice system
for activity that can often be dealt with otherwise."'74 The NCW also noted the
relationship between the number of police officers and population figures in
different communities: increasing the number of police in some communities
resulted in immediate "crime waves."'' Similarly, the NCW report suggested
that legislation such as Ontario's Safe Streets Act,'76 and city bylaws which limit
the activities of beggars, may increase the numbers of accused persons charged
with criminal offences. Indeed, in its 1995 study of legal aid, the National Council
of Welfare noted the impact of several offences related to activities which are
proscribed in public, "including drinking on the street,... shouting, swearing,
loitering and being obnoxiously drunk":
Such laws have a much greater impact on the poor, some of whom are
homeless and many of whom spend a great deal of time on the street or in
other public places to stay out of their overcrowded homes. In Canada in
1992, these laws were used to lay more than 100,000 charges against men
and over 10,000 against women, reminding us of the famous saying: "The
law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets
174 R. Levi, "The Provision of Legal Aid Services Under the Young Offenders Act' in McCamus, supra note 32
at 758 [hereinafter Levi].
175 As Roach 1999, supra note 24 at 264 argued, "the under-policing thesis should be approached with
caution. Mary Hyde has suggested that 'the dependency of native communities on police for services,
not otherwise available on reserves, results in high police to population ratios, increases the likelihood
of police interventions and 'criminalizes' behaviour that Would not otherwise be criminal if other
agencies were involved.' Adding more police may only increase Aboriginal overrepresentation in
prison."
176 The Safe Streets Act provides for a fine of up to $500.00 for the first offence, and a fine of up to $1000.00
or up to 6 months in prison or both for the second offence.
177 National Council of Welfare 1995, supra note 24 at 6.
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Thus, in determining how to respond to the "needs" of criminal accused,
particularly those who are young and poor, it is possible to consider restorative
justice practices as alternatives to the traditional criminal justice system.
However, it is arguably just as important to re-examine the kinds of activities
which are labelled "criminal" to determine whether de-criminalization of some
activities might alleviate the need for a criminal justice system response altogether.
In this context, one of the guiding principles for criminal justice proposed by
Justice and the Poor was "restraint," the idea that the justice system should refrain
from intervention.' Of course, there may still be a need for better supports for
offenders, especially youth, whose family and employment situations impact on
their ability to achieve independence effectively. The fundamental question is
whether labelling their activities (and these accused) "criminal" is the most
effective way to achieve these goals. Another way of looking at this question is to
ask to what extent community resources which were once available to assist young
people, and which were withdrawn in the 1990's, are now being redeployed
(perhaps only partially) to restorative justice programmes as a result of the change
in definitions of criminal activity.
In this context as well, it may be important to take account of a third issue:
the characteristics of offenders, including gender and race. As Maureen Cain and
others have suggested:
"[The] most consistent and dramatic findings from Lombroso to post-
modern criminology is not that most criminals are working-class ... but
that most criminals are, and always have been, men. Instead of asking
how the maleness of men connects with this result, ... we ask why women
do not offend, as if even the criminogenic properties of maleness were
normal compared with the cheerful and resigned conformity of women.
This is because the criminological gaze cannot see gender; the
criminological discourse cannot speak men and women. 79
Although the rate of criminal activity for women remains lower than that
for men, there is some evidence that the number of women offenders has increased
in the United States. In a 1998 report, for example, concern was expressed about
178 "Every Canadian report on the criminal justice system ... emphasized the importance of restraint. In its
broadest sense, restraint implies a) that the criminal justice system should not interfere in people's lives
unless intervention is necessary to protect other people from harm; and b) that the justice system
should not be used to accomplish tasks that would be better done by other institutions...." (National
Council of Welfare 1995, ibid. at 103).
179 M. Cain, ed., Growing Up Good (London: Sage, 1989) [as quoted in S. Walidate, Gender and Crime: An
Introducion (London: Prentice Hall, 1995) at 20-21.
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the increased number of women offenders and the failure to meet their "needs" in
the American legal system and especially in prisons:
Evidence shows that greater emphasis should be placed on the concerns
of and programs for adult female offenders. In 1995, more women were
arrested, convicted, and sent to prison than ever before; female offenders
made up 6.3 percent of the state and federal prison populations, an
increase from 3.8 in 1975. The nature of the crimes women are convicted
for today has also changed. In 1975, women were most likely to be
incarcerated for crimes such as larceny, forgery, embezzlement, and
prostitution. In 1995, an increasing percentage of women were sentenced
to prison for drug offenses. Unfortunately, this increase in the number of
female offenders has not been matched by enhanced attention to
specialized programs geared particularly for women.... This is especially
true in light of the criminal justice system's recent adoption of a more
punitive philosophy. 80
The National Institute of Justice's report included similar concerns about
female juvenile offenders, concluding that "girls are still seriously neglected by the
juvenile justice system."'"' Although there appears to be little analysis of
differences between young women and young men who are in trouble with the
criminal law in Canada, there have been some suggestions that restorative justice
interventions may need to be designed to meet the specific "needs" of young
women offenders.'82
According to Dianne Martin, female offenders in Canada are broadly
typical of female prisoners throughout the western world: they are "generally
poor, young, white, single mothers with few, if any, previous convictions": they
are involved in minor crimes such as shoplifting, prostitution, and drug-related
offences. As well, "the majority are also survivors of violence."'8 3  As Martin
noted, a substantial proportion of women offenders are also poor; indeed, she
characterized welfare fraud as "a woman's crime:"
180 National Institute ofJustice Women and Cn'ina/Justice - A Twenty-Year Update.- Special Report (Rockville,
MD: National Institute ofJustice, 1998) at vii [hereinafter National Institute ofJustice].
181 Ibid. at viii.
182 C.L.O. Pepi, "Children without Childhoods: A Feminist Intervention Strategy Utilizing Systems Theory
and Restorative Justice in Treating Female Adolescent Offenders" (1998) 20:4 Women and Therapy 85 at
85.
183 Physical or sexual abuse, or both. [D.L. Martin, "Punishing Female Offenders and Perpetuating Gender
Stereotypes" in Roberts & Cole supra note 10 at 190).
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There are many reasons for this situation. The increase in the need for
social assistance caused by the recent recession has been accompanied by
the usual increase in resentment expressed toward recipients. This
resentment translates into support for harsh punishment for those who
break the rules, even where the offence is motivated by "need not greed,"
and where poverty and privation have compelled a recipient to fail to
disclose the contributions of a boyfriend or the extent of part-time
employment earnings. In these difficult cases, pitiful and understandable
circumstances seem to cry out for mercy, but the mercy received is often
minimal and a jail sentence is a real risk. 4
Martin's analysis is confirmed by the statistics of persons charged for 1994.
Although 55% of persons charged with prostitution were women, the percentages
of women charged for other offences were relatively small, except for the offences
of fraud (30%) and theft under $1000 (33%)."8 Thus, it appears that female
offenders in the justice system may have needs because of their poverty, as well as
because of their experiences of violence and abuse in the past.
Moreover, as the findings of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the
Ontario Criminal Justice System demonstrated, there are also problems for
offenders who are members of racial minorities in Canada. As the Commission
concluded:
The Criminal justice system operates through a series of highly
discretionary decision making stages. Discretion is exercised in subtle,
complex and interactive ways, which leave considerable scope for
racialization to influence practices and decisions, and for bias to be
transmitted from one stage of the process to others." 6
The Commission's data revealed that there was significant over-
representation of Blacks among accused in the Ontario criminal justice system.'87
184 Ibid. at 193.
185 Ibid. [quoting from Commission of Inquiy into Certain Events at the Kingston Prison for Women (Ottawa: Public
Works and Government Services Canada, 1996) at 205].
186 Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System, Report of the Commission on
Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1995) at 105.
187 As Roach indicated:
Over-representation is clear and stark. Black people account for 15% of prison admissions in Ontario,
but only 3% of the province's population. The white adult admission rate to Ontario Prisons in
1992/93 was 706 per 100,000 while the Aboriginal and black admission rates were 1993 and 3686
respectively. The majority of the black, but not the Aboriginal, admission rate consists of unsentenced
remand prisoners who have been denied bail.... The inquiry explains dramatic over-representation of
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As Frances Henry suggested, the Commission's report provided excellent research
data to explain this overrepresentation of Black accused in prison - the result of the
impact of imprisonment before trial, and the "differential treatment with respect
to bail and other pre-trial measures" for Black accused. 8 ' In her review of the
Commission's findings and conclusions, Toni Williams also emphasized how it is
necessary to examine all stages of the criminal justice process to assess whether,
and in what ways, racism affects decision-making about Black offenders. As she
concluded in relation to theories about sentencing, moreover, it is possible that
"cultural beliefs and assumptions about black people may implicitly shape judges'
assessments of the individuals before them ... [especially when] judges are asked to
assess intangible factors such as the attitude or personality of a convicted
person."189
In the context of such data, it is not surprising to find research which
reveals that "members of many racial and ethnic minorities [in Canada] have
strong perceptions that they are discriminated against by the criminal justice
system."' 90 Moreover, as Etherington suggested, there is a need to examine how
discretion is exercised by prosecutors, and to develop guidelines to structure it,
"including a directive that race or ethnicity not be a consideration in initiating plea
discussions or in reaching a plea agreement."' 9' In reviewing a range of reports
about discrimination in the justice system, Etherington reported a degree of
consensus about measures to address these problems.'92 However, he suggested as
black people in Ontario's prisons by social and economic inequality and by differential enforcement
within the criminal process, K. Roach, "Systemic Racism and Criminal Justice Policy" (1996) 15
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 236 at 239 [hereinafter Roach 1996].
188 F. Henry, "Review of the Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario CriminalJustice
System" (1996) 15 Windsor Yearbook of Access toJnstice 230 at 231.
189 T. Williams, "Sentencing Black Offenders in the Ontario Criminal Justice System" in Roberts & Cole,
supra note 10 at 214.
190 Etherington supra note 18 at x.
191 Ibid. at xiii.
192 "There is a significant uniformity in the reports for measures to address concerns about racism and
discrimination in the exercise of discretion within the justice system. The four types of measures most
often repeated are an increase in minorities as justice system actors at all levels; implementation of
cross-cultural and anti-racism training for justice system actors; community liaison programs to
improve relations between system actors and minority communities; and monitoring bodies or
complaint agencies to uncover abuses and to provide access to remedies to minority community
members" (Etherington supra note 18 at xiv. Suggestions for better cross-cultural understanding on the
part of lawyers were analyzed in detail as well by Michael Wylie, who concluded that legal services in a
multi-cultural Canada require lawyers to understand the cultural context within which an individual
client's problem is presented. See M. Wylie "Enhancing Legal Counselling in Cross-Cultural Settings"
(1996) 15 Windsor Yearbook ofAccess to Justice 47.
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well that problems within the criminal justice system are often linked to broader
concerns about racial discrimination in Canadian society. As Etherington
explained:
The criminal justice system does not exist in isolation and many of the
barriers to access to justice faced by minorities originate in institutions
which are generally perceived to be extrinsic to the criminal justice
system. Where individuals are rejected by, or perceive rejection by
dominant groups in society, the potential for conflict between them and
the values of the majority may increase. It is critically important to ask
whether or not the broader non-criminal justice system provides access to
justice to racial and ethnic minorities in their pursuit of economic and
social justice or their attempts to gain redress for wrongs suffered in those
areas of activity.93
Like Etherington, the National Council of Welfare's 1995 report also drew
attention to the need for broader measures to prevent offending behaviour,
particularly for young males. The report identified the success of a sports camp
for young aboriginals in northern Manitoba and preschool programs in Michigan,
both of which resulted in a decrease in criminal activity on the part of teenagers.' 94
As these broader approaches to criminal activity reveal, the "needs" of offenders
may encompass matters that go beyond individual acts of criminal offences, and
they may need to take account of issues of poverty, gender and race - and the
interrelationship of these characteristics for some offenders. In this way, the
"needs" of offenders may require quite specific responses from the criminal justice
system, whether it is the traditional system or one which embraces restorative
justice.
D. The "Needs" of Victims and Communities for Justice
As explained, there has been a marked increase in recognition of the
"needs" of victims in the criminal justice system in recent decades. These
developments reflect earlier stages of criminal justice, prior to the creation of state-
organized processes which clearly demarcated criminal justice as "public" and
different from "private" civil claims. In a 1985 study of alternatives to criminal
courts, Tony Marshall provided an analysis of the "needs" of victims in the
criminal justice process. According to Marshall, victims suffer two kinds of losses:
1) material losses, including loss of money or property, or physical injury; and 2)
193 Etherington, ibid. at xix.
194 National Council of Welfare 1995, supra note 24 at 75.
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emotional losses, including feelings of anxiety, insecurity or "pollution."
However, as he noted, the criminal justice process is not well-designed to respond
to either of these needs of victims. In relation to material losses, for example, the
criminal justice system conceptualizes the offender's actions as primarily creating a
"debt to society," so that it is "not well geared to helping out the victim
financially."' 5 As well, the victim's emotional needs can be met only if the state
can ensure that the offender is punished. Perhaps more importantly, Marshall
suggested that victims' participation in criminal proceedings (as witnesses, for
example) may actually "reinforce victims' sense of powerlessness arising from the
initial criminal experience and further add to their dissatisfaction or even
distress."' 96
The inability of the criminal justice system to meet these "needs" of
victims is the basis for many claims about the potential for restorative justice. As
Mark Umbreit suggested, for example, processes of victim-offender mediation can
hold offenders accountable for their actions and emphasize the human impact of
the crime on the victim, as well as providing opportunities for offenders to take
responsibility for their crime by making amends to victims; in addition, victim-
offender mediation can promote active involvement by victims and communities
in the justice process and enhance the quality of justice experienced by both
offenders and victims.'97 In a similar way, Bazemore suggested that victim-
offender mediation in relation to juvenile justice could better respond to the needs
of victims, but that it could also respond more appropriately to the needs of all
involved:
But what may be the most unique insight of the restorative justice
perspective is that advocacy for victims rights and involvement is not a
zero-sum game. A focus on the needs of victims is therefore not
incompatible with a concern with the needs and risks presented by
offenders and with a concern with the general needs of communities.
Restorative justice recognizes three clients ... in any "justice" process:
victim, offender, and the community. 8
195 Marshall, supra note 78 at 20.
196 Ibid. at 21.
197 Umbreit, supra note 129 at 5.
198 G. Bazemore, "Crime Victims, Restorative Justice and theJuvenile Court: Exploring Victim Needs and
Involvement in the Response to Youth Crime" (1999) 6 InternationalReview of Victimologv 295 at 299
[hereinafter Bazemore 1999].
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Although the processes of victim-offender mediation are considered in
detail in chapter 3, it is important at this point to analyze how the "needs" of
victims are defined - and the consequences that flow from such definitions in
relation to the choice of processes to respond to these needs. In such a context, it is
also important to consider the extent to which different processes, including the
criminal justice system, prioritize the needs of victims, and communities, in
relation to those of offenders.
One way of ensuring that victims' "needs" have some degree of priority is
the creation of Victims' Bills of Rights. Thus, Bacchus suggested that the
enactment of An Act Respecting Victims of Crime in Ontario in 1996 represented
"a significant step in acknowledging the needs of victims of crime in the criminal
justice system," and resulted in requirements for Crown counsel to ensure the
participation of victims in accordance with the statute. 99 This emphasis on victim
involvement in the criminal justice process has also been evidenced by assertions
that victims' "needs" must be recognized as "rights." In their analysis of critical
victimology, Mawby and Walklate emphasized that accused persons have "rights,"
and that the criminal justice system must therefore recognize that victims'. "needs"
are also "rights."2 °° At the same time, they argued that there remain many unmet
needs for those who do not fit current notions of "victims," and that it is critical to
recognize how structural inequities in society fundamentally affect criminal
victimization."0 ' Mawby and Walklate identified four areas where "rights" for
victims need to be improved: the right to play an active role in the criminal justice
system (including mandatory victim impact statements); the right to knowledge
about the progress of the case against an accused and the right to compensation;
the right to financial help (including insurance schemes and the assistance of
police); and the right to advice and support from state-funded agencies.
199 Bacchus, supra note 86 at 219. As Bacchus explained, "Crown attorneys are directed to ensure that the
interests of victims of crime are brought forward at every stage of the prosecution to a degree
consistent with the primary role of a prosecutor, although comments of the victim that are not relevant
to issues of sentencing should not be placed before the court. As a result, Crown counsel is sometimes
required to act as a screen or filter for the concerns of the victim and must balance the vicims' right to
dignii and some level ofpartipation in the process with the Crown'sfunction as an officer of the court' (at 219-220,
emphasis added).
200 In his review of victims' rights, Roach concluded that "although they achieved some recognition, the
rights of crime victims [in Canada] were more fragile than either the rights of the accused or the rights
of the disadvantaged groups who claimed equal protection of the criminal law. Part of the reason may
be found in the Charter, which entrenched both due process and equality rights, but not the rights of
crime victims.... Crime victims have had some impact on the criminal process, but it was limited and
contested" (Roach 1999, supra note 24 at 309.
201 R.I. Mawby & S. Waldate, Critical Victimologr (London: Sage Publications, 1994) at 169 [hereinafter
Mawby & Walklate].
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There are also some studies which define the "needs" of victims in relation
to the benefits of restorative justice, at least on the basis of victims' responses to
such programmes. For example, Umbreit et al identified a number of studies
which seem to confirm victims' preference for victim-offender mediation
programmes in the United States." 2 For the victims in these surveys, it appears
that there was a serious "need" to confront the offenders face-to face. The authors
suggested, moreover, that victim-offender mediation might meet the needs of
victims, not only in crimes of property and minor assault but also "in crimes of
severe violence, including murder;" at the same time, the authors identified a need
for much more research and assessment with larger samples before any firm
conclusions can be drawn. Indeed, they recommended caution, suggesting that
"many unintended negative consequences could result from such initiatives,
including a significant re-victimization of the victim. '  In this context, it may be
significant that the authors also stressed the usefulness of restorative justice to
meet not just the needs of victims but also those of offenders and communities
At its core, the process of victim-offender mediation and dialogue in
crimes of severe violence is about engaging those most affected by the
horror of violent crime in the process of holding the offender truly
accountable, helping victims gain a greater sense of meaning, if not
closure concerning the severe harm resulting from the crime, and helping
all parties to have a greater capacity to move on with their lives in a
positive fashion. This emerging restorative justice practice certainly
warrants further development and analysis, along with an attitude of
cautious and informed support (emphasis added)."°
The benefit of restorative justice practices for communities has been
identified as a major impetus for their adoption in Australia. In a review of three
case studies in the Wagga Wagga model, O'Connell identified the need for such
practices in order to re-establish "community:"
202 "Today it is very clear, from empirical data and practice experience, that the majority of victims of
property crimes and minor assaults presented with the opportunity of mediation chose to engage the
process, with victim participation rates often ranging from about 60-70% in many programs. A
statewide randomized public opinion survey in Minnesota found that 84% of citizens, including many
who had been victimized by crime, indicated they would be likely to consider participating in victim
offender mediation if they were the victim of a property crime.... A more recent statewide survey of
victim service providers in Minnesota found that 91% felt that VOM was an important service to be
made available to victims on a volunteer basis and that it should be offered in each judicial district of
the state" (M.S. Umbreit et al, "Victims of Severe Violence Meet the Offender: Restorative Justice
Through Dialogue" (1999) 6 International Review of Vicimology 321 at 322 [hereinafter Umbreit et al
1999].
203 Ibid. at 340.
204 Ibid. at 340-341.
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Conferencing is about re-creating community, one that is critical to assist
us make sense of a world that has experienced significant social change
over the past 40 years.... [All] those involved [in criminal justice] at some
stage experience some "disconnection" from community.... [The]
conference process allowed those communities to be strengthened and ...
individuals to re-connect with those who are significant in their lives.
These experiences raise questions about our increasing reliance on
professionals ... (working in relative isolation) to assist communities re-
establish themselves in the aftermath of any disruption that threatens
social cohesion.05
Although it may not be appropriate to design restorative justice practices
with the "needs" of only victims in mind, it may be important to have a clear
understanding of the relationship among competing demands within such
processes. Particularly where there may be conflicts or inconsistencies between
the "needs" of victims, and the "needs" of communities or of offenders, it is
important to implement protocols for defining the compromises that may be
appropriate to meet the "needs" of these different interests. For example, the
Criminal Code reforms (Bill C-41) which codified the rights of victims to
participate in sentencing hearings, and which set out provisions for restitution of
victims, for the introduction of victim impact statements, and for victim fine
surcharges appear to have provided victims with more involvement in the
traditional criminal justice process; as Sandra Bacchus suggested in her review of
these provisions, however, it is possible that attentiveness to the "needs" of victims
may result in more conditional sentences in order to improve the potential for
offenders to be able to provide restitution to their victims.2 In this way,
implementing victims' needs for restitution clearly affects the scope of sentencing
of offenders. Moreover, balancing the "needs" of victims and offenders will be
necessary in restorative justice processes as well as in the traditional criminal
justice system. In this way, it is also important to note that there are others who
may be harmed, in addition to the victim, including the offender. °7
In this context, the gender of victims may also be an important factor in
meeting victim "needs." As the National Institute of Justice report in the USA
indicated in 1994, "women were victimized about five times more often than men
by persons with whom they had intimate relationships - spouses, former spouses,
205 T. O'Connell, "Conferencing and Community Empowerment: Rediscovering the Human Face of
Justice" in Healy and Dumont, supra note 80 at 143.
206 Bacchus, supra note 86 at 225 [quoting R v. Viisanji et aL; R. v. Visanji, Lall, and 4kbar (unreported) Ont.
Ct. Prov. Div., 2 July 1997].
207 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
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or boyfriends/girlfriends.""2 8 Comparing the treatment of female victims of crime
in 1975 to 1995, the report concluded that there had been some positive changes in
the criminal justice system's response to female victims of crime: the
criminalization of domestic violence, the establishment of sexual assault treatment
centres, the enactment of victims' bills of rights, and the passage of the Violence
Against Women Act in 1994. All the same, the report concluded that:
Despite these changes, current data on violence against women illustrate
the need for additional measures such as a coordinated and integrated
approach to reduce and prevent victimization of women. A coordinated
approach to this problem suggests collaboration among law enforcement,
prosecution offices, and the courts, as well as victim advocates and service
providers. For the criminal justice system's response to be effective,
professionals within the system should share a vision that prioritizes the
safety and well-being of female victims.29
There have been some efforts to respond to these "needs" within the
traditional criminal justice system in Canada, including specialized courts for
prosecuting child abuse cases and domestic violence cases. These courts offer
specialized personnel, as well as coordination among social agencies and
prosecutors. Yet, as a number of studies in Canada have revealed, the criminal
justice system does not provide a safe and effective response to women who are
victims of intimate violence. In a study of access to justice for abused immigrant
women in New Brunswick, for example, Miedema found that there were strong
religious and cultural constraints within immigrant families which made it
difficult, if not impossible, for women to seek help in relation to problems of
violence on the part of their spouses: "the fear of shaming or bringing dishonor to
the family (husband) was a very powerful social control mechanism preventing
women from seeking help in case[s] of abuse."2 ' In a related study, Miedema and
Wachholz concluded that:
208 National Institute of Justice, supra note 180 at viii.
209 The National Institute of Justice report also explained how, even when victims' rights are recognized,
"they may not be enforced and there are few sanctions for failure." The report described a request by
Mary Byron of Jeffersontown, Kentucky to be notified when her estranged boyfriend, who had been
charged with raping her at gunpoint, was released from detention. Unfortunately, she was not notified
and her estranged boyfriend murdered her. Her estate sued the Jeffersontown Police Department and
the detective who had failed to notify her, but the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the court held that
there was no duty to notify Byron of her estranged boyfriend's release [National Institute of Justice,
ibid. at 45 (citing Lexington Herald-Leader, 13 July 1996)].
210 B. Miedema, Bariers and Strategies: How to Improve Services for Abused Immigrant Women in New Brunswick
(1997) [unpublished] [hereinafter Miedema].
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The vast majority of participants identified the interplay of cultural
norms and structural oppression as very profound barriers to the justice
system for abused immigrant women. All the women ... described their
social life as deeply rooted in patriarchal structures. Many women ...
indicated that the norm of defining abuse as a private, personal matter in
conjunction with the fear of bringing shame to their family meant they
were often very reluctant to contact the justice system. Structural
constraints, such as language barriers, perceived racism in the criminal
justice system and social service agencies, and lack of adequate
ethnocultural services and representation, were also identified as
disincentives to seeking help in cases of abuse."'
These concerns are similar to those identified by Martin and Mosher, who
suggested that there was a neo-criminalization reform policy for wife assault in the
two decades from 1970 to 1990. However, they concluded that "the evidence is
compelling that the neo-criminalization strategy [failed] individual women;" as
they explained, "an aggressive criminal justice response exposes individual women
to harms of a variety of sorts, and offers, only in some cases, potential benefits."2 2
Martin and Mosher proposed a more complex strategy, one that "neither
homogenizes the experiences of abused women, nor denies them the status of
rational agents competent to exercise choice in their own best interest" and which
recognizes that criminal justice intervention may be only one of a multitude of
services and interventions which may be necessary."' Such an approach reveals
that there may be different "needs" for victims of different kinds of criminal
actions, especially in relation to gender; and that even among the victims of wife
abuse, there may be different "needs" on the part of individual women because
their circumstances differ. Overall, however, in the context of the "needs" of
women who are victims of intimate violence, there is evidence that the current rate
of reporting is extremely low. Using data from the 1993 Canadian Violence
Against Women Survey, Gartner and Macmillan concluded that "police learned of
these victimizations relatively rarely, only about 15% of the time."2"4 In assessing
211 B. Miedema & S. Wachholz, A Complex Web: Access to Justice for Abused Immigrant Women in New Brunswick
(Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 1998) at 29 [citingJ. Currie, EthnoculturalMinoriy Women, Spousal
Assault, and Barriers to Accessing and Problems in Using the Justice System A Review of the Literature (Ottawa:
Department of Justice, 1995)] [hereinafter Miedema & Wachholz I .
212 D.L. Martin &J.E. Mosher, "Unkept Promises: Experiences of Immigrant Women With the Neo-
Criminalization of Wife Abuse" (1995) 8 CJ.W.L 3 at 37.
213 Ibid. at 43 [citing J.W.E. Sheptycki, "Using the State to Change Society: The Example of 'Domestic
Violence"' (1991) 3 Journal of Human Justice 54].
214 R. Gartner & R. Macmillan, "The Effect of Victim-Offender Relationship on Reporting Crimes of
Violence against Women" (1995) (uly) Can. Jour. Ctim. 393 at 405.
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the scholarly debates about whether increased reporting would respond better to
women's needs, however, Gartner and Macmillan were undecided; yet, as they
emphasized, their study confirmed "the extent to which crimes of violence against
women continue to exist outside of the law's domain. 215
These concerns about the failure of the criminal justice system for women
who are victims may also apply to some victims who are members of visible
minorities. As Barbara Hudson suggested, some women and some Blacks who are
victims may have difficulty engaging the criminal justice system because they do
not fit the construction of the "ideal victim"; for example, this problem has
affected "prostitute women or other independent, sexually-active women,
attempting to bring rape charges."" 6 Moreover, for Hudson, it is important to take
note of the differing responses of the criminal justice system to racial and sexual
crimes on one hand, and "the street crimes of the powerless": while the latter have
been taken seriously and "over-penalized," the former have all too often been
ignored:
In other words, the censuring, moral-boundary-declaring, symbolic
purposes of criminal law have already been served in relation to these
latter types of offences, whereas with racialized and sexualized violence,
the symbolic force of criminal law has only recently, and only partially
(especially in the case of racial violence) been deployed to demonstrate
that society, at least in its official organization, disapproves of these forms
of behaviour.217
For Hudson, it is also important to acknowledge how power relationships
within society affect the commission of crime. She suggested, for example, that
social inequality which "pushes so many young men into economic marginality"
may prompt them to use violence to establish their claims to racial and gender
superiority. As a result, she argued that differential power relationships are
completely different in domestic, sexual and racial crime, by contrast with
property offences and other kinds of "economic survival" crimes. Thus, she
expressed concern that victim-offender mediation processes, which make the
relationship between victim and offender central - displacing the relationship
215 Ibid. at 423. At the same time, it is important to recognize that proposals for innovative intervention
strategies within the criminal justice system, perhaps especially in relation to gender issues, may
provoke strenuous opposition, as was revealed in the decision of students to alter their approach to
legal aid services for abused women in Ottawa: see R. Carey, "Useless (UOSLAS) v. the Bar: The
Struggle of the Ottawa Student Clinic to Represent Battered Women" (1992) 8J.L &Sot. Pol) 54.
216 Hudson 1998, supra note 33 at 244.
217 Hudson 1998, supra note 33 at 245.
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between offender and the state - may "reproduce and reinforce the imbalance of
power of the crime relationship, rather than confronting the offender with the
power of the state acting on behalf of (in the place of) the victim." '218 Moreover,
while recognizing the victim's "need" for community disapproval of the offender's
actions, Hudson questioned the real possibility of community shaming:
... [Most] of us now inhabit not 'communities,' but shifting, temporary
alliances which come together on the basis of private prudentialism.
Residents' associations; parents' associations; city-centre rate-payers;
shopping-mall retailers; share-holders' meetings; women's groups: these
are the kinds of collectivities which claim people's allegiances now, rather
than communities. The weakest point of [restorative justice] is ... what is
the community; what is the community interest, and how can it be
represented? Without the concern to make safer communities, restorative
justice is in danger of merely substituting civil justice for criminal justice.
Without the community, restorative justice is reduced to the competing
perspectives of the victim and the perpetrator, and there is no social
group with reference to whom the offender can experience either shame
or reintegration.... To serve the expressive functions of punishment,
restorative processes will have to devise ways of clearly separating
condemnation of the act from the negotiation of measures appropriate to
the relationships between the particular victim, the offender, and the
community.
19
Like Martin and Mosher, however, Hudson also acknowledged how "get
tough" policies in relation to sexual (and racial) violence may not be solved within
the current criminal justice system: "penal toughness towards racial, sexual, and
domestic violence would only be inflicted on the poor and marginalized, with the
powerful continuing to perpetrate their racist and misogynist behaviour behind
closed doors." Penal toughness will thus lead to "the rich getting counselling and
the poor getting prison."22'
These comments reveal the political content of discussions of victims'
"needs." As Walklate suggested, there has been a convergence between women's
advocates (who have drawn attention to the rate and seriousness of crimes of
violence against women) and political needs to demonstrate "get tough" policies in
relation to crime.22" ' Similarly, David Garland has argued that current punitive
218 bid at 247.
219 Hudson 1998, supra note 33 at 251.
220 Ibid. at 155.
221 Mawby & Walklate supra note 201 at 33.
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policies have been shaped, at least in part, by a linkage with the interests and
feelings of victims:
[Actual victims), victims' families, potential victims, the projected figure
of 'the victim' - are now routinely invoked in support of measures of
punitive segregation. American politicians announce mandatory
sentencing laws and are accompanied at the podium by the families of
crime victims. Crime victims are featured speakers at British party
political conferences. Measures are named for victims ... The new
imperative is that victims must be protected, their voices heard, their
memory honoured, their anger expressed, their fears addressed. The
rhetoric of penal debate routinely invokes the figure of the victim.... A
political logic has been established wherein being 'for' victims
automatically means being tough on offenders. A zero-sum policy game
is assumed wherein the offender's gain is the victim's loss.... [What] is
insufficiently acknowledged is the degree to which the figure of the
victim has come to have the status of a 'representative individual' in
contemporary society."2
As Garland's analysis suggests, the "needs" of individual victims have been
appropriated, indeed transformed, by political rhetoric into the "representative
needs" of victims. In this way, the focus on victims' "needs" may have contributed
to a "get tough" political agenda by providing added support for more and longer
periods of incarceration. In such a context, the real needs of actual victims may be
less important, even ignored. Moreover, the rhetoric may create a need for those
who claim that restorative justice provides a viable alternative to exercise care not
to be captured by a "get tough" political agenda and to define the real "needs" of
actual victims. Overall, victims' "needs," as well as the "needs" of offenders and
communities (including aboriginal communities) appear to be both complex and
contested in relation to the goals and values of criminal justice in Canada.
III. CHALLENGING THE MAINSTREAM: APPROACHES TO
INCREASING ACCESS TO CRIMINALJUSTICE
A. Introduction
This chapter concentrates on the substantive responses to the questioning
about and criticisms of the mainstream legal system discussed in "The Concepts
and Context of Criminal Justice: From Access to Justice to Access to Justice," and
to the needs identified in "Re-Assessing 'Needs" in Relation to Access and
222 Garland 2000, supra note 95 at 351.
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Justice." The earlier discussion of concepts and context identified the following
issues raised by the current state of criminal justice: the appropriateness of the
contemporary or modern distinction between civil and criminal justice; the
implications of the public/private dimensions of justice; and the extent to which
the criminal legal system is based on, recognizes or is able to respond to equality
concerns. This last issue - equality - leads us to the reassessment of needs and the
proposition that the concept of "needs" should encompass more than "legal needs"
to include those related to poverty, gender, race, age and similar factors and, in a
related way, to the needs of offenders, victims and communities. This chapter
considers how the responses are characterized both by a recognition of shifting
boundaries between civil and criminal justice and between the public and private
and by the necessity of incorporating an understanding of needs. Chapter IV
returns to these issues in a more critical way, asking not only whether the
responses are able to answer the criticisms levelled at the mainstream system and
whether they adequately incorporate equality considerations, but also whether
they raise concerns of their own.
Specifically, this part considers transformative justice, restorative justice
and specific forms of the latter, namely victim-offender mediation, family
conferencing and circle sentencing. In addition, however, it is useful to refer to
some of the individual responses which have been put in place or have been
considered in the literature, termed "piecemeal" by Van Ness.223 "Piecemeal" in
this context does not mean "minor" or "insignificant," but rather reflects a lack of
challenge to the most fundamental principles of the mainstream system as
identified in the discussion about "The Concepts and Context of Criminal Justice"
(treating crime as an offence against the state for which the offender must be
punished following a finding or admission of guilt in an offender-centred
adversarial system involving for the most part the offender and the state).
The most "radical" conception of access to criminal justice is termed,
appropriately, "transformative justice."
B. Transformative Justice
"Transformative justice," an ambitious alternative to the existing civil and
criminal legal systems, has as its goal the transforming of the system, the
participants and their conflict. With respect to civil disputes, transformative
mediation is directed at transformation of the parties' perceptions of each other
223 Van Ness 1993, supra note 127 at 257.
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and of their dispute.224 This kind of mediation is said to provide an opportunity for
the parties' moral development, as well as social change more generally. Its goals
are to empower the parties and mutual recognition of their situations and
"common human qualities." ''2 In the criminal context, transformative justice
poses a challenge to the conception that law's function is to provide "rules,
procedures and institutions that facilitate just interactions between people," and to
achieve "justice" "by controlling socially inappropriate behaviour that reveals itself
in conflict." As one commentary declares, "the power of transformative justice
[is] . . . the possibility of using the substance of conflict as a means of exploring
options and establishing responses that are not only acceptable to all parties but
develop and strengthen relationships among those involved."" 6 Conflict becomes
a means by which the specific parties and society in general may change
significantly and in that sense is potentially transformative.
Transformative justice envisions a radical new way of characterizing
problems which in turn attract new responses. Thus if we define drugs as a
criminal problem, we will apply criminal responses to it, with a primary emphasis
on convictions for using or selling illegal drugs; if it is defined as a health problem,
however, responses would emphasise prevention.2 7 Once problems have been
characterized as criminal, they are addressed within the criminal framework which
in its retributive form means that wrongdoing is determined through a legal duel
between the accused and the state, with particular emphasis on the rules which
protect the accused; the victim is treated less as a participant than as a witness; the
process is segregated from the community and historical context; and the object is
to determine guilt and punishment.228
It is useful to identify transformative justice as a distinct approach in order
to highlight the sea of change it would bring to our understanding of the concept
of "justice," as well as the comprehensive changes required in both the civil and
criminal systems. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, while there are those who
view restorative justice as sufficiently challenging to the mainstream system as to
be properly characterized as "transformative," such a characterization is probably
premature. The concept and practice of restorative justice are broad, some would
224 R.A.B. Bush & J.P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict tbrough Empowerment and Recognition.
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994) [hereinafter Bush & Folger].
225 Ibid. at 84-85.
226 Law Commission 1999, supra note 7.
227 Ibid.
228 Kwochka, supra note 148 at 158; Delgado, supra note 107.
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say too lax to be meaningful, and apply within the current system. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that either restorative justice does not necessitate a
foundational transformation of the criminal legal system or that many of the
initiatives encompassed by the term are wrongly labelled. In the latter case, these
initiatives may not only promise results which cannot be realized, but also indeed
may reinforce some of the negative aspects of the current system which restorative
justice proponents claim they are challenging.
In practice, few, if any, restorative justice projects have achieved the power
to transform either the criminal justice system or society, regardless of any
perceived potential to do so. Restorative justice responds to the mainstream's
designation of acts as criminal and while it may affect the outlook of individuals or
their relationship with each other, it is rarely directed at systemic transformation.
Accordingly, while it may have the potential to transform, its recognition of
persons rather than laws is insufficient to support a claim that restorative justice is
"inherently transformational" (emphasis added)."2 9
It is also important to maintain a distinction between "transformative" and
"restorative" justice for another reason. As Kwochka points out, the latter assumes
a pre-existing positive relationship while in fact the "original state [ might have
been] disrupted and dysfunctional," while transformative justice "suggests the
ability to actually create change in individuals, families, and communities."230 For
purpose of the following discussion, restorative justice will be treated as a distinct
approach to the criminal legal system rather than as either a synonym for or sub-
category of transformative justice.
C. Restorative Justice
a. Introduction
First referred to in 1977,23 ' restorative justice is the predominant theme in
the current literature and in government initiatives for increasing access to justice
229 D. Van Ness & K. Strong, Restoring Justice (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 1997) at 175 [hereinafter
Van Ness & Strong 1997].
230 Kwochka, supra note 148 at 197 [citing C. LaPrairie, "Altering Course: New Directions in CriminalJustice
Sentencing Circles and Family Group Conferencing" (1994) [unpublished].
231 T.F. Marshall, "Restorative Justice: An Overview" (1998) online: Center for Restorative Justice &
Mediation <http://ssw/che/umn/edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/bmar98a.PDF> (date accessed: 2
January 2001) [hereinafter Marshall 1998], [crediting R. Barnett, "Restitution: A New Paradigm of
Criminal Justice" (1977) 87 Ethics 279; Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11; Van Ness & Strong, supra
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for offenders, victims and communities. Its proponents offer restorative justice as
a preferable alternative to the current system on both efficacious and ethical
grounds."'
As indicated in Chapter 1, restorative justice recalls earlier systems,
western and non-western, non-state (or acephalus) and state societies, which were
identified with community-based justice and is contrasted with the state-centred,
retributive justice system developed between the eleventh and twelfth centuries
and the nineteenth century in western regimes;233 Blakely and Bumphus also
discuss citizen policing in the United States and England as an example of
community based justice."' Victim offender mediation is generally considered to
constitute the beginning of contemporary efforts at restorative justice. Initial
victim-offender mediation programs during the late 1970s in Europe and North
America, often begun in faith communities, tended to remain distinct experiments
serving as an alternative to sentences, however, since the main objective was
reparation to the victim. According to Braithwaite, "[r]estorative justice became a
global social movement [only] in the 1990s as a result of learning from indigenous
practices of restorative justice the ways in which individualistic Western victim-
offender mediation was impoverished.""23  The major differences between
indigenous and western practices were the role of the community and the
significance of remorse and forgiveness.236 According to Braithwaite,237 Canada
has taken a leadership role in applying restorative justice principles. Canadian
note 11; A. Eglash, "Beyond Restitution: Creative Restitution" in J. Hudson & B. Galaway, eds.,
Restitution in Criminal Jusice (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 19771.
232 D.A. Andrews, I. Zinger, R.D. HogeJ. Bonta, P. Gendreau & F.T. Cullen (1990). "Does Correctional
Treatment Work? A Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis" (1990) 28 Criminology 369; P. Gendreau.
& C. Goggin, "Principles of Effective Correctional Programming" (1996) 8 Forum on Corrctions Research
38; Kwochka, supra note 148; J. Bonta, S. Wallace-Capretta & J. Rooney, "Restorative Justice: An
Evaluation of the Restorative Resolutions Project" (1998) online: Solicitor General Canada
<http://www.sgc.gc.ca/epub/corr/e199810b/el99810b.htm> (accessed December 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Bonta et al 1998]; Lewellyn and Howse, supra note 11; Braithwaite, supra note 27; F.W.
Gay, "Restorative Justice and the Prosecutor" (2000) 27 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1651.
233 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11; E.G.M. Weitekamp, "The History of Restorative Justice" in G.
Bazemore & L. Walgrave, eds., Restorative Juvenile Justice: Repairing the Harm of Youth Crime (Monsey, N.Y.:
Criminal Justice Press, 1999) [Bazemore & Walgrave] at 75 [hereinafter Weitekampl.
234 C.R. Blakely & V.W. Bumphus, "American Criminal Justice Philosophy: What's Old-What's New?"
(1999) 63 Federal Probation 62.
2-5 Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1743.
236 Ibid.
237 Supra note 27 at 1.
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commentators have observed that "[t]he rise of restorative justice in Canada both
in practice and public rhetoric has been quick." '238
It has been observed that "it may ...be doubted whether any unified
'restorative justice' movement exists," since "there appear to be a number of
apparently similar, yet independent, 'alternative justice' movements and
philosophies," using different names including transformative justice, peacemaking
criminology, relational justice and community justice." '239 On the other hand,
Weitekamp maintains that the terms "restitution, reparation, compensation,
reconciliation, atonement, redress, community service, mediation and
indemnification" all "can be united under the umbrella of restorative justice." 240
Kurki has suggested that since the 1970s, restorative justice "has evolved ... to a
comprehensive approach toward crime." '4 Other terms used to capture the same
approach include "relational justice," "positive justice" and "reintegrative justice"
(the last involving Braithwaite's concept of reintegrative shaming to which we
refer below). This discussion uses the more common label of "restorative
justice" '242 which is widely understood to represent a particular approach, albeit
broadly defined and applied, to addressing wrongdoing or "crime."
Restorative justice treats crime as an interference or breach of a
relationship, whether that is a relationship between individuals who know each
other or a relationship which is implicit in living together in society. 43 It replaces
retribution, described as "revenge formalized by the state" (although "less
emotional, more rational and more socially constructive than [private] revenge")2"
with restoration of the relationship. The intent is to restore the moral balance
disrupted when one person offends against another person or against property.
238 K. Roach, "Changing Punsihment at the Turn of the Century" (2000) Can. J. Crim. 249 [hereinafter
Roach 2000]; also see C.T. Griffiths & R. Corrado, "Implementing Restorative Youth Justice: A Case
Study in Community Justice and the Dynamics of Reform" in Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 233 at
273 [hereinafter Griffiths].
239 Griffiths, ibid., at 46.
240 Weitekamp, supra note 233 at 75.
241 L. Kurki, "Restorative and Community Justice in the United States" (2000) 27 Crime and Justice 235 at
263.
242 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 25; Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
243 M. Price, "Can Mediation Produce Justice? A Restorative Justice Discussion for Mediators" ADR Report
(1997) http://www.vorp.com/-vorp/articles/art.html accesed January 2, 2001 [hereinafter Price];
Lewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
244 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
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Restorative justice also challenges the adversarial model on which the
criminal justice system is based and offers as a replacement "a consensus approach
to justice." '45 This is similar to the "alternative dispute resolution" or problem-
solving consensus approaches in the civil context.246 In the criminal context, the
current system focuses on a snapshot of the victim-offender relationship, that is on
one particular act, while in reality the particular offence may be only the most
immediate result of an on-going conflict which requires redressing. 47
Although it would not be appropriate to treat restorative justice in its
current state as "transformative justice," it has been argued that there is "a strong
connection between restorative justice and social justice;" although it can have
harmful effects on social justice, it also may address some of the needs of the poor
by, for example, at least reducing harms such as joblessness pursuant on
imprisonment. 48 Restorative justice may be best seen as part of a broader
restorative project, as some commentators are beginning to question whether
restorative justice can by itself transform justice, since justice cannot be viewed
separately from society as a whole. Thus Mills and Schacter 49 propose using the
term "restorative governance" to indicate that criminal justice cannot transform
society or "restore the balance in society," but can at best play a "small role" in a
process of governance of society in the larger sense." ° Braithwaite and Parker
argue that a "republican" restorative justice based on non-domination and equality
principles must go beyond the individual offender and victim to deal with
underlying causes of conflict in the community (such as racism as a cause of
bullying in a school)."5'
Thus restorative justice has been described as "'a revolution in criminal
justice,"'252 and "a paradigm shift", 53 one which goes beyond how we think about
245 Ibid.
246 British Columbia Ministry of the Attorney General (1998) A Restorative Justice Framework [hereinafter B.C.
Ministry of the Attorney General]
247 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
248 Braithwaite 2000, supra note 106 at 186 and 191.
249 S.B. Mills & M. Schacter, "From Restorative Justice to Restorative Governance" (2000) 42 Can. J. Crim.
405 at 1.
250 See also Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 23.
251 J. Braithwaite & C. Parker, "Restorative Justice is Republican Justice" in Bazemore & Walgrave, supra
note 233 at 105 [hereinafter Braithwaite & Parker].
252 Umbreit & Coates 2000, supra note 2.
253 Ibid.,
Vol. XIII
Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues
crime and conflict to how we think about ourselves collectively as a society.254 It is
a "framework for thinking about and responding to conflict and crime, rather than
a unified theory or philosophy of justice," ' relating to both process and
outcome,256 although it has also been described as "a philosophical approach to
responding to crime" '257 and "a comprehensive and coherent theory of justice"
which must nevertheless be viewed as a "partial theory" in conjunction with other
theories." 8 Van Ness and Strong259 suggest that restorative justice is a pattern of
thinking which permits us to incorporate otherwise troublesome "data" about
crime which the older pattern (which "channels us to see crime as law breaking, to
focus our energies on the offender and to value punishment when it deters,
rehabilitates, incapacitates or denounces") does not. Nevertheless, the term is also
used loosely to apply to "alternative" approaches to the conventional criminal legal
system and it is important to ensure that the particular - and peculiar -
characteristics of restorative justice are identified.26 ° Distinguishing between the
revolutionary and more limited objectives of, or expectations about, restorative
justice requires an understanding of its principles and characteristics.
b. Principles and characteristics of restorative justice
The term "restorative justice" does not refer to a particular process, but a
set of principles and may be defined as "a process whereby parties with a stake in a
specific offence resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence
and its implications for the future." 6 '
Lewellyn and Howse's comparison of the "three main theories of justice
[which] comprise most of the contemporary terrain: justice as restitution,
corrective justice and retributive justice" is a good place to begin. 62 While
254 B. Archibald, "A Comprehensive Canadian Approach to Restorative Justice: The Prospects for
Structuring Fair Alternative Measures in Response to Crime" in D. Stuart, et al, eds., Towards a Clear and
Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at 522 [hereinafter Archibald].
255 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
256 Umbreit & Coates 2000, supra note 2.
257 B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General, supra note 246 at 4.
258 Roach 2000, supra note 238.
259 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 5.
260 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
261 Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1743; see also Joseph, supra note 83; Marshall 1998, supra note 231;
Nova Scotia Department of Justice, supra note 129.
262 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
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restitution may be an element of restorative justice, the two should not be seen as
synonymous. Restitution may also be incorporated into the conventional system
when the offender is required to return what he or she has taken or otherwise pay
back the victim.263 Restitution and restorative justice both involve the victim, but
the latter does so within the context of the relationship between the victim and the
offender and the community. Furthermore, restitution generally fails to take
account of the non-material harms suffered by the victim; yet these psychological
or "spiritual" harms may actually be more important than the quantitative losses
under restorative justice processes. In other words, restorative justice is not about
paying reparations in the sense of compensation, but about "'righting wrongs' in
the broad sense or "healing wounds." '264 Corrective justice does take account of the
non-material harms, but does so by making a transfer from the wrongdoer to the
victim; yet, as Llewellyn and Howse 6 ' point out, making the offender worse off
does not necessarily make the victim better off or remedy the injustice she or he
has suffered.
Retributive justice, like restorative justice, aims to establish or reestablish
what Llewellyn and Howse call "social equality between the wrongdoer and the
sufferer of wrong," '266 but it does so through punishment. Restorative justice, on
the other hand, "problematizes the issue of what set of practices can or should, in a
given context, achieve the goal of restoring social equality" and determines the
answer through dialogue among the wrongdoer, the victim and the community.
The participants are encouraged to recognize "the Other in her/his individuality,"
not merely in generic category of wrongdoer and victim.267 This recognition of
"Other" is also at the core of transformative mediation in the civil context.
Mediation provides an opportunity for the parties' moral growth and mutual
recognition of each other's condition.268  Such recognition must include
acknowledgement that the wrongdoer also experiences harm, argue Llewellyn and
Howse,269 requiring a commitment by the community not to stigmatize the
wrongdoer.
263 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 92.
264 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
265 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
266 Ibid.
267 B. Hudson, "DoingJustice to Difference" in Ashworth & Wasik, supra note 32 at 249.
268 R. Bush, A. Baruch & J.P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Confict through Empowerment and
Recognition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1994) at 81.
269 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
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According to Bazemore and Umbreit, 270 restorative justice "emphasizes
one fundamental fact: crime damages people, communities, and relationships. If
crime is about harm, a justice process should therefore emphasize repairing the
harm." Furthermore, it involves "seeing crime problems in their social context. '27,
Restorative justice is relational rather than individual and contextual rather than
abstract. 2 The phrase "balanced and restorative justice," captures the idea that
restorative justice constitutes a return to or development of harmony or
equilibrium within the mainstream setting of parole: balance means "the restoring
of victims and their respective communities at large, while at the same time
maintaining a focus on the risks and needs of the offender." '273 Llewellyn and
Howse 274 point out that "[w]hile the beginning point of restorative justice is a state
of wrong that has disturbed the relationship between the wrongdoer and the
sufferer of wrongdoing, its endpoint may be quite different than the status quo
ante.
275
Because restorative justice begins with the premise that crimes are not
merely or even most importantly "transgressions against the state," but rather "the
rupture of a relationship between two or more people," in contrast to the
mainstream system, it places the offender and the victim, along with the
community or communities of which they are a part, front and centre in the
resolution of the problem represented by the criminal activity. 7 6  It takes a
"holistic" approach to crime, one which recognizes the interrelationship between
offender, victim and community and that the goals of each may attract at least
some shared solutions. It involves the offender as an active participant in
addressing the problem represented by his or her offence rather than as a passive
recipient of sanctions imposed by the law. It sees the victim less as a witness on
behalf of the state than as someone who may be witness to the restoration of her or
his own situation and that of the offender in the community. The community
270 G. Bazemore & M. Umbreit, Conferences, Circles, Boards, and Mediations: Restorative Justice and Citizen
Involvement in the Response to Youth Crime. Prepared for the Balanced and Restorative Justice Project
(Funded by Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice)
http://ssw.che.umn.edu/rp/Resurces/Documents/bazumb99.PDF (accessed January 2, 2001)
[hereinafter Bazemore & Umbreit].
271 Marshall 1998, supra note 231 (emphasis in original).
272 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
273 A.D. Lewis & T.J. Howard, "Parole Officers' Perceptions of Juvenille Offenders Within a Balanced and
Restorative Model of Justice" (2000) 64 Federal Probation 40 at 40 [hereinafter Lewis & Howard].
274 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
275 See also Kwochka, supra note 148 at 157.
276 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
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becomes both actor and place of reintegration of both offender and victims.2"
Indeed, "building community" has been described as "the true test" of restorative
and community justice."' According to Braithwaite
Restorative justice means restorating victims, restoring offenders and
restoring communities. These objectives take priority over punishment.
Key values of restorative justice are healing rather than hurting,
respectful dialogue, making amends, caring and participatory
community, taking responsibility, remorse, apology and forgiveness.
Restorative justice is also a process that involves bringing together all the
stakeholders - victims, offenders and their friends and loved ones,
representatives of the state and the community - to decide what should
be done about a criminal offence. (Emphasis in original)
279
The language used in each system is revealing: rather than
"proportionality, certainty and severity," the words of the mainstream criminal
legal system, restorative justice employs terms such as "[h]ealing, contrition,
forgiveness, growth and development, ' as well as "reconciliation, negotiation,
vindication and transformation. "281
Llewellyn and Howse identify the main elements of restorative justice as
voluntariness and truth-telling (reflected in an "imperative of personal narrative"),
a process which requires the perpetrator to admit wrongdoing and through which
all the participants seek an "intersubjective truth."2 2 The notion of "encounter"
has been called "one of the pillars of a restorative justice approach to crime. '"283 In
the mainstream system, rules of evidence and the involvement of lawyers, the
absence of primary and secondary victims and the accused's lack of understanding
about how the system works, militate against an encounter between the offender
and the victim.2 4 Although Llewellyn and Howse emphasize that the encounter
must be face-to-face "confrontation and challenge," the importance of this
requirement is somewhat diminished by their acknowledgement that if one party
277 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 111.
278 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
279 Braithwaite 1999a, supra note 26.
280 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
281 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 181.
282 LleweUyn & Howse supra note 11.
283 Ibid. at 68, 77.
284 Ibid. at 68.
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does not want to participate or both parties do not want to meet face to face, a
communicator may be used as a go-between." 5 Another alternative is "victim-
offender panels" which bring together groups of unrelated victims and offenders
with the intent of informing the offenders about the impact of their wrongdoing. 6
In Minneapolis, panels of neighbourhood residents meet with offenders charged
with soliciting prostitutes and develop a sentence.287
Messmer and Otto88 explain that under restorative justice, "[r]eparation
should encourage the integration of victims into legal proceedings as individuals
with justified claims;" the victim's right to reparation supercedes punishment of
the offender by the state. The emphasis for offenders is accountability. The
procedures by which the offender and victim reach agreement about reparations
must be fair, characterized by "voluntariness, equality of treatment, as well as the
chance to disagree". The community be involved in helping to integrate the
offender into society. (emphasis in original)
Restorative justice contemplates the reintegration not only of the offender,
but also the victim, into society, since often the victim feels stigmatised by the
crime. For reintegration to be successful, the victim or offender and the
community must respect each other, must commit to each other and must have
"intolerance for - but understanding of- deviant behavior."289
Some commentators maintain that restorative justice processes provide an
opportunity for forgiveness of the offender by the victim. Enright and Kittle29°
view forgiveness as "a merciful act of giving a gift to someone who does not
necessarily deserve it;" it is not a substitute for justice, since regardless of whether
the victim has forgiven the offender, "the offender still has a debt to pay, whether
to the victim, to the state, or both." Worthington29' suggests that although
285 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
286 Van Ness & Strong, supra note 11 at 74.
287 D. Lerman, "Restoring Dignity, Effecting Justice (1999) 26 H.R.LJ. 20 at 20.
288 H. Messmer & H-U. Otto, "Restorative Justice: Steps on the Way Toward a Good Idea" in H. Messmer
& H-U. Otto, eds., Restorative Justice on Trak Pifalls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation - International
Research Perspectives (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Press,1992) at 2 [hereinafter Messmer & Otto].
289 Van Ness & Strong, supra note 11 at 120.
290 R.D. Enright & B.A. Kittle, "Forgiveness in Psychology and Law: The Meeting of Moral Development
and Restorative Justice" (2000) 27 Fordham U. L.J. 1621 at 1630 [hereinafter Enright & Kittle].
291 E.L. Worthington Jr., "Is There a Place for Forgiveness in the Justice System?" (2000) 27 Fordham U.
L.J. 1721 at 1731.
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forgiveness occurs within the victim and cannot be achieved by the justice system,
"[f]orgiveness is more likely with restorative justice than traditional justice." Even
so, this is a "grudging forgiveness, which satisfies the grudge by helping the victim
feel free of hate and righteously magnanimous for granting mercy." '92 On the
other hand, Lerman29 maintains that restorative justice principles "provide a
theoretical and programmatic background for forgiveness to become a part of the
lexicon of the United States criminal justice system. Proponents of forgiveness
affirm that it does not necessarily mean either condonation294 or forgetting, but
rather viewing the offender as part of the human community and "committing to
deal with him [sic] again." '295
More prosaically, the British Columbia Restorative Justice Framework
identified seven principles which could equally characterize less purportedly
"new" initiatives: awareness and involvement of the public; accessibility at every
stage of the justice process; inclusiveness; public safety; procedural fairness and
equitable settlements and agreements; redressing of significant power imbalances;
and cost effectiveness.296
c. Relationship with the mainstream system
There is some debate about the extent to which restorative justice should -
or can - co-exist with the mainstream system. Llewellyn and Howse2 97 go so far as
to argue that restorative justice should replace the current system. Most such
proponents of a single system concede the necessity, albeit not the desirability, of a
dual system during a transition to a full restorative justice model, even while
acknowledging that in a restorative system it may be necessary to deprive some
offenders of their liberty for the protection of the public in narrowly defined
cases.
2 98
292 Ibid. at 1730.
293 D. Lerman, "Forgiveness in the Criminal Justice System: If it Belongs, Then Why is it SO Hard to Find?"
(2000) 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1663 at 1674.
294 Enright & Kittle, supra note 290 at 1623.
295 L.R. Meyer, "Forgiveness and Public Trust" (2000) 27 Fordham U.L.J. 1515 at 1523 [hereinafter Meyer].
296 B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General, supra note 46 at 7.
297 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
298 M. Wright, "Victim-Offender Mediation as a Step Towards a Restorative System of Justice" in Messmer
& Otto, supra note 288 at 520.
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Most commentators recognize or concede that restorative justice will not
always be appropriate or effective and that it must be "backed up" by more
traditional approaches, such as punishment, including imprisonment or, more
generally, "incapacitation." '299 Braithwaite's examples of incapacitation other than
imprisonment include removal of licences for medical frauds and the removal of
children from child abusers. The approach to wrong-doing, he suggests, should
not be either/or but one in which "the weaknesses revealed in the failure of one
strategy [will be countered] with the strengths of another."3" Others have agued
that the government should be "responsible for maintaining a basic framework of
order, and the other parties [should be] responsible for restoring community peace
and harmony."30' Realistically, restorative justice "as a partial theory of justice
must be reconciled with retributive theories of justice;" for example, what
constitutes harm will be determined not only by the victim, but also by the
Criminal Code and "the charging decisions of police and prosecutors."302
Even where there is agreement on a dual system, there remain contentious
issues. Marshall" 3 contends that victims should always have a chance to engage in
victim-offender mediation and the offender the opportunity to make reparations,
although now the main factors determining whether this option is presented are
those of greatest significance to the legal system by diverting the offender from
prosecution (or trial) or imprisonment and reducing costs. Rudin3 4 argues that
restorative justice should not always involve representatives from the formal legal
system, since that transfers the coercive nature of the legal system to the
restorative justice system; others argue, however, that "state officials should be
involved if restorative justice is to reach those affected by state processing.
30 5
Nevertheless, the timing of events in restorative justice - or of the introduction of
restorative justice practices into the situation - should not be dependent on timing
in the formal legal system; for example, a victim might not be ready to meet an
offender prior to sentencing when often that is when the restorative initiative is to
take place.
299 Ibid. at 530; Kwochka, supra note 148 at 167; Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1742.
300 Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1742.
301 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 31.
302 Roach 2000, supra note 238.
303 Supra note 231.
304 J. Rudin, "From Punishment to Healing" online: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice
Conference(1999) http://www.ciaj-icaj.ca/sentencing/rudin.htn-l (accessed December 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Rudin 19991.
050 Roach 2000, supra note 238; see also Braithwaite & Parker, supra note 251at 109.
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Young argues that "restorative community justice" brings offenders in a
local community "to account" so that they are "both punished and required to
settle accounts with the victims and community" with both punitive and
rehabilitative "judicial interventions" implemented quickly. 306 Thus in this light,
restorative justice is an aid to the mainstream system and both work together to
respond to the challenges posed by the "law-and-order" and "holistic" critics of the
mainstream system.
In Canada formal restorative justice initiatives fall within the "alternative
measures" permitted by section 717 of the Criminal Code and section 4 of the
Young Offenders Acr. they require the sanction of the mainstream system. Thus
the British Columbia "restorative justice framework" was intended to "enhance"
the existing system, not replace it3" 7 and the same is true of the Nova Scotia
comprehensive restorative justice program which was actually an extension of the
alternate measures process in place for juvenile offenders. °8 Perhaps more
significantly, there may be a temptation to bring even more flexible restorative
justice processes which began outside the mainstream system within the control of
the dominant system. For example, some observers, including appellate courts,
believe that guidelines should be established for circle sentencing, 9 perhaps the
ultimate irony since traditional aboriginal practices are considered by many to be
the foreparent of "modern" restorative justice practices.
d. Relationship between criminal and civil justice
One signal of a "paradigm shift" is the eliminating of the boundaries
between the civil and criminal legal systems. Llewellyn and Howse31° contend
that while the emphasis on restorative justice has been in the criminal area, this
development is the result of "the arbitrary historical distinction between public
and private law" which "was grounded on morally arbitrary choices about which
actions could threaten the rulers' social position or control." The issue is not,
therefore, whether the legal regime is criminal or private, but whether a wrong has
been committed, although it may be a matter of debate about whether particular
306 M. Young, "Restorative Community Justice in the United States: A New Paradigm" (1999) 6 Intl Rev. of
Victimology 265 at 266 [hereinafter Young 1999].
307 B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General, supra note 246 at 2.
308 Nova Scotia Department ofJustice, supra note 129; Archibald, supra note 254 at 523.
309 A. Manson, "The Reform of Sentencing in Canada" in Stuart et al, supra note 254 at 489 [hereinafter
Manson].
310 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
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conduct should be framed as a "wrong." They refer to labour law, family law
(where there are power imbalances and emotions), international law and corporate
regulation (white collar crime) as civil areas where restorative justice has a part to
play. The British Columbia justice reforms were directed at both the civil and
criminal systems, although typically employing different language ("collaborative,
consensus-building approaches" and "restorative approaches," respectively)."' The
perception of crime as a breach of the relationship between the victim and the
offender, rather than as an offence against the state, reflects the basis of civil harm
as arising from wrongdoing by one individual against another. The increased
involvement of the victim in criminal cases diminishes the control by the Crown.
Yet while the boundaries between civil and criminal disputes may be blurring,
they are far from dissolved and even proponents of criminal restitution
acknowledge the different purposes satisfied by the civil and criminal systems.32
e. Responding to needs
One of the major claims and appeals of restorative justice is that it takes
the needs of all participants into account and emphasizes their needs determines
process and outcome. Most, although not all, programs acknowledge the needs of
the generic offender, victim and community (for example, all victims "need to
regain control over their own lives, and [have] need for vindication of their
rights");... the major exception appears to be aboriginal programs which are
directed at the particular circumstances of aboriginal offenders and communities.
Restorative justice redefines the offenders' "needs" from a fair trial to the
need to take responsibility and to replace the expectation of "just" punishment,
specifically imprisonment, with consequences designed to lead to growth and
positive change. The Balanced and Restorative Justice Project (BARJ) in the
United States, a national program directed at juveniles, begun in 1993 and funded
by the United States Department of Justice, illustrates the response to offenders'
needs.3"' Offenders' accountability is viewed as taking responsibility for their
offences and the harm they caused victims rather than "taking [their]
punishment," with victims and community taking "active roles in the sanctioning
process;" competency is achieved when offenders develop their strengths and
311 B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General, supra note 246 at 1.
312 S.A. Thorvaldson, "Restitution and Victim Participation at Sentencing: A Comparison of Two Models"
in Galaway & Hudson, supra note 47 at 35.
313 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 32.
314 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270; Lewis & Howard, supra note 273.
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relationships with law-abiding adults in order to become more productive
members of their communities; without eliminating "locked facilities," public
safety is achieved through the development of new relationships and structuring
time around work, education and service. The approach reflected in BARJ may be
applied through a variety of specific measures, including victim-offender
mediation or reconciliation, sentencing circles, community reparative boards and
conferencing.
For victims, the most significant impact of restorative justice is the larger
role it envisions for the victim, sometimes one that is central to the process or one
which contemplates a different "structural position" for the victim in the criminal
legal system." ' One probation service in the U.K. contends that "work with
victims can no longer be seen as an adjunct to work with offenders; it assumes a
standing in its own right in relation to the development of a broader contribution
by the Probation Service to the criminal justice process." '16 Llewellyn and Howse
distinguish between processes which are "victim-controlled" and those which are
"victim-centred;" the latter reflect restorative justice, while the former do not since
the victim cannot ask for something antithetical to the restoration of the
relationship.317
The goal of including victims as a major player in the process is to
"empower" the victim." ' The minimum requirement is to be sure that the victim
"is not more abused or overwhelmed by the process" '' and that practices are
instituted to inform and safeguard the victim.32° Therefore, the victim must
consent to involvement in a particular process, although there is a concern with the
pressure a victim might feel faced with claims about the value of restorative justice
and its importance to the community.32" ' Once involved in a process, a victim may
feel pressured to reach agreement with the offender since the offender may
otherwise go to jail.32 '
35 Law Commission 1999, supra note 7.
316 HM Inspectorate of Probation, The Victim Perpective: Ensuring the Victim Matters (London: U.K.: Home
Office, 2000) [hereinafter HM Inspectorate of Probation].
317 Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
318 Bonta et al 1998, supra note 232; LIewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
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The most extensive role for victims occurs in victim-offender mediation,
one form of which goes back to the introduction in Ontario of a Mennonite
Church sponsored victim reconciliation program in the 1970s 323 where often the
victim speaks directly with the offender and has a say in the determination of the
"reparative plan." It also may occur in circle sentencing where the victim not only
participates equally in the circle process but may be involved in a healing
conference. 324 These models encourage the victim to express her or his feelings
about the crime, although some emphasise restitution and others reconciliation.325
According to Bazemore and Umbreit, family group conferencing may be
least responsive to the victim's needs, although more recent experiences indicate
greater attention to the victim, and circle sentencing, because it is an open process,
risks greater attention being given to the offender and his or her rehabilitative and
support needs than to the victim and her or his reparative needs; one way in which
the balance may be redressed is through a victim support group organized by the
convenors of the circle.326
Restorative justice envisions that the community will also become
"empowered" to deliver relevant programs; this means that it will not be
government's responsibility to do so, as it is now.327 The Youth Circles program in
Saskatchewan, begun in the fall of 1997, is an example of a community-based
program developed between the government and the Saskatoon Tribal Council."'
Aboriginal youth had tended to be excluded from the established young offender
mediation programs because they were not considered suitable for diversion in
light of the high number of contacts they had had with the police by the time they
had turned twelve. The program uses a medicine wheel approach, completing in
each case a "home study" in order to discover "which aspect of the medicine wheel
was out of balance." As Kwochka329 explains, the medicine wheel "teaches that
everything is interrelated and evolves in a circular pattern;" the physical, mental,
emotional and spiritual elements in an individual must be equally developed to be
323 Bonta et al, supra note 232.
324 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
325 Bonta el al, supra note 232.
326 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
327 Nova Scotia Department of Justice, supra note 129.
328 Y. Boyer, "Community Based Justice Initiatives of Saskatoon Tribal Council" online: Canadian Institute
for the Administration of Justice Conference(1 999) http://www.ciaj-icai.ca/sentencing/boyer.html
(accessed December 1, 2000) [hereinafter Boyer].
329 Kwochka, supra note 148 at 159,
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balanced. Where there is an imbalance in the individual or the community, it
needs to be restored through healing, taking into account a broader time period
and circle of people than does the retributive system.
D. Restorative Justice Initiatives
a. Introduction
Governments in a number of countries have adopted restorative justice as
an approach to criminal justice, including England, Scotland, New Zealand,
Norway, the United States and European countries.33° It is perhaps not surprising
that restorative justice is a significant model in Japan, since "[a]pology and
reciprocal pardon are dominant threads of Japan's cultural fabric" and restitution
and mediation are "normal" or regular activities."' In Canberra, the capital of
Australia, "more than 10,000 citizens out of a population of 300,000 have attended
a conference."" 2 The United States Department of Justice has embraced victim-
offender mediation and there are more than 1000 victim-offender mediation
programs (VOMs) dealing with thousands of cases a year, although many are
private, community-based programs; there are more than 25 programs in Canada
and over 700 programs in Europe. 33 In the U.K. victim-offender mediation and
reparation schemes exist in connection with some probation services; there are also
community mediations directed at crime prevention which deal with cases where
the offender and the victim are both victim and contributor to the problem.3  The
Community Law Reform Commission for the Australian Capital Territory
recommended that its proposed Process of Attempted Reconciliation program "be
110 Wright, supra note 298 at 531; Marshall 1998, supra note 231at 234; Bonta et al., supra note 232; M.
Omatsu, "Experiences with Restorative Justice" (1999) 23:1 Prov. Judges J. 22; Bazemore & Umbreit,
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331 J.O. Haley, "Victim-Offender Mediation: Japanese and American Comparisons" in H. Messmer & 0.
Hans-Uwe, eds. Restorative Justice on Trail Pif'alls and Potentials of Victim-Offender Mediation - International
Research Perspectives, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992) at 114.
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offender and often members of the community with the assistance of a mediator or facilitator. For
discussion of conferences, see infra.
333 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270; Bonta et al, supra note 232; M. Umbreit, "Avoiding the
Marginalization and 'McDonaldization' of Victim-Offender Mediation: A Case Study in Moving
Toward the Mainstream," in Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 233 at 213 [hereinafter Umbreit 1999].
334 HM Inspectorate of Probation, supra note 316.
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accorded statutory recognition and protection," following a pilot project, based on
the legislative support given programs in New South Wales and Queensland.33
Governments may embark on restorative justice processes for many
reasons. The Nova Scotia restorative justice project, for example, had as its
primary goals, reducing recidivism and increasing victim satisfaction and as
secondary goals, strengthening communities and increasing public confidence in
the justice system.336 As previously indicated, restorative justice initiatives in
Canada need the legitimacy offered by section 717 of the Criminal Code and
section 4 of the Young Offenders Act and the Canadian government initiatives in
Canada do conform to the legislative requirements.
The most comprehensive schemes permit restorative justice at any point
during the criminal legal process; however, they usually remain linked with the
process in the event restorative processes fail. For example, the Nova Scotia
initiative contemplates entry points at various stages of the criminal legal process,
with more serious cases (particularly domestic violence cases) being diverted at
later and more public stages; this multiple entry "may be unique" and, it is
claimed, differentiates the Nova Scotia scheme from "an adjunct to sentencing" or
more limited or piece-meal alternative measures. " The Nova Scotia program
builds on existing alternative systems, such as the adult and juvenile diversion
systems, which Archibald suggests are not in themselves restorative because they
do not include the victim and the community "on a consistent basis."
The minimum requirements of the Nova Scotia project (reflecting those
required by section 717 of the Criminal Code and section 4 of the Young
Offenders Act) are that the referral is not inconsistent with public safety; it is
appropriate in light of the interests of victim, offender and community; the
offender accepts responsibility for his or her actions; the offender is given
information about the program and consents "freely and fully" to participation and
may retain counsel; there is sufficient evidence to proceed and prosecution of the
offence is not barred by law. The discretionary factors which, according to
335 Community Law Reform Commission (Australian Capital Territory) online: Report No. 6: Victims of Crime
(1993) http://www.dpa/act.gov.au/ag/Reports/CLRC/r6/Report6.html (accessed December 1, 2000)
[hereinafter Community Law Reform Commission 1993].
336 Nova Scotia Department of Justice, supra note 129.
337 Ibid.
338 Archibald, supra note 254 at 524.
Vol. XlIII
Vol. XIII Re-Thinking Access to Criminal Justice 87
Archibald,339 "are similar to those found in Crown Attorney guidelines concerning
the decision to terminate proceedings in the public interest or those found in
various alternative measures schemes presently in use across the country, though
with a heavy emphasis on victim concerns," are the degree of the offender's
cooperation; the extent of the victim's willingness to participate; whether the
community desires a restorative result; the offender's motive for committing the
offence; the seriousness of the offence and the planning engaged in by the
offender; the relationship between victim and offender and possibility of a
continued relationship; the offender's capacity to learn from the process and
follow through with any agreement; the potential for a meaningful agreement for
the victim; the harm suffered by the victim; previous referrals of the offender to
similar programs; conflict with a government or prosecution policy; and other
relevant factors about the offence, offender, victim and community. If the
offender or community agency believes that the forum should not continue, the
offender may be returned to the conventional process, there will be monitoring of
the agreement by the community agency and statements by the offender will not
be admissible in evidence against the offender.
According to Braithwaite, "participant (victim, offender, community,
police) satisfaction with such restorative justice processes [as conferencing] is
extremely high, typically 90%-95%, and in some studies even higher."3" He
suggests that anticipated sources of opposition (the police, victims and in particular
women with respect to crimes of violence against women) have either been
supportive or have converted after experience with conferencing 4'
Before considering the main restorative justice responses in greater detail,
the next section identifies some "piecemeal" responses to problems with the




"Piecemeal" or individual responses include legal aid, conditional
sentences, lay tribunals, initiatives designed to recognize victims and initiatives to
-19 Ibid. at 528.
340 Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1744.
341 Ibid. at 1745.
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provide information to and liaison with accused. All these initiatives are intended
to make the mainstream system "work better," and/or more equitably, but they are
not intended to change it fundamentally. As indicated in Chapter I, these are first
and second wave reforms, to use Cappelletti and Garth's nomenclature.342 It
should be noted, however, that most of these initiatives may be considered
"restorative justice" initiatives by some observers.343 Thus Marshall considers
support groups for victims and for offenders as examples of restorative justice
practices.3"' Although describing discrete approaches such as victim impact
statements as "marginal," he maintains that "[r]estorative justice is not simply a
matter of new self-contained programmes. It involves principles that can inform
every aspect of the work of all criminal justice agencies. One can have restorative
prisons, restorative policing, etc." Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada has
acknowledged that Canadian sentencing provisions now incorporate restorative
principles."'
ii. Legal aid
Although it is not a restorative justice initiative, any discussion of these
approaches should begin with legal aid since it has been for many years the major
way in which offenders have been given "access to justice." Formal legal aid
programs have been part of the criminal legal system since the 1950s. The
primary objective of criminal legal aid (including state-funded legal representation
provided outside the legal aid plan) has been to provide to an indigent accused the
legal representation necessary for a fair trial, ideally similar to that which a paying
client would receive (for the most part, this means a legal aid client would not
receive a higher level of representation than a paying client).346 The same principle
-underlies civil legal aid, although it may not as easily available.347 Criticisms of the
legal aid system relate both to the amount of legal aid allowed and the kinds of
342 Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 8.
343 Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 233 at 48.
344 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
345 R v. Gladue, supra note 150; K. Roach & J. Rudin, "Gladue: The Judicial and Political Reception of a
Promising Decision," (2000) 42 Can.. J. Crim. 355 [hereinafter Roach & Rudin]; Llewellyn & Howse
supra note 11.
346 Winters v. Legal Services Sodeoy and the Attorny General of British Columbia, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 160.
347 Mossman 1993, supra note 116; P. Hughes, "New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Communitly Services) v.
G. a.); En Route to More Equitable Access to the Legal System?" (2000) 15 J. L. & Soc. Pol'y 93
[hereinafter Hughes 2000]; New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Communiol Services) v. G. .), [1999] 3
S.C.R. 46.
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cases for which legal aid will be granted." 8 While there have been calls for a
broader or more holistic approach to legal aid,349 these proposals generally remain
within the parameters of the adversarial criminal legal system. Indeed, as
indicated in Chapter I, some commentators maintain that legal aid may even
"perpetuat[e] social injustice."" Given the differential access to the criminal and
civil legal systems in their current form, legal aid is a necessary tool of access, but
in itself it is not - and is unlikely to become - a means by which we can redefine
the meaning or reality of the phrase "access to justice." This is not to say,
however, that the way in which legal aid is allocated could not take into account
equitable access to processes or initiatives arising out of new ways of defining
justice;' on the contrary, it could and should do so.
iii. Victim-centred initiatives
In recent years, the mainstream system has incorporated a greater role for
the victim (other than as a witness), but participation is still not extensive."3
In Canada, section 722 of the Criminal Code provides that victims or their
families may deliver victim impact statements on sentencing or when discharge or
conditional discharge is a possibility, for example. In one sense, the impact on the
victim has long been taken into account by a sentencing judge; victim impact
statements are a more formal element in sentencing, however, and bring the
victim's own words into the process. Relying heavily on the Canadian experience
through 1990, the Community Law Reform Commission of the Australian Capital
Territory's Report on victim impact statements found that the use of these
statements had not led to too great a victim influence in sentencing or to
complicating the sentencing process, but had allowed victims to feel involved in
the process, even if the statement was not actually used in court."5 On the other
hand, victims groups have argued that the use and understanding of victim impact
statements is erratic and may be censored to the extent that the victim hardly
348 Mossman 1993, ibid.; McCamus, supra note 32; Zemans, Monohan & Thomas, supra note 99.
349 Ewart, supra note 99.
350 Young & Wall, supra note 10 at 25.
351 A. Currie, "Riding the Third Wave: Rethinking Criminal Legal Aid Within an Access to Justice
Framework." (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2000) [hereinafter Currie].
352 Van Ness 1993, supra note 127; Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
353 Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335.
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recognizes them."4 The Australian Report pointed out that victim impact
statements were for the benefit of the victim and the court and do not "mean that
the offender will gain an appreciation of the hurt he or she has caused a person;"
3 s5
such an appreciation is a mark of restorative justice.
Another discrete victim-focussed process has been criminal injuries
compensation which revived the old custom of offenders' paying reparations to
victims in Anglo-Saxon society, gradually displaced by payments to the Crown or
lord for the loss to them.3 56 Criminal injuries compensation was introduced in
New Zealand in 1963 and now exists in a number of jurisdictions, including
Canada where it is the responsibility of the provinces. On the one hand, the
justification for criminal injuries compensation has been said to be consideration
for the victim's having left the crime to be dealt with by the state; on the other
hand, it has been said to be a recognition by the community of the unjust infliction
of harm.3"7 But the process can be counterproductive if it is highly technical,
formal or adversarial; or if the state is able to claim any monies paid to the victim
from the offender, since the offender might then be entitled to cross-examine the
victim.
315
In the U.K., a "Victim's Charter" was established in 1990 (and updated in
1996) which required the probation service to contact victims to see whether they
had concerns about the conditions of release of offenders who had been sentenced
to life and subsequently to the release of other offenders. A subsequent study
showed that it had mixed but generally positive results, concluding that the
restorative work that was accomplished was impressive and "[n]ew developments
with victims of domestic violence added a depth to work with offenders, whilst
protecting women from re-victiminization. '3 9
It should be noted that many victim-centred initiatives have resulted from
lobbying by the "victims' rights movement." Thus Kurki argues that restorative
justice, which focuses on victims and offenders, is not "part of' the victims' rights
movement, even though it is "typically associated with it and other social
354 "Victims' Groups" (1999) online: Submission to the Alberta Summit on Justice
<http://www/gov.ab.ca/justicesummit/consult/crepl2.htm> (date accessed: 1 December 2000).
355 Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.; Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
358 Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335.
359 HM Inspectorate of Probation, supra note 316.
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movements., 360 Joseph, in contrast, suggests that "the growth of the victims' rights
movement should have a positive effect on the growth of victim-offender
mediation programs. "361
iv. Offender-directed initiatives
No measure is actually offender "centred," since at least the community
must always been considered. Therefore, the term "offender-directed" may be
more appropriate. Lay tribunals and legal aid, already discussed, are both
offender-directed initiatives. Other initiatives directed at the offender's ability to
interact with the mainstream system include court workers, programs which are
sometimes designed specifically to recognize accused's specific characteristics,
such as the Native Court Worker Program in Saskatchewan, and which provide
information about the system and may act as a liaison as the accused proceeds
through the system.362
One of the main offender-directed initiatives is conditional sentencing.
Criticisms of the heavy-handed resort in Canada to imprisonment as a form of
punishment led to the sentencing reforms in Bill C-41 enacted in 1995. Sections
718, 718.1 and 718.2 set out the purpose, objectives and principles governing
sentencing. The Supreme Court of Canada has said that section 718, in referring
to sentencing objectives providing reparations to victims or the community,
promoting in offenders a sense of responsibility and acknowledgement of harm
done to victims and community, and in assisting rehabilitation of offenders, has
identified "restorative goals" as a "focus" of sentencing; furthermore, "[r]estorative
sentencing goals do not usually correlate with the use of prison as a sanction." '363
The application of restorative justice principles is intended "to reduce the rate of
incarceration and improve the effectiveness of sentencing. '' "6 Section 742.1 of the
Criminal Code provides for conditional sentences where the judge would have
sentenced the offender to a term of imprisonment of less than two years,3 65 the
public's safety would not be endangered and a conditional sentence would be
consistent with the sentencing principles set out in section 718 of the Code. The
360 Kurki, supra note 244 at: 266, 264.
361 Joseph, supra note 83.
362 Currie, supra note 351.
363 Gladue 1999, supra note 150 at para. 43
364 R. v. Proulx, [20001 1 S.C.R. 61 at para 20 [hereinafter Pmul].
365 Conditional sentences are not allowed where an offence is punishable by a minimum term of
imprisonment.
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sentencing judge must impose certain "compulsory" conditions, may also impose
other specified conditions and has some discretion to impose others which can be
tailored to the offender with the goal of preventing recidivism; this differs from
conditions attached to probation under section 732.1 of the Criminal Code, the
purposes of which are to protect society and to facilitate the offender's
reintegration into society." At least some of these conditions are meant to be
"punitive" and conditions "restrictive of the offender's liberty should be the norm,
not the exception." '367
Although the requirement that the judge would have sentenced the
offender to prison is intended to avoid "net-widening" or actually increasing the
number of persons incarcerated, there is still concern that conditional sentences
may increase the number of people incarcerated.368 Conditional sentences may be
longer than prison sentences and offenders who breach a condition may be
imprisoned for the longer period.369 Conditional sentences must be realistic and
relevant to the offence; otherwise there is an increased risk of the offender's
committing a minor offence (such as breaking curfew) which will result in
imprisonment,370 a not insignificant concern given that aboriginal offenders have
been "disproportionately subject to system based offences" which include breach
of a condition imposed as part of a conditional sentence.3 ' At the same time,
Roberts and LaPrairie72 warn that conditions must be "properly crafted" if
conditional sentences are not to appear too lenient to a population which already
believes sentences are not severe enough.
v. Community-centred initiatives
One way of involving the community in the criminal legal system is to
"decentralize" mainstream institutions, actors or processes. Turner argues that
"the community can deliver a more effective form of justice in many cases than
366 (Roberts and LaPrairie 2000 [hereinafter Roberts & Laprairie].
367 Proulx, supra note 364 at para. 36.
368 Roberts & LaPrairie supra note 366; Roach & Rudin, supra note 345.
369 Roach 2000, supra note 238; Proulx, supra note 364 at para. 39.
370 Quigley, supra note 32.
371 Roach & Rudin, supra note 345.
372 Supra note 366.
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can the centralized criminal justice system.373 [This approach] also reflects local
expertise and recognizes that the public should be involved in developing and
delivering justice services."
In Canada piece-meal community-based or partnered initiatives include
the provision of public education, measures directed at crime prevention,
community policing, support for and supervision of offenders released into the
community and victim support services.' In the United States, for example,
there has been a concerted effort "to bring courts, prosecution units and defence
teams to local neighborhoods." '375 While "restorative justice" and "community
justice" may be treated as very similar, if not the same, particularly when
contrasted with more traditional approaches,376 in fact community justice
processes are more likely to be directed at crime prevention and citizen
participation often takes the form of assisting agents of the system, such as police,
rather than challenging them.377 It must be recognized, furthermore, that "neither
developing programs and increasing access will alone change the role of
neighborhood residents from service recipients to decision makers with a stake in,
or feeling of ownership, in what services are provided and how they are delivered
[sic];" rather, it is necessary to identify "distinctive roles for citizens in
determining what the obligation and terms of accountability will be, as well as
how these reparative requirements may be carried out as part of a dispositional or
diversion sanction.
378
Lay tribunals, operating in the United States and Canada, also involve the
community in the criminal system.17  For example, reparative boards are
composed of local citizens who, after hearing from the young offender (who has
been referred by the courts), others (such as parents or friends) and sometimes the
victims, determine the appropriate outcome and process of enforcement which
373 J. Turner, "Changing Punishment at the Turn of the Century: Finding a Common Ground" (1999)
online: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference <http://www.ciaj-
icag.ca/sentencing/turner.html> (date accessed: 1 December 2000).
374 Ibid.; Currie, supra note 351.
375 Bazemore 1999, supra note 198. See also M.K. Harris, "Exploring the Implications of Four Sanctioning
Orientations for Community Corrections," (1998) 62 Federal Probation 81 [hereinafter Harris]; Young
1999, supra note 306; Kaas 2000).
376 Harris, ibid. at 83.
377 Kurki, supra note 244.
378 Bazemore 1999, supra note 198.
379 Kurki, supra note 244 at 282.
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they may monitor. Even among those who consider these tribunals to be a form of
restorative justice, they are acknowledged to be the most formal and least
consensual of the approaches. 8 A similar system involving a lay tribunal of
community representatives, the offender and the offender's parents, but not the
victim, has been in place for thirty years in Scotland.38'
The kinds of initiatives discussed above, if successful, may help the victim
overcome some of the destructive effects of the crime she or he suffered. They
may give "the community" some sense that the legal system is not always distant
or abstract. They may even make the criminal legal system slightly more
accessible or equitable for the offender. But they do not require "the paradigm
shift" to which this paper is addressed. For that, a change in the conceptual
framework is required. It is to responses which purport to offer such a substantive
change to which the discussion now turns.
c. The three main restorative justice approaches
i. Introduction
This section considers the most common measures designed to advance
restorative justice: victim-offender mediation, (family) group conferencing and
aboriginal circles and other aboriginal initiatives. The discussion is not meant to
be exhaustive, but to indicate the way in which these processes are said to respond
to criticisms of the mainstream system and to meet the needs of victims, offenders
and communities or, in short, to indicate how these approaches are said to reflect
principles of restorative justice. Although it is possible to identify "pure" or
discrete models, they have begun to influence each other.382 While some observers
believe that a "hybrid" model may be developed, Bazemore and Umbreit383
conclude that it is more realistic to envision the use of a variety of models,
depending on the specific needs of the case and the need to maximize efficiency in
use of resources. Factors which could be taken into account in determining the
appropriate model include the seriousness of the crime, the nature of the harm
380 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
381 Marshall 1998 supra note 231, citing L. McAra & P.Young, "Juvenile Justice in Schotdand" (1997) 15
Oim. J. 8.
382 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
383 Ibid.
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suffered by the victim, the record of the offender and the existence of other
"complications" such as dysfunctional relationships." 4 As Peachey indicates,
[T]he various approaches to restorative justice have different foci.
Restitution and compensation focus on the victim. Retribution focused
on the offender. Forgiveness often implies altering the relationship
between the victim and the offender.
8 5
Yet for those involved, the distinctions may not be as clear. An offender may
perceive as punishment that which the victim or "authorities" consider restitution.
One final introductory comment: while these approaches are all said to
reflect restorative justices principles, they differ with respect to who is involved
(the community is less likely to be involved in victim offender mediation than in
conferencing, for example) and whose interests are most significant (the offender's
interests may be emphasized more in conferencing than in victim offender
mediation); furthermore, it is important to recognize and respect the different
processes which these approaches follow (for example, in the sentencing circles,
each person speaks in turn to all the participants and there is to be no interruption
of people as they speak, while in victim-offender mediation, the mediator may
encourage the offender and victim to speak to each other; either of these might be
usefully contrasted with the reparation board (to which we have previously
referred) where the offender, victim and others who participate address the board
members).
ii. Victim-offender mediation
Victim-offender mediation (VOM) may be the most widespread
restorative justice practice, although Price argues that it is "not inherently
restorative," since it may have punitive goals386 and others have argued that
"restorative justice is more than mediation." '387 Other terms for this process include
"victim offender dialogue, meeting or conference" in order to distinguish it from
384 D. E. Peachey, "Restitution, Reconciliation, Retribution: Identifying the Forms ofJustice People Desire,"
in Messmer & Otto, supra note 288; Marshall 1998 smpra note 231; Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note
270.
385 Peachey, ibid at 553.
386 M. Price, "Victim Offender Mediation: The State of the Art" (1996) online: 7 VOMA.Q.
<http://www.vorp.com/-vorp/articles/art.htm> (date accessed: 2 January 2001) [hereinafter Price
1996].
387 Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 233 at 132.
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civil mediation."' The Community Law Reform Commission of the Australian
Capital Territory suggested that an appropriate term is "Process of Attempted
Reconciliation," since it more accurately reflects process rather than outcome:"'
Although VOM may be considered a descendent of victim-offender
reconciliation programs (VORPs) developed in the 1970s in Canada, it is now a
distinct branch in order to emphasize a heightened attention to the victim. 9 The
difference in terminology is important. When the American Bar Association was
considering whether to endorse these programs, the victim caucus objected to
endorsing VORP because "reconciliation" carries a connotation of forgiveness and
ignores victims' anger; the ABA subsequently endorsed victim-offender mediation
because "it emphasized the process rather than the expected outcome of
mediation,"'3 9' a feature generally characteristic of restorative justice, 39' although
others argue that process and outcome are equally important.393 The term actually
approved by the ABA was "victim-offender mediation and dialogue" in order to
make it clear that neither losses nor guilt was negotiable. 94
The most commonly recognized benefits of VOM include a more
comprehensive approach to victims' needs; the opportunity for the victim and
offender to see each other as persons; and the possibility that it will have greater
impact on the offender than the usual sanctions. Where the community is
involved, VOM delivers a message of the community's willingness to re-accept the
offender.393 In practice, programs may differ with respect to the particular
community of offenders whom they serve, the extent to which they involve the
community, the type of crime they address or their affiliation or funding,396 but
there are some common elements and goals: the programs are meant to be more
388 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270; Office for Victims of Crime, The Restorative justice and Mediation
Collection (2000) online: U.S. Department of Justice <http://ojp.usdog.gov/ovc/infores/
restorative-justice/buUetinl /welcone.html> (date accessed: 1 December 2000) [hereinafter Office for
Victims of Crime 2000).
389 Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335. See also Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra
note 229 at 70.
390 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
391 Ibid.
392 Llewelyn & Howse supra note 11.
393 Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 233 at 48; Kurki, supra note 244 at 264.
394 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
395 Marshall 1998 supra note 231.
396 Joseph, supra note 83.
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concerned with changing the parties than restitution of any actual loss.397 When
the American Bar Association endorsed VOM in 1994 as a practice which should
be available in all courts in the United States, it set out thirteen requirements with
which the programs should comply.3 98
The dynamics of victim-offender mediation have been described as
different from those characterizing civil mediation. Unlike much of civil
mediation, mediation in the criminal context does not involve "disputants" and the
mediation is not for the purpose of determining fault, since the offender has
admitted wrongdoing. Thus the mediator's participation is based on recognition
of one person's wrongdoing at the outset; "[t]he mediator is neutral as to the
individuals, respecting both as valuable human beings and favoring neither... But
the mediator is not neutral as to the wrong. ' 99 It is important that the mediation
not divert attention from the offender's conduct and obligation to make amends by
considering whatever role the victim might have had in the crime; these
complexities can be addressed only when "the current offence has been atoned for,
when the bargaining table is once again level."4" Victim-offender mediation also
has been described as "dialogue-driven," compared to "most other forms of
mediation in civil court settings [which are] settlement-driven with little or no
time to talk about the larger context of the conflict or the feelings of the involved
parties.""°  Thus Umbreit °2 advocates "humanistic mediation" as a healing
process rather than an emphasis on reaching agreements, contrasting it to classic
problem-centred mediation; his comparison between the two treats the latter
narrowly and does not recognize that civil mediation generally may have some of
the characteristics he ascribes to "humanistic-transformative mediation" or indeed,
have some of the same objectives.4"3
397 Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335.
398 "Endorsement of Victim-Offender Mediation/Dialogue Programs" (1994) online: American Bar
Association <http://www.abanet.org/scripts/searchmore.asp> (date accessed: 26 March 2001); Office
for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388 [hereinafter ABA].
399 Price, supra note 243.
4o Marshall 1998 fupra note 231; Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
401 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270; Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388. To the extent
that civil mediation is a step in the litigation process, this is not an inaccurate statement; it would not be
an accurate statement with respect to much voluntary civil mediation, however.
402 M. Umbreit, "Humanistic Mediation: A Transformative Journey of Peacemaking" (1997) online: Centre
for Restorative Justice & Mediation <http://www.che.umn.edu/rjp/Resources/Documents/
umb97e.PDF> (date accessed: 1 December 2000)
403 Bush & Folger, supra note 224.
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VOM may occur at various stages of the criminal legal process, including
as a diversion from prosecution (deferred prosecution) which is conditional on the
agreement's being completed or after an admission of guilt in which case it is a
condition of probation.' Although most often involving juveniles, it may also
apply to adult offenders; of about 250 established VOM programs in the United
States, 45% of the programs worked exclusively with juvenile offenders and 9%
exclusively with adult offenders, but 46% worked with both.40 5  Referrals may
come from judges, probation officers, victim advocates, prosecutors, defense
attorneys and police. °6
While victim-offender mediation may be employed for any crimes, they
are more often used for "petty" or minor property crimes or minor assaults and
less frequently for serious crimes against the person, including assault with a
deadly weapon, assault resulting in bodily harm, sexual assault, domestic violence,
negligent homicide, attempted murder and murder. 7  Marshall asserts that
mediation may be as successful with serious crimes, people with a record of crime
and adults as with minor crimes, first time offenders and juveniles and that
personal considerations such as motivation and attitudes of victim and offender are
more important. 8 Rudin argues that restorative justice should not be restricted to
minor offences because "this is clearly a waste of a very valuable resource.""4 9
Price reports on his mediation of "severely violent crimes" which may take place
only after months or even years of preparation.41° Peachey maintains that
reconciliation is most necessary where the desire for retribution is greatest (usually
when the victim has been assaulted or sexually assault or otherwise personally
wronged): "there is little need for reconciliation where the loss is trivial or can be
addressed by third-party compensation through insurance or the state, but there is
a tremendous opportunity for reconciliation where pain runs deep."4"' Umbreit
44 Marshall 1998 supra note 231; Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
405 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388. The study identified 289 programs, but 35 of them
were too new to provide data; not all the programs answered all questions. For example, 103 programs
answered responded to a question asking with whom they worked.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
408 Marshall 1998, supra note 231. See also Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335.
409 Rudin, supra note 304. See also Marshall 1998 supra note 231; Kurki, supra note 244 at 290.
410 Price 1997, supra note 399.
411 Peachey, supra note 384 at 556.
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indicates that VOM is beginning to take account of the need to adapt "to serve the
more intense needs of parties involved in serious and violent criminal conflict."4"'
To be successful, victim-offender mediation requires considerable effort.
Both the offender and victim must give their consent to the process and must
understand the nature of the process if it is to be effective. It often involves a
session or sessions prior to the actual mediation in order to prepare both of the
major players; these preparatory sessions, which occur prior to the obtaining of
consent from the offender and victim to the mediation process, may be more
important than the actual mediation in the effectiveness of the process." 3
Similarly, enforcement of reparation agreements is an important aspect of victim-
offender mediation, although it may be done in a number of different ways,
through the mediator or through paid staff, for example.4"4 Yet VOM does not
always include follow-up after the mediation or monitoring of the offender's
compliance with the agreement; this is often done by another agency, although
more is apparently being done in this regard to link enforcement with the actors
involved in the mediation."'
Victim-offender mediation (as compared to victim offender reconciliation
programs which focused on the offender) began in large measure in response to
victims' needs. As a result of early studies in the United Kingdom which showed
that victims sometimes felt pressure to participate in victim-offender mediation or
were "rehearsed" in their expression of their emotions to have a greater impact on
the offender, guidelines and victim support services were implemented." 6 The
National Survey carried out in the United States in 1996 under the sponsorship of
the Office for Victims of Crime also resulted in guidelines for victim-sensitive
victim-offender mediation which address separate pre-mediation preparation
sessions with and preparation of the victim and the offender, a humanistic
dialogue-driven model of mediation, follow-up and make recommendations for
program development and mediator training.417
The engagement between the victim and the offender is often touted as the
most important aspect of victim-offender mediation. Victims report that the
412 Umbreit 1999, supra note 333 at 223.
413 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
414 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
415 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
416 Marshall 1998 supra note 231.
417 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
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opportunity to speak directly with the offender is often more important to them
than any actual restitution which results from the mediation." 8 Victims may feel
that they have regained some of the control which they had lost and which the
traditional system does not offer them;4 9 they may be able to obtain answers to
questions which have haunted them, such as "why me?" "How did you get into
my house" or "were you watching me?" and set aside some fears about whether
the offender will return.42°  Yet an acknowledged alternative to face-to-face
mediation is indirect mediation where the victim and offender do not meet,
perhaps because the victim is not willing to speak directly to the offender;
although the benefits may not be as great, it is practised in the United Kingdom.42'
The ABA requirements suggest only that a face-to-face meeting is "encouraged.7
422
A more abstract approach available when a victim or offender does not want to
participate or the offender has not been identified is the victim-offender panel
which brings victims who have been subject to a particular type of crime together
with offenders who have committed that crime.423 It is also worth noting that
although victim-offender mediation is theoretically premised on the offender's
being willing to acknowledge the harm he or she has done to the victim, a 1996
National Survey of VOMs in the United States indicated that offenders were
required to admit their guilt in only 65% of the programs.424
Attention to victim participation requires flexibility in scheduling
mediation until the victim is ready,4' although it must be acknowledged that the
impact of delay on the offender must also be considered, both from the perspective
of the offender's "rights" and the offender's capability of connecting the process
with the offence. Similarly, the attention to the victim is relevant to the
determination of "who goes first:" some observers argue that the victim deserves
to express her or his feelings towards the offender without having to take into
account any apology, for example, but some programs believe it is easier on the
victim if the offender speaks first and victims are often "moved" when the offender
411 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
419 Joseph, supra note 83.
420 Price, "Benefits." This short on-line document sets out concisely the benefits of victim-offender
mediation for victims, offenders, communities and the justice system.
421 Marshall 1998 supra note 231.
422 ABA, supra note 398.
423 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7; Lerman 1999, supra note 287.
424 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
425 Marshall 1998 supra note 231.
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offers an apology or shows remorse without having heard the victim.426 Llewellyn
and Howse suggest that relying on the perpetrator to speak first makes the
wrongdoer accept responsibility and places the victim at the centre of the
process.427
In the U.S. national study of VOMs, the mediator's role was defined most
often as "facilitating dialogue between the victim and the offender," slightly less
often as "making the parties feel comfortable and safe," and about equally
"assisting the parties in negotiating a mutually acceptable plan for restitution of
the victim" and "actively listening to both parties," although these last elicited
more responses than a number of other typical mediator activities.428 Most
programs provide training for community volunteer mediators, particularly for
mediating cases involving severe violence.429  Co-mediation, used at least
occasionally by 93% of the programs, was considered beneficial because it
permitted greater opportunity for volunteers from the community, quality control,
responding to diversity issues, more thorough case processing and debriefing,
increased safety and teamwork.43° Mediators must be aware of their own
culturally-affected behaviours and their implications, even if these behaviours are
in themselves otherwise neutral, as well as his or her biases and predispositions. It
is also important to understand whether an offender's motivation for committing a
crime was in some way related to race (for example) and whether a victim is
demanding more from an offender for a similar reason.43' But mediators must also
find a balance between awareness of "cultural" differences and responding on the
basis of stereotypes or generalized presumptions about how people will act.43
2
Victim offender mediation must also take into account and negotiate different
views about mediation and restoration held by different ethnic communities.433
426 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
427 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
428 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid.
431 Umbreit & Coates, supra note 2.
432 Delgado, supra note 107 at fn 96: which indicates a number of ways in which discussions of "cultural
difference" may be based on stereotypes, although note that these examples rely heavily on M.
Umbreit, "Victim Offender Mediation in Urban/Multi-Cultural Settings," 1986 National Institute of
Corrections Information Centre 12 [hereinafter Umbreit 1986].
433 A. Currie& G. Kiefl, Ethnocultural Groups and the Justice System in Canada (1994) online: Department of
Justice Canada <http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/eg> (date accessed: 1 December 2000);
Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11.
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The U.S. 1996 National Survey included interviews with persons involved
with VOM which indicated that effective programs require support from the
community, the willingness of victim support groups to consider restorative justice
and availability of volunteer mediators; some of the concerns with the programs
were lack of understanding about the program among court personnel, a tendency
to shorten or eliminate the preparation phase by volunteers or as a result of lack of
funding and transient volunteer populations, requests to mediate more serious and
complex cases for which mediators may not be trained; and disagreements about
the importance of the preparation phase. The programs often operate in isolation
with the result that mediators often do not have the opportunity to discuss or
brainstorm approaches. Furthermore, confusion about the "appropriate" objectives
of the program with the result that obtaining the appropriate balance of benefits to
offender and victim may not always be easy and may depend on who is
responsible for running the program.434 The 1996 National Survey of victim-
offender mediation programs in the United States showed, however, that most
program directors were enthusiastic about the benefits of the program for the
victim and offender and the community.4"
Studies of victim-offender mediation indicate that over 85% of the sessions
resulted in an agreement and that Was significantly higher than was the case with
court-ordered restitution.436 Far more offenders who met the victim completed
their restitution obligations compared to those who had not participated in
mediation.437
In one study of VOM 18% of offenders recidivated compared to 27% in the
regular system and their crimes were less serious,43 while Marshall indicates that
lower rates of recidivism may be connected with direct contact with the victim
(rather than indirect mediation) and first time offenders. 439
434 Community Law Reform Commission 1993, supra note 335.
435 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
436 Umbreit 1994, supra note 129; Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.; Marshall 1998 supra
note 231.
437 Umbreit 1994, ibid.
438 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
439 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
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It has been reported that "victim satisfaction with VOM has been
uniformly high,"44 although Bonta et al44' indicate that sample selection and other
factors may influence the results and report Umbreit as showing 64% attrition rate
in his study of four victim-offender mediation sites, yet concluding a high degree
of satisfaction among victims. 79% of the victims in the Umbreit's 1994 multi-site
study were satisfied with the process compared to 57% who had gone through the
normal court process; victims were "significantly less fearful of being
revictimized" after they had met the offender," 2 although Marshall points out that
we do not know whether less fearful victims are more likely to participate in the
mediation process." 3
Although most victim offender mediations take place with juveniles,
Umbreit and Bradshaw compared victim satisfaction with a program for juveniles
in Minneapolis and satisfaction with a program for adults in Winnipeg. 4"
Although victims were generally satisfied with the process, those mediating with
adult offenders had a greater fear that the offender would commit another crime
against them and were less likely to "improve" their attitude towards the offender;
they also had lower levels of satisfaction with their participation in the larger
justice process. 45
Some victim offender mediation programs do not involve anyone
(including juvenile offenders' parents) other than the offender and the victim
because they believe other attendees might dilute the benefits of the face-to-face
contact between victim and offender, while others believe support helps the
session and the follow-up phase." 6 Marshall has referred to the "excessive
individualism of victim/offender mediation practice" which gave the impetus to
-40 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270, citing M. Umbreit & R. Coates, "Cross-Site Analysis of Victim-
Offender Conflict: An Analysis of Programs in These Three States" (1993) 43(1) Juvenile andFamiy Crt.
J. 21 and Belgrave 1995; Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
441 Bonte el al199 8 , supra note 232.
442 Umbreit 1994, supra note 129.
443 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
444 Umbreit, supra note 402.
445 Explained by M. Umbreit & W. Bradshaw, "Victim Experience of Meeting Adult vs. Juvenile Offenders:
A Cross-National Comparison" (1997) 61 FederalProbation 33 at 38, as reflecting the fact that victims
of adult offenders were already more likely to have participated in the system than were victims of
juvenile offenders)
446 Office for Victims of Crime 2000, supra note 388.
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the development of a restorative justice approach involving the community called
group conferencing.447
iii. (Family) group conferencing
Conferencing is a meeting among offender, victim and members of the
community and perhaps even the arresting police officer." s In some cases, the
emphasis is on including the family of juvenile offenders, while in others, the
conference would include members of the larger community. 49 Although
conferencing is widely considered to be a restorative justice initiative, Umbreit
and Zehr state that the original conferences were not based on restorative justice
principles; rather, restorative justice has modified them or increased the models
which are grouped as "conferencing. '45
Family group conferencing (FGC) originated in New Zealand where it
arose from Maori tradition and was subsequently legislated as the standard way to
deal with juvenile crime.45' It was then adapted in Australia by the police and,
more recently in Canada and the United States.4 ' FCG is a major feature of the
Nova Scotia Comprehensive Restorative Justice Program, having been in place
prior to the establishment of the comprehensive program.4" Conferencing is also a
major aspect of the proposed federal youth offender legislation.4 4
A Community Justice Forum (CJF) is a form of conferencing instituted
about four years ago by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as an outgrowth of
community policing, is "a meeting of all those affected by an offending incident
gathered by a neutral facilitator to solve the problem fairly and meaningfully.
455
44 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
448 Van Ness & Strong, supra note 11 at 73; Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27.
449 Circles are also a form of conferencing. Because of their association with Aboriginal communities, they
raise distinct issues and we therefore discuss them separately infra.
4
50 M. Umbreit & H. Zehr, "Restorative Family Group Conferences: Differing Models and Guildelines for
Practices," (1996) 60 Federal Probation 24 [hereinafter Umbreit & Zehr] at 25.
451 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
452 Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 450.
453 Archibald, supra note 254 at 526.
454 M. Bootie, "ADR big part of new youth justice bill" Law Times (12 March 2001) at 13.
455 C. Cooper and J. Chatterjee, "Punishment at the Turn of the Century: The RCMP Perspective" (1999),
online: Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Conference http://www.ciaj-
icag.ca/sentencing/Cooper.html (date accessed: 1 December 2000).
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CJF involves facilitation by member of the RCMP or by -members of the
community and can be instituted for a wide variety of offences ranging from theft
under $5,000 and common assault to (far fewer cases) sexual assault. The vast
majority involve persons 19 or younger.
The goals of FGC include involvement of the victim in decisions about
appropriate sanctions; increasing the offender's understanding of the harm caused
by his or her behaviour and providing an opportunity for the offender to take
responsibility for his or her behaviour; involving the offender's support system in
a collective fashion in the offender's future behaviour; and allowing both the
victim and the offender "to reconnect to key community support systems." Used
primarily in juvenile cases, the term "family" is used broadly, since participants
other than the victim's and offender's immediate families might be involved, such
as teachers, special friends, the arresting officer or other persons playing a
significant role in the offender's life.456 Because of the inclusion of community
members, Marshall emphasises that group conferencing may be a more effective
tool for social reintegration of the offender than is victim offender mediation. 57
Not all family group conferencing is based on the same principles, even
though many of the same processes are in place. For example, FGC in New
Zealand is based on restorative justice principles with reference to early VOM and
VORP experience, while the Wagga Wagga model in Australia is based on
Braithwaite's "reintegrative shaming" theory. 5 This concept or process is based
on the premise that committing certain acts can be shameful for the offender.
Shame can be used to stigmatize the offender, as is usually the case in western
systems, or to reintegrate the offender into the community, as is the case in some
African or Asian systems. 59 Stigmatizing shame leads the offender to reject the
culture which has rejected him or her and find support and acceptance elsewhere,
such as in a criminal subculture. Reintegrative shaming, on the other hand, is
based on respect for the person, emphasizing that the offender is a good person
who has done a bad act. Reintegrative shaming is most successful in strong
communities. 4 ° The role of the community or of persons who are close to the
456 M. Umbreit, "Family Group Conferencing: Implications for Crime Victims," online: Office for Victims
of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice <http://www.ojp.gov/ovc/infores/restorativejustice/96523-
family-group/welcome.html> (date accessed: 1 December 2000) [hereinafter Umbreit 2000]
457 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
4s8 Umbreit 2000, supra note 456; Braithwaite 1999a, supra note 26.
459 Braithwaite 1999a, ibid.
460 Braithwaite 1999a, ibid.
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offender means that "denunciation" comes from someone who is loved and
respected rather than from a distant authority figure. More recently, there has
been a move away from the "shaming" aspect of family group conferences and it
may be considered a precondition of access to a conference that there is a sense of
interdependency between the offender and those disapproving of the offence and
"countering the inevitable stigma attached to offending by equally strong efforts at
reintegrating (restoring) the offender and enhancing self-esteem.46'
Umbreit and Zehr maintain that there are at least five potential dangers
with FGC, especially the Wagga Wagga model: the New Zealand model involves
prior meetings with the offender and family, but not with the victim and family
and the Australian approach usually involves phone contact and only occasionally
in-person contact; there is a greater emphasis on the offender during the mediation
who (with his or her family) is seated first and speaks first; the presence of adults
(including police) may inhibit the juvenile offender; since authority figures
facilitate, instead of volunteer (or at least neutral) mediators, there may be at least
an apprehension of bias or authoritarian practices in communication; and the
Australian model follows a script which specifically tells conference coordinators
not to be concerned about cultural needs and community preferences and assumes
that the process will work as long as all participants trust the coordinator.462
As with victim offender mediation, (family) group conferencing can be
employed at different stages in the criminal process.463 Compared to VOM, there
is some dispute about whether significant preparation is dysfunctional in reducing
the impact of the offender's and victim's stories.464 There is also less emphasis in
this model on enforcement than in some of the other models; it may be informal
and may lie with the offender or it may be the responsibility of the police who
convened the conference.46 Also in contrast to victim-offender mediation,
however, there is greater emphasis on the offender and in educating the offender
about the harm caused by his or her behaviour. The offender speaks first because
this is said to facilitate the offender's "owning of his or her behaviour, as well as to
461 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270, citing a FGC from Victoria, Australia)
462 Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 450. See also Umbreit 2000, supra note 456.
463 Marshall 1998 supra note 231.
464 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270, citing M. Umbreit and S. Stacy, "Family Group Conferencing
Comes to the U.S.: A Comparison with Victim Offender Mediation," (1996) 47(2) Juvenile and Family
Crt. J. 29 [hereinafter Umbreit & Stacy].
465 Bazemore & Umbreit, ibid.
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"put the victim at ease following the offender's formal apology."4 The emphasis
on forgiveness for the offender has been criticized because it may place pressure
on the victim; for some commentators, there is insufficient attention paid to victim
empowerment." Indeed, the family group conference has been described as "the
strongest of all the models in their potential for educating offenders about the
harm their behavior causes to others," but may be weak in addressing victim
concerns.468 Bazemore and Umbreit suggest, however, that the concerns arising
out of the early experiment with family group conferencing in New Zealand
should not lead to the conclusion that there is insufficient attention paid to victim
concerns in this model and point to studies indicating greater victim satisfaction
with this model in the United States.469
Umbreit and Zehr report that with the integration of greater attention to
the victim, a New Zealand judge "terms the approach as the first truly restorative
system institutionalized within a Western legal system."47  Marshall describes
conferencing as "a restorative justice process par excellence," given "its
combination of victim restoration, offender reintegration, individual participation
and community involvement," but suggests that it may not be necessary where all
these goals do not need to be met.47'
Despite the differences between VOM and (F)GC, Umbreit and Zehr's
recommendations for appropriate FGC practices reflect the practices of VOM in
many respects.47 For example, they suggest that preparation should include in-
person meetings with the primary participants and that if a public agency initiates
an FGC, a trained community facilitator should also be involved in the sessions.
Furthermore, victims should be able to choose when and where to meet and to
present their story first, both recommendations which change the focus of
conferencing. The impact of these recommendations would be to lessen the
differences between victim offender mediation and conferencing.
466 Ibid., citing McDonald et a 1995)
467 Ibid, citing Umbreit & Stacy, supra note 464; Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 450; Marshall 1998 supra note
231.
468 Bazemore & Umbreit, ibid.,, citing Alder and Wundersitz, 1994; Umbreit & Zehr, ibid.
469 Bazemore & Umbreit, ibid. See also Marshall 1998 supra note 233.
470 Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 450 at 25.
471 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
472 Umbreit & Zehr, supra note 450.
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There have been fewer studies of family group conferencing than of victim
offender mediation, although those that have been completed indicate participant
satisfaction.473 The RCMP's review of the CJF process indicated that the process
was successful with both offenders and victims and their supporters; furthermore,
"the restorative justice initiative, although initially implemented as an extension of
the Aboriginal Justice Strategy [of the Department of Justice Canada in 1991], has
expanded far beyond the Aboriginal communities into the mainstream and that
communities which are aware and well-informed about this approach, are usually
receptive." '474 It has been acknowledged, however, that the study of CJF processes
was not systematic and could not be considered to meet adequate study standards.
In particular, it appears that some victims felt some pressure to participate."7
iv. Aboriginal communities and circles
As indicated in Chapter II, aboriginal communities and issues focus
heavily in any consideration of access to criminal justice for two main reasons: the
first is that members of aboriginal communities have been ill-served by the
predominant legal system, whether they are offenders or victims; the second is
that current theories of enhanced access to criminal justice rely heavily on
approaches which were traditional in and have already been reestablished in
aboriginal communities. In Canada, section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code
constitutes legislative recognition of "innovative sentencing practices, such as
healing and sentencing circles, and aboriginal community council projects" which




One example of a specific restorative justice project is found in agreements
entered into in 1997 by the Saskatoon Tribal Council (comprising seven First
Nations located in the central portion of Saskatchewan) and government funders
with respect to both on-reserve and urban Aboriginal people. Elders were
involved in these initiatives; the process of seeking their participation followed
Aboriginal practices.477 Restorative justice initiatives include healing centres for
federal offenders, either conditionally released or with inmate status, under the
473 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 74.
474 Cooper & Chatterjee, supra note 42.
475 Cooper & Chatterjee, ibid at Appendix A: The project was evaluated by the Research and Evaluation
Branch of the Contract and Aboriginal Services Directorate.
476 Gladue, supra note 150 at para 74.
477 Boyer, supra note 328.
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guidance of Elders, under section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code (Programs).
There are also programs specifically developed for reserves. As Boyer points out,
on the one hand, "[m]any of the problems and issues are the same on reserve or in
the urban environment;" on the other hand, the reserve community is more close
knit and thus community-based initiatives are easier to maintain. The initiatives
include sentencing circles, healing circles, individual and community-based
mediations, family group and community conferencing, cautioning, re-
integrations.478
In Ontario, aboriginal community councils have been established by
native leaders in co-operation with local Crowns and the police.479 The Crown
decides whether offenders (who have admitted liability) will have the opportunity
to participate in a sentencing circle; if the offender does participate, criminal
charges are stayed or withdrawn, but may be reinstated if the offender does not
appear or does not complete the program determined by the Council. Victim
involvement is encouraged and the program may involve paying a fine, making
restitution or participating in a treatment program.
Types of circles include "talking, healing, community and court
sentencing circles, family and community conferences" with specific processes
differing among aboriginal communities. 48  Bazemore and Umbreit describe
sentencing circles, which they say have been used most often in Saskatchewan,
Manitoba and the Yukon, as involving several steps: the offender must apply for a
sentencing circle process; the victim has the opportunity to be involved in a
healing circle, as does the offender; the actual circle involving Elders, the offender,
the victim and their families and supporters, other members of the offender's and
victim's community and members of the mainstream legal system; and follow-up
circles monitoring the offender's compliance with the plan developed by the
circle.48' They identify the goals of circle sentencing as follows: promoting healing
for all parties; providing an opportunity to the offender to make amends; empower
victims, offenders, community members and families by involving them in a
process for finding a resolution to the problem; addressing the underlying causes
of criminal behaviour; building "a sense of community and its capacity for
478 Ibid.
479 "Report of the Criminal Justice Review Committee" (1999) online: QL (LNCR) Doc.154 at 60.
480 B. Stuart, "Sentencing Circles: Making 'Real Differences"' in J. Macfarlane, ed., Rethinking dirputes: The
Mediation Alternative (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1997) at 202 [hereinafter Stuart].
481 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues
resolving conflict;" and "promot[ing] and shar[ing] community values.""4 2 They
do not include reintegration into the community which in some ways is at the
heart of circle sentencing in the Aboriginal community. The extent to which the
official actors in the criminal justice system are involved will depend on the type
of circle." 3
Under the Saskatchewan Youth Circle Program, for example, a circle is
composed of the victim, the victim's family/support, the offender and the
offender's family/support, community representatives and a professional facilitator
from the program, with the guidance of Elders.484 Re-balancing requires the youth
to perform tasks and to engage with other members of the community; in some
cases, they will be involved in activities (such as canoeing) with the Saskatoon City
Police. They meet with Aboriginal federal and provincial inmates to hear about
the latters' experiences and "bad choices." When the conditions imposed by the
circle have been met, the charges are withdrawn. Success is measured by changes
in the youths' lives. Some of the youth who had taken part in the Saskatchewan
Youth Circle program become involved again to assist other youth.
Boyer reports that in 1998-1999, of 108 cases in the Saskatchewan Youth
Circle Program, twelve youth re-offended and one committed a more serious
offence than the one he had originally committed.485 Boyer attributes the success
of the program to the individual care given to the youth (for example, urban youth
must be picked up at home for appointments and transported to all activities) and
points out that this requires extensive funding.
Preparation is particularly important in circle sentencing, as is the pre-
circle involvement of the offender who may be required to meet with Elders and
begin a reparative plan; this process is a way of indicating the commitment of the
offender to the process.486 Similarly, the community and victim and her or his
support group play an integral role in the follow-up and monitoring process. 87 It
is important that all participants are trained in the circle sentencing process and
that there is a healthy and strong relationship between the formal justice system
482 Supra note 475 for a detailed description of preparation for circles in Kwanlin Dun, an Aboriginal
community in the Yukon.
483 Ibid at 202.
484 Boyer, supra note 328.
485 Ibid.
486 Stuart, supra note 480.
487 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
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and justice professionals and the community."' Without proper preparation and
understanding of the purpose and traditions underlying the sentencing circle, they
can be unsatisfactory and in Boyer's word "debased." Boyer concludes that "there
is no role for either the judges, prosecutors and the police in community based
justice."4 9 She suggests that the community should be able to hold its own circle
at which it determines the offender's sentence which is then taken before the
court. Similarly, although the federal Corrections and Conditional Release Act
has provisions for both the early release of Aboriginal offenders into their
communities, and the provision that aboriginal offenders may develop a release
plan in conjunction with the community's justice committee to be implemented
by the community, Boyer reports that it was difficult to obtain information about
the meaning of the provisions.49° It may be that Aboriginal practices challenge the
relationship between the mainstream system and official agencies, on the one
hand, and restorative principles and the community, on the other more directly
than any other implementation of restorative justice practices. They are also more
likely to raise tensions between reliance on government for funding and the desire
for autonomous community practices.
Jonathan Rudin uses the Community Council Program at Aboriginal
Legal Services of Toronto as an example of restorative justice in practice. 9'
Established in 1992, it is directed at Aboriginal adult offenders. The Program is
not merely a step in the "regular" legal system, it is an alternative. Once offenders
(who would otherwise be sentenced to a term of imprisonment) are involved in the
Program, the charges against them are dropped and they never re-enter the
mainstream system. The Community Council system is based on "kindness and
respect" towards the offender; the offender is a participant in the full sense of the
word, something that Rudin contends the structure of the court system cannot
accommodate.'92
The next section considers the extent to which restorative justice seems to
meet its own goals and whether it raises its own concerns which must be
addressed before assuming that it is an acceptable way of increasing access to
criminal justice.
488 Ibid.
489 Boyer, supra note 328.
490 Ibid.
491 Rudin 1999, supra note 304.
492 Ibid.
illVol. XIII
Windsor Review of Legal and Social Issues
IV. A STEP BACK... TOWARDS THE FUTURE
A. Reflections
As Chapter III indicated, there are many projects underway to bring a
new perspective and vision to the criminal justice system based on a radically
different understanding the concept of "justice." These efforts are directed at
implementing a concept of substantive justice, going beyond procedural justice to
just outcomes for all participants. Restorative processes may well have the
capacity, not only to take into account, but perhaps to respond to some extent to
the specific problems facing an accused and the victim, arising out of the criminal
offence; they may also have the capacity to help a community harmed by crime to
reintegrate the offender, support the victim and respond to its members' fears
about social disorder. Yet the trend towards restorative justice measures needs to
be complicated by considering whether they are really the "panacea" some of their
proponents believe. Part of the difficulty with restorative justice is knowing what
it really is, since the term is applied from everything from a revolution in justice to
limited measures such as victim compensation schemes. For some, restorative
justice is too little (they would bring restorative justice principles to bear on all
societal practices), while for others even some of claims made for it in the more
confined sphere of the criminal legal system are too much (for them, restorative
justice poses a serious risk of heightening the inequality already characterizing
criminal justice).
This section steps back and reflects on the measures discussed in the
literature and implemented in practice in response to the criticisms of the
mainstream criminal legal system and the needs of those who participate in it. It
also suggests some directions for future research.
The on-going experiment in restorative justice raises a number of
questions that should be addressed before we can conclude that these practices will
increase access to criminal justice. Are some forms of restorative justice
inappropriately transferred from cultures with different norms and values?493 A
related concern is whether the concept of "community" which underlies
restorative justice, particularly conferencing and circles, is meaningful in urban
settings.494 Do these programs acknowledge and provide ways of addressing
493 Marhsall 1998, supra note 231.
494 K. Bussman, "Morality, Sumbolism, and Criminal Law: Chances and Limits of Mediation Programs," in
Messner & Otto, supra note 288; Roach 1999, supra note 24; Law Commission 1999 supra note 7;
Hudson 1998a; Manson, supra note 309; Delgado, supra note 107.
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internal community power differentials and possible conflicts between the goals of
victims and the community?49 To what extent do restorative justice principles
recognize how gender, racial and class may affect victims and offenders or worsen
the position of particular groups compared to the mainstream system?496 Is the
recourse to restorative justice initiatives by government at least in part a
convenient way to "download" services without providing adequate resources?497
Are restorative practices appropriate for all kinds of offences or should there be a
dual system of retributive and restorative justice practices either for philosophical
or efficacy reasons?49 If they are associated with the mainstream criminal legal
system, will restorative justice principles be undermined by that system or even
exacerbate the problems identified with the mainstream system?499
The importance of "community" in restorative justice approaches and
practices raises a umber of issues. As discussed in Chapter III, one of the major
goals of restorative justice is to bring justice back to the community and to involve
the community with the offender and the victim in reaching a just solution to the
harm created by the offender's wrongdoing, although not all forms of restorative
justice emphasize this to the same extent. The extended community is crucial to
circle sentencing, may be limited to the juvenile offender's family in family group
conferencing and may not be involved at all in victim offender mediation. On the
other hand, "bringing courts to the community" may be considered a restorative
practice by some observers. Yet what is meant by "community?" Even if we can
identify the community, what kind of internal dynamics enhance or impede
restorative justice? Do communities have sufficient resources to implement
restorative justice adequately?
The identification of "community" matters not only because restorative
justice may involve the community, but also because the particular characteristics
of a community ought to be taken into account in developing restorative justice
practices. For example, circle sentencing recognizes that western systems have
495 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270; Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
496 H. Mika, "Mediation Interventions and Restorative justice: Responding to the Astructural Bias" in
Messner & Otto, sopra note 288; Marshall 1998, supra note 231; Roach 2000, supra note 238; Delgado,
supra note 107.
497 Marshall 1998, ibid.; Supra note 7; Roberts & LaPrairie, supra note 366.
498 Bussman, supra note 494; Joseph, supra note 83; Roach 1999, supra note 24; Roach 2000, supra note 238;
Delgado, supra note 107.
499 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229; Llewellyn & Howse supra note 11; Umbreit 1999, supra note
333; Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270; Law Commission 1999 supra note 7; Field 1999; Roach
1999, supra note 24; Delgado, supra note 107.
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destroyed many traditional aboriginal practices because those system were based
on principles and norms sometimes antithetical to those of many, although not all,
aboriginal communities. We should be similarly wary of importing approaches to
the mainstream system which are based on fundamentally or at least significantly
different world views or on particular characteristics, such as a well-defined
community with an easily identified relationship to the offender (and victim, in
fact)."° Yet some commentators propose transferring practices developed in very
different cultural settings to western jurisdictions. Concepts such as reintegrative
shaming require a community about whose opinion the offender cares and cannot
readily be used in contexts in which the state or other "anonymous" authority
attempts to impose shaming;"0 ' it requires, too, a culture in which apology and
forgiveness are the norm. The same practice may have quite different implications
in different cultural settings. Thus, as suggested earlier in this paper, minimizing
the presence of the Crown in circle sentencing is a tacit (and perhaps more
explicit) acknowledgement of the legitimacy of some form of aboriginal self-
government; but minimizing the presence of the Crown in the majority legal
system may be viewed as a denial of state interest in offences against victims.
It is worth repeating Hudson's observation that without the involvement
of community, "restorative justice is reduced to the competing perspectives of the
victim and the perpetrator." ' 2 Involving the "community," however, requires us to
identify it. The identification of community is difficult in the contemporary urban
world, °3 where many residents are "immigrants" to their neighbourhoods. As
Roach asks, "[a]re [restorative justice initiatives] viable in a mobile, busy urban
environment in which you may not know or even want to know your
neighbour?"' 4 Hudson points out, "[Most] of us now inhabit not 'communities,'
but shifting, temporary alliances which come together on the basis of private
prudentialism." ' In some cases, the "community" will be determined by the
scope of the offence. Thus juvenile vandalism may occur within the range of a few
blocks; the residents and shopkeepers in this area may constitute the community
for certain purposes. Yet by community, we also mean those who are in some way
associated with the offender or the victim or both; in the context of reintegration,
500 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
50 Ibid.
502 B. Hudson "Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence" (1998) 25:3J.L&Soc. 237
at 251.
503 Bussmann, supra note 494.
504 Roach 1999, supra note 24.
05 Supra note 502.
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for instance, there must be an association between offender and community which
is more than that created by the offence itself. If the offender is to work in "the
community" as part of the process of restoration, in which community does he or
she work? Delgado wonders, for example, whether a poor minority offender
should work for a middle class white victim, for a predominantly white charitable
organization or in his or her own community: what is the purpose of the work and
how does it relate to the concept of "community?" ' 6
Post-modernists would reject the notion of community, while in contrast
Delgado points out, "[i]n a diverse, multicultural society, many collectivities may
vie for . .. status [as 'the community']" ' 7 and Meyer finds that we "define
ourselves in myriad ways." '  Yet at least one participant in an early project
combining legal and social services in Atlanta, Georgia (now labelled a restorative
justice project) has been forced to conclude that restorative justice may succeed
only in homogeneous communities." Even where we think the identification of
community is easy, as in the case of Aboriginal circles, this may not be the case in
urban rather than reserve settings."' 0 We need to establish more clearly the
meaning and purpose of community in restorative justice initiatives (is the
community always the same for purposes of reintegration and restoration, for
example?) and develop ways of ensuring that there is some kind of organic
connection between the offender and the community which makes the interaction
between offender and community meaningful.
Even if it is possible to define the parameters of the relevant community,
Ashworth is critical of the vagueness of the concept of "community harm" in
restorative justice and asks how the nature and quantum of harm to the
community can be assessed; what forms of restorative justice should be used; and
how does this process differ from one based on punishment?"' Van Ness suggests
that Ashworth does not appreciate the difference between the community and the
state and thus the importance of recognizing the distinct interest of the community
506 Delgado, supra note 107 at 769.
507 Ibid.
508 Meyer, supra note 295 at 1519.
509 D.B. Ammar, "Forgiveness in the Law - A Redemptive Opportunity" (2000) 27 Fordham Urban LJ. 1583
at 1591.
510 Manson, supra note 309 at 489.
51l Ashworth 1993, supra note 127 at 294.
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does not answer Ashworth's questions which remain valid even if one assumes that
they can be answered."'
It is also important to acknowledge and redress imbalances of power
within the community and conflicts between the norms and goals governing
victim participation and those governing community involvement. It is crucial that
a balance between the sharing of power with the community and maintenance of
restorative justice principles be maintained. On the one hand, a failure to
recognize community differences may result in these initiatives being subsumed
within or co-opted by the traditional system, a point to which we return below.
On the other hand, a failure to monitor community-based initiatives adequately
may run the risk of powerful members of the community unduly influencing the
process or diminishing the involvement of more vulnerable groups."' Replacing
state control with community control "may make some liberal individualists
uneasy and ... raises concerns for those who are sceptical about the possibilities of
non-coercive local politics and self-governance." ' 4 Yet the idea that community
politics are in equilibrium or that in some communities, certain classes of people
are not at a disadvantage because of gender, race or class is unrealistic. As pointed
out in Chapter II, some commentators have been concerned about how state
control has been replaced by social control with the potential to divide
communities rather than heal them.
51S
A related issue is how disagreements between the victim and the
community about the appropriate "restoration" are to be resolved." 6 Increased
victim involvement in the mainstream criminal justice system has been in part
motivated by the perception and reality that the interests of the state or the Crown
are not necessarily those of the victim; yet there may well be instances in
restorative justice processes where victims and the larger community are at odds.
It may also be that particular communities families engaged in conferencing will
expect different behaviour from male and female offenders and treat them
differently in determining sanctions for the same reason, although at least one
study in New Zealand indicates that "women seem to confront fewer traditional
disadvantages to active participation than in other dispute resolution
512 Van Ness 1993, supra note 127.
s"3 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270, citing Griffiths et a! 1996.
514 Roach 2000, supra note 238.
515 Griffiths 1999, supra note 238 at: 293, quoting LaPrairie, supra note 133.
516 Law Commission of Canada 1999, supra note 7.
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alternatives." ' 7 In some aboriginal communities, however, flags have been raised
about the treatment of wife abuse; concern about restoration of aboriginal culture
has often failed to take account of differential experiences in aboriginal
communities for women."8 One of the risks with restorative justice approaches is
that while they may take into account the offender's status, they may be less likely
to understand the need to provide the victim with the means of overcoming the
cultural and patriarchal oppression underlying wife abuse and the cultural norms
which make it difficult for them to demand redress for violence."1 9 The potential
claimed for restorative justice to "transform" the parties' relationship and even
societal dynamics more generally cannot be realized when current dynamics are
not rigorously questioned.
Where communities become involved through the action of government,
5 20
to what extent is community involvement merely a reflection of downloading
from government to other entities or the process of privatization? And do
adequate resources accompany the increased responsibility?52'
The coincidence of timing of restorative justice projects raises the spectre
of the more general trend to "downloading" of government activities which has
occurred over the past decade or so or, in a variant of that concern, from the desire
to remove some of the pressure from overloaded courts,522 a criticism made about
mandatory mediation in the civil context. 23 Nova Scotia officials explicitly deny
that downloading plays a part in its restorative justice program. 24 Nevertheless, as
provincial functions have been downloaded to municipalities, so, it might be said,
centralized legal functions have been downloaded to the local community. While
in both cases, there might well be some normative justification for this transfer, in
517 D. Van Ness, "Legal Issues of Restorative Justice" in Bazemore & Walgrave, supra note 233 at 267,
relying on Maxwell and Morris 1996 [hereinafter Van Ness 19991.
518 Zellerer, supra note 158; Lash, supra note 163.
519 Miedema, supra note 210; Miederna & Wachholz, supra note 211.
520 In this context, the "community" is likely to be defined as, for a example, a judicial district or
municipality or an aboriginal community or reserve. Community is likely to be determined on the basis
of convenience for instituting government programs.
521 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
522 Law Commission 1999 supra note 7.
523 C. Menkel-Meadow, "Pursuing Settlement in ad Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or
'the Law of ARD," (1991) 24 Florida State UniversityLR. 1; L. Street, "Editorial: The Mediation
Evolution - Its Moral Validity and Social Origin," (1998) 9 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal237.
524 Nova Scotia Department of Justice, supra note 129.
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other cases, there may be concern that the allocation or transfer of resources has
not kept pace with the transfer of function.
Restorative justice projects are labour intensive, requiring a great deal of
preparation of the major participants and training of facilitators and mediators.
These processes require real and not perfunctory participation with a commitment
to changed behaviour in the future yet as indicated in Chapter III, family group
conferences (for example) may involve only perfunctory preparation. Bazemore
and Umbreit compare elements of "community justice" on the basis of compliance
with restorative justice principles. 2 For example, restorative justice requires a
dialogue between the offender and victim, while a complete focus on financial
reparation has the least restorative impact. A voluntary process with separate
preparation meetings, giving the victim choices and an opportunity to speak first
or non-directional mediation by a trained community volunteer based on a
transformative model with a high tolerance for expression of feelings, lasting at
least an hour are both reflective of restorative justice principles. These processes
should be compared to the process which too often actually occurs: mandatory for
the offender, with no separate meetings, giving victims little choice or opportunity
for involvement, highly directive mediation by paid lawyers or other professionals
who talk a great deal compared to the parties and have a low tolerance for
expression of feelings (or silence) and which is settlement-driven and lasts for
perhaps 15 minutes. Despite the emphasis on "encounter" between the victim and
the offender, short cuts are tempting where resources are inadequate.
Nor should it be presumed that families will automatically respond
positively to involvement in family group counselling or victim-offender
mediation; education about the processes is crucial. Therefore, it is necessary to
commit the resources necessary for trained facilitators, preparatory work and time
for the actual mediation or conference. 26 Roberts and LaPrairie report that nearly
a third of judges who considered conditional sentences could not find out about
the community resources available and that more judges would impose conditional
sentences if there were more community resources available."' Similarly, for
community involvement in and acceptance of conditional sentences, it is necessary
that resources be expended to inform the public be informed about why
conditional sentences are a satisfactory substitute for imprisonment." '
525 Supra note 270.
526 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
527 Roberts & LaPrairie, supra note 366.
528 Ibid
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A variant of concern about the amount of resources allocated to restorative
justice is how resources are delivered and controlled. Lancaster has cautioned
against targetted resources and advocated "holistic" funding which permits
customary approaches to apply in the community, while working with outside
justice institutions. 29 Chapter II also raised questions about the extent to which
some of the resources now being allocated to restorative justice (and thus within
the criminal justice system), were previously allocated to social programs, since as
a result of the withdrawal of those social support services, and as a result of the
criminalization of certain activities, youth and marginalized adults may well
become criminal offenders."' In short, it is important to understand how
restorative justice practices may have been co-opted to serve this revised
criminal/social dynamic.
Concerns about the privatization of justice take another form. In stressing
responsiveness to the needs of offenders, Victims and communities, these
approaches often fail to factor in the systemic implications of crime, looking more
to the individual or to a generic 'victim" or "offender." Crime becomes less an
affront to the state or society as a whole and more an intrusion of an individual
victim's rights and - perhaps - the concern of the local community. To what
extent, therefore, are these projects another example of the privatization of justice
or individualization of systemic concerns?..' The symbolic value of the state's
condemnation of certain kinds of activities becomes simply a dispute between the
victim and the offender, particularly of concern in domestic, sexual and racial
crime.532 While there may be - and ought to be - vigorous disagreement about
which activities are appropriately designated "criminal," the principle that some
activities are an "affront" to the public interest should not be easily discarded in
favour of an atomistic perception of "right and wrong." There is a difference
between recognizing that the victim of a crime has a particular interest in it and
identifying that interest as the whole interest, as if society does not have a claim or
concern. Even when "the community" is brought into the equation, it is from a
narrow perspective rather than from an (admittedly imperfect) holistic sense of
harm.
529 P. Lancaster, "Omaninomowayak: Anishinaabe Justice in Muskrat Dam First Nation" (1994) 14 Windsor
YB. Access Just. 331 at 349.
53 National Council of Welfare 1995, supra note 24; National Council of Welfare 2000, supra note 170;
Roach 1996, supra note 187 at 239; Martin, supra note 183 at 190, 193
531 M.J. Mossman, "Child Support or Support for Children? A Review of Canadian Legal Academic
Scholarship 1977-1987" (1997) 46 UNB Law Journal63; P. Hughes, "Domestic Legal Aid: The Public
Means of Redress for Private Matters" (1997) 47 UNB Law Journal 119.
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Privatization of justice, whether in the civil or criminal context, often fails
to address the societal interest in ensuring that widespread wrongdoing is known
and addressed or that societal values are reaffirmed. 33 Bussman points to the way
in which the "criminal law, its institutions, and sanctions symbolize existing social
moral or basic values," while mediation lacks such symbols. 34 Roach argues,
however, that privatization is not in itself the problem; rather the real issue if
whether there will be adequate funding for restorative justice initiatives."'
Bussman suggests that mediation reflects the importance rational communication
or discourse plays today; increasingly, people listen to each other and respond to
each other's arguments." 6 This discursive quality - the "encounter" between
offender and victim - is reflected in informal or unofficial dispute resolution
processes generally, civil, as well as criminal. Again, however, the potential of
discourse lies in adequate preparation to ensure as much as possible that the victim
and the offender appreciate the nature of their meeting and the opportunity
through a face-to-face meeting, to come to greater appreciate their respective
situations
While some proponents would replace retributive justice with restorative
justice (perhaps with separation of offenders, that is, incarceration, where
unavoidable), some would go further and eliminate the boundaries between civil
and criminal justice. Van Ness and Strong maintain, however, that the criminal
law serves different purposes from those served by the criminal law:
it provides an effective method of vindicating the rights of secondary
victims, it restrains and channels in acceptable ways retributive emotions
in society, and it offers procedural efficiencies in enforcing public
values ."'
At the same time, proponents of restorative justice express concern that restorative
justice will be undermined or distorted by association with the mainstream system
with its emphasis on the offender and its coercive character. 38  Some
commentators maintain that if the formal system maintains control of the new
processes, instead of sharing power, the result will be "net-widening, rather than
533 Fiss, supra note 63; Braithwaite & Parker, supra note 251 at 108; Delgado, supra note 107.
534 Bussman, supra note 494 at 318, 319.
5 Roach 2000, supra note 238.
536 Bussman, supra note 494 at 323.
537 Van Ness & Strong 1997, supra note 229 at 49.
538 Ibid. at 60.
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the development of more effective alternative decision making processes."" 9 There
is a real danger of increased criminalization of activities not otherwise the subject
of a criminal charge resulting in a disparate impact on the poor and members of
vulnerable groups. 4 Since restorative justice often applies in the case of minor
crimes, and since a failure to abide by the conditions imposed in a restorative
justice process may result in imprisonment, restorative justice processes applied
uncritically may merely serve to enhance to disadvantages suffered by those who
are already effectively "outside the system" and without recognized community
supports. The determination of what is "criminal" behaviour is a highly normative
exercise related to the ordering of society and the identification of "who matters,"
as Penner's story about the Martian related earlier illustrates.
Some of the questions about the relationship between restorative justice
and the mainstream criminal legal system can be traced to the debate between
"rights" and "needs" to which Chapter II referred. Van Ness argues that the
objective of restorative justice is to address "the need for building safe
communities as well as the need for resolving specific crimes." '41 Thus although
Van Ness does not wish to jettison the criminal courts altogether, it is evident that
he wants to see "healing" given a higher priority than "punishment." Ashworth,
on the other hand, differentiates between the function of criminal justice and the
function Of civil justice, with the latter being the appropriate recourse for claims of
harm. 42 Similarly, he differentiates between the right of victims to services (such
as restitution and better communication) and the right of victims to be involved in
criminal law processes. The latter may distort the goals of criminal justice, such as
fairness (that is, consistency) in sentencing by imposing a more stringent sanction
against an offender whose victim experienced great harm than against another
offender whose victim experienced less harm as a result of the same crime.
Without a clear understanding of restorative justice principles - and a reluctance to
apply them to any "difference" in the mainstream system -, the traditional system
may subsume "new" approaches for its own purposes with, among other
consequences, more control of and sanctions against the offender."'
539 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270, citing K. Polk, "Family Conferencing: Theoretical and Evaluative
Questions," in C. Alder & J. Wundersitz, ed. Famiy Group Conferendng andJuvenile Justice: The Way
Forward or Misplaced Optimism? (Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 1994); Messmer & Otto,
supra note 288 at 3.
540 Levi, supra note 174 at 758.
541 Van Ness 1993, supra note 127 at 259.
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Much of the restorative justice literature glosses over differences in power
between victims and offenders or between certain offenders and others, as well as
the extent to which mediators or facilitators can pressure victims and (especially
juvenile) offenders."' In one stream of restorative justice, at least, the emphasis on
healing and forgiveness fails to acknowledge these differences. Requiring
forgiveness may result in the victim's need to reassert his or her sense of self,
diminished by the crime against him or her, being overwhelmed by pressure to
forgive, since
[T]he focus when someone forgives is predominantly on the other
person, not on oneself (Enright and Kittle 2000: 1630). Indeed, Garvey
(1999: 1828) contends that "[i]t reflects a moral failure .. for victims to
withhold forgiveness unreasonably from offenders who have done all
they can do to expiate their guilt . . Forgiveness is something victims
ought to give even if they are not obligated to give it.545
This pressure on victims distorts the relationship between victim and offender in a
way that is reminiscent of the re-victimization of the victim in sexual assault cases
in the traditional criminal system.
Furthermore, restorative justice often seems "apolitical," failing to take
into account structural inequality and imbalances of power between victims and
offenders. Mika, for example, maintains that victim offender reconciliation reveals
an "astructural bias" manifested in the assumption that the individual relationship
between the victim and the offender "transcends" the socio-structural relationship
and ignores the social context.546 Braithwaite and Parker contend that conferences
"are in danger of doing too little justice with too little equity," although they argue
that it is possible to overcome this danger.547 While sometimes offences (such as
wife abuse) may reflect an on-going relationship of domination and subordination
between the victim and the offender, in other cases, offenders may be poor or
otherwise disadvantaged compared to a middle-class victim and "it will be the
offender who needs a better education, increased job training, and an improved
living environment." '48 Llewellyn and Howse answer these concerns about power
imbalances by suggesting that the parties should help establish the ground rules,
544 Ibid. at 286.
545 Ammar, supra note 509 at 1586; Delgado, supra note 107.
546 Mika, supra note 496 at 561, 563.
47 Braithwaite & Parker, supra note 251 at 107.
548 Delgado, supra note 107.
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yet this seems more likely to reinforce the power imbalance than to dismantle
systemic power hierarchies. 49
Some proponents of restorative justice argue that it should not be expected
to solve "the deep structural injustices that cause problems like homelessness or
hunger,"55 although, as mentioned in Chapter Il, others are turning away from
restorative justice to the more ambitious restorative governance. Nevertheless,
Braithwaite and Parker suggest that three "republican solutions" may meet the
challenges posed to restorative justice initiatives: the rule of law governs with the
result that formal proceduralism acts in a supervisory way to counter the excesses
of informalism; "de-individualizing" the process by using community conferences
more than victim offender mediation; and perhaps most idealistically, "[v]ibrant
social movement politics that percolates into the deliberation of conferences,
defends minorities against tyrannies of the majority and connects private concerns
to campaigns for public transformation." '551 Social movement politics acts to check
the abuse of both state and community.552
Inequality may also be ignored - or even reflected in - the kind of
reparation an offender may be required to make. Financial reparations are easily
paid by economically advantaged offenders, but only with difficulty by others."5 3
Community "services" may be a contemporary menial version of the punishment
carried out by prison labour gangs.5" It is not insignificant that one of the ways in
which an advocate of a community court in Hartford, Connecticut measures
success is by the nearly 43,000 hours the city has "benefitted" from the
"community service" performed by offenders; this service, in the form of cleaning
garbage from parks and vacant lots, loading trucks at soup kitchens (this advocate
does not ask whether there is any connection between the need for the soup
kitchens and the plight of at least some of the offenders) and clearing snow from
handicap accessible curbs.555 On the face of it, some of these activities would be
considered selfless examples of voluntary community services. In the context of
community sanctions, however, one must ask how much free labour performed by
549 Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 11.
550 Braithwaite & Parker, supra note 251 at 108.
551 Ibid. at 109.
552 Ibid. at 111.
553 Roach 2000, supra note 238.
554 Delgado, supra note 107 at 769.
555 G. Kass "Restorative Justice: A New Paradigm for the Prosecutor (A View from Hartford Community
Court," (2000) 34 Procesutor 31.3
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offenders saves the municipalities in providing the services expected of them.
Young prefers the term "community restitution" to "community service" to
differentiate it from both punishment and voluntary service,556 although Garvey
believes that it should be viewed as punishment, since this is the only way for the
offender to atone and for society to condemn morally the offender's actions. 57 In
any event, it is not difficult to see how community service sanctions may be a form
of degrading shaming. Van Ness recognizes that shaming may be degrading, but
says that "[pirogram guidelines and mediator and facilitator training must ensure
that shaming is reintegrative rather than stigmatizing." '558 According to Roach,
however, some proponents favour stigmatizing or humiliating penalties because
they will help in obtaining public support for alternatives to imprisonment.559
The lack of understanding of the impact of systemic power differentials
(reflected in micro-level relationships between some victims and offenders) is
marked out in another way. Their enthusiasm for restorative justice leads some
supporters to suggest that there are few types of wrongdoing which are not
suitable for these processes. Yet other commentators wonder whether there are
some crimes which might not be suitable for mediation for a variety of reasons.
For example, domestic abuse cases may be unsuitable for mediation. 6' In light of
the goal of restoration of the relationship, in the context of wife abuse and sexual
assault cases, these processes may seem too much like the admonishment to "go
home and sort things out" which until recently was too often the response to
charges of domestic violence. Furthermore, not all communities may have
developed the same degree of concern about sexual assault or wife abuse as has
even the mainstream criminal legal system.16' Although some commentators have
suggested that victim offender mediation might be employed in cases of severe
crimes, including murder, they have also cautioned that more research needs to be
done to determine whether there could be "unintended negative consequences....
including a significant re-victimization of the victim." '562
556 Young 1999, supra note 306 at 275.
557 S. Garvey, "Punishment as Attonment," (1999) 46 UCLA. L Retv. 1801.
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The relationship between restorative justice initiatives and the mainstream
legal system remains to be delineated. Many programs, while called restorative
justice, are merely adjuncts to the mainstream process and are governed by the
mainstream rules. Roach asks,
[I]f restorative and aboriginal justice represent legal pluralism and an
alternative to state centred criminal law, will their incorporation in formal
diversion programmes and especially in judge-driven sentencing distort
them beyond all recognition? 63
More fundamentally, it has been observed that even though restorative justice
challenges the meaning of "crime," "[m]ost programs are organised around
criminal behaviour rather than around conflict that may or may not be
criminal." '64 Llewellyn and Howse maintain that restorative justice cannot be run
in conjunction with the existing system and they point to the power of the
retributive system to dictate the course of restorative justice. s65
Much criticism of the mainstream system is directed at its reliance on
rules. In contrast, restorative justice projects usually rely less on formal than on
informal procedures.566 Often this is desirable; at the same time, it is important to
appreciate that formal procedures often are protective of both offender and
victim. 67 Whatever the weaknesses of the trial, for example, it is based on well-
developed practices about the rights of the accused and shields, to some extent, the
victim from direct contact with the offender. It is these very practices which are
set aside in restorative justice. The offender may give up these rights in favour of
a different penalty or outcome by pleading guilty. At the same time, it can be
argued that this is little different from plea bargaining and other mechanisms upon
which the current system relies. 68 The victim, on the other hand, may feel
pressure to participate in a restorative justice approach, even though she or he
561 Roach 2000, supra note 238.
564 Law Commission of Canada supra note 7; B. Feld, "Rehabilitation, Retribution and Restorative Justice:
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would prefer not to have to deal with the offender directly and may wish to leave
the experience behind her or him. 569
As restorative justice initiatives lose their novelty, there is the possibility
that they will become perfunctory or practitioners will become satisfied with
meeting minimum requirements or cutting comers reflective of a "loss of
vision." '70 The same result may be compelled by inadequate resources; even if
adequate resources are allocated initially, after the first euphoria about restorative
justice has waned, will the necessary levels of funding be maintained? On the
other hand, there is also the risk that those who are cynical about the process,
including offenders who simply will learn to do what is necessary to avoid
imprisonment or to receive "the lightest restitution agreement possible."57'
B. Future Directions
This assessment of new approaches to access to criminal justice has
referred throughout to the concerns commentators have expressed about these
processes or about their implementation in the current criminal justice system.
The previous section "reflected" on some of the issues raised by restorative justice
principles and processes. This section focuses on the issues of evaluation and
equality.
Chapter III reported that the studies of restorative justice measures -
primarily of victim offender mediation - have reported high levels of satisfaction
by victims and offenders. It also indicated some of the concerns with the lack of
methodological rigor of many studies, however. Rigorous and relevant evaluation
remains to be done. Bazemore and Umbreit argue that potential restorative justice
models should be assessed on the basis of whether they create or strengthen
positive relationships, increase community skills in problem-solving and
constructive dispute resolution, increase the community's sense of its capacity to
solve problems, "increase individual awareness of and commitment to the common
good" and create informal support systems and safety nets for both victims and
offenders. 72 These may be praiseworthy goals, but they are also difficult to
measure. Since restorative justice objectives "may encompass macro-level
dimensions such as cultural and community revitalization and empowerment, as
569 A. Gaudreault, "Restorative ustice and Victims of Crime: Some Issues" (1999) 14:2Jusice Reports 6 at 6.
570 Umbreit 1999, supra note 333 at 226.
571 Delgado, supra note 107 at 766.
572 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
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well as community, family and individual healing," evaluation is difficult and
requires distinct measures. 73
Chapter III indicated that studies of victims offender mediation and family
conferencing show high level of victim and offender satisfaction and lower rates of
recidivism compared to the traditional system and higher rates of compliance with
restitution agreements than with restitution orders. After reviewing the
evaluations of a number of projects which generally show high levels of victim
satisfaction, Immarigeon concluded that "they only touch lightly on the myriad
concerns and questions of interest to crime victims" and fail to address what long-
term impact participation may have on victims' attitudes towards crime and
themselves.574 Schiff similarly finds that the research shows "encouraging" results
with respect to offenders' involvement in restorative justice initiatives, but
cautions that it is important to identify when restorative justice processes are
coupled with retributive sanctions labelled "restorative" and more generally, "the
extent to which a program is truly restorative in nature and not simply a
transmogrified retributive approach." '  She refers, as well, to the potential for
discrimination in the selection of offenders who are directed to restorative
initiatives and for net widening.576 Bonta et al report a lack of consistency in the
apparent impact of restorative justice approaches on recidivism, coupled with
methodological problems in the evaluations of the programs.577 Some studies have
shown that recidivism is only delayed.578
It is important to measure restorative justice projects using criteria which
reflect the particular goals of restorative justice, both with respect to process and
outcome. Bazemore and Umbreit, speaking primarily in the juvenile context,
conclude that there has been inadequate evaluation of many restorative justice
programs. 79 They point out that evaluation involves different criteria from that of
recidivism rates usually used to evaluate the traditional system; these criteria
573 C.T Griffiths & R. Corrado, "Implementing Restorative Youth Justice: A Case Study in Community
Justice and the Dynamics of Reform," in Bazemore & Umbreit, ibid. at 252.
574 R Immarigeon, "Restorative Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Crime Victims: A Review of the Literature"
in Bazemore & Umbreit, ibid. at 321.
575 M. Schiff, "The Impact of Restorative Interventions on Juvenile Offenders" in Bazemore & Umbreit,
ibid.
576 Ibid at 344.
577 Bonte el al, supra note 232.
578 Kurki, supra note 244 at 272.
579 Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 270.
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include outcomes of community empowerment and solidarity, victim interests and
crime prevention. Braithwaite maintains that the
[S]cience of evidence-based crime prevention used to inform restorative
justice must be rigorous and strong on statistical power, using
randomized controlled trials when possible (combined with rich
ethnographic engagement with the phenomenon."' 0
Kurki complaints that "[tlhere have been too few efforts to estimate traditional
measures, such as recidivism, crime, and victimization rates, and to create new
measures to estimate community involvement, empowerment, and crime
• ,581
prevention.
A review of the literature suggests a number of aspects of restorative
justice which need evaluation. There are insufficient data to explain why victims
choose to participate or not and what the long-term effects on victims are; or how
important a face-to-face encounter is compared to indirect mediation. 82 Marshall
also maintains that it is important to know whether mediation "offer[s] a
significantly better deal to victims to warrant the cost" of victim offender
mediation, for example.
5 83
Chapter I identified the degree to which the current and "new" approaches
satisfy or enhance equality principles as one of the important issues to be
addressed. One serious gap in the discussion of restorative justice is the extent to
which it actually either enhances or diminishes equality. We know little about
whether equality is achieved more in restorative justice processes, for both
offenders and victims, than in other practices. If we knew whether these practices
are "fairer" than criminal trials, it might be possible to use information about
restorative justice processes to make criminal trials fairer. 84 Apart from that
possibility, however, on the basis of their theoretical underpinnings, we should
expect restorative justice initiatives to have a positive impact on the development
of equality. Yet while there is some theoretical discussion about this (although not
a great deal in the main restorative justice literature), there is almost no evaluation
580 Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1749.
581 Kurki, supra note 244 at 285.
582 Marshall 1998, supra note 231.
583 Ibid.
584 Braithwaite 1999b, supra note 27 at 1750.
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of how practices measure up on this dimension. Studies usually do not report
findings on dimensions of equality."' 5
One of the great appeals about mainstream adoption of restorative justice
principles is the opportunity for Aboriginal communities with a tradition of these
practices (noting that not all Aboriginal communities did follow these practices) to
revive them. At the same time, one of the great challenges facing restorative
justice is to ensure that its promise is realized; there has been inadequate
evaluation to determine whether it has. This would be best accomplished by an
ethnographic study of the application of restorative justice practices in a number of
Aboriginal communities where restorative justice has been in place for longer
-periods to assess, among other things, the values reflected in the application of the
practices, the treatment of the participants (for example, is there pressure on
victims to participate?), the efficacy of monitoring of the sanctions applied to the
offender and the long term impact on participants in these practices (for example,
has the offender become successfully reintegrated into the community?). It is also
necessary to establish definitely the consequences of involvement by or lack of
involvement by state officials in circles, taking into account whether officials are
(or can be) adequately trained to participate. The role of Aboriginal community
circles and other practices as a form of self-government or as a variation on
mainstream practices relies on information about the efficacy and other effects of
the programs, as well as the nature and accountability for funding.
There has been inadequate consideration of the gender implications of
restorative justice practices more generally. Therefore a pilot project comparing
the attitudes and behaviour of female victims and male offenders who have
committed gendered crimes (such as sexual assault and domestic abuse) with the
attitudes and behaviours of female victims and male offenders who have
committed non-gendered crimes (such as break and enter or property vandalism)
would be helpful in determining the appropriateness of restorative justice
programs for gendered crimes or the "protections" for victims which must
accompany victims in these cases. We want to be clear that we have concern about
the use of restorative justice practices in connection with crimes such as sexual
assault and domestic abuse and suggest that it would be preferable to identify
existing projects that already include these crimes, as well as establishing a distinct
project with carefully developed protections for the victims.
515 Kurki, supra note 244 at 268.
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A third equality concern relates to the diversion of offenders into
privatized criminal justice: which offenders are more likely to be diverted with
what consequences? For example, it is very different for a poor offender to be
diverted and be required to perform services for a community or victim than for
an economically advantaged offender to be diverted and be able to pay
compensation or restitution as the main sanction. A study of a number of existing
programs to identify the background characteristics of offenders, the reasons they
agree to participate in restorative justice measures, the sanction imposed, whether
the offender failed to satisfy the sanction and the consequences for non-compliance
would help to show whether restorative justice is beneficial for disadvantaged and
minority offenders. As already indicated, a study of conditional sentencing has
shown that Aboriginal offenders are disproportionately incarcerated for breach of
conditions. We need to determine whether there are similar patterns arising from
the broader application of restorative justice measures.
V. CONCLUSION
Restorative justice principles and processes are the most widely advocated
way to increase access to criminal justice. Currently, however, restorative
approaches are for the most part too intertwined with the mainstream criminal
legal system on the one hand, and pose serious challenges themselves, on the other,
to treat them as either a paradigm shift or a panacea. In many cases, "restorative
justice" is used as a "catchall" for a wide variety of disparate initiatives, a number
of them having been introduced within the traditional system in a manner
consistent with the premises on which the mainstream system operates.
Most studies fail to address the most significant questions about the
effectiveness of these processes for recidivism (or, in restorative justice language)
reintegrating the offender into the community) and equally significantly, do not
adequately measure whether victims are "better off" participating in a process
with the offender than in having their harm vindicated through the traditional
processes. It is not irrelevant whether restorative justice is "better" than
traditional approaches; costly though criminal justice may be, proper
implementation of restorative justice programs requires considerable resources.
While the rhetoric of restorative justice may. be appealing (although in
some instances, even this conclusion must be questioned), the practice is less so.
Rather, as Delgado586 and others conclude, neither the traditional system nor
586 Delgado, supra note 107.
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restorative justice may be always fair; both may be characterized by race, class and
gender bias, in one case hidden by the rules, in the other hidden by "an overlay of
humanitarian concern." And as Bussmann argues, in a modern society it is
necessary to have both the symbolic value of criminal law, albeit perhaps only to
the extent necessary to maintain the symbolism, and the discursive value of
restorative justice."s 7  For victims and offenders, Delgado's advice to choose,
where possible, the approach most suitable for their own objectives seems
opposite. s88 For governments, the rush to "restorative justice" needs to be
tempered by a better understanding of its effectiveness and its effects.
Current restorative justice initiatives raise concerns not only about their
political convenience to governments, but also about their systemic consequences
for the privatization of the criminal legal system, the criminalization of minor
offences, the apolitical treatment of victims and offenders from marginalized
communities and the pressure exerted by community power-holders over
individual members. These difficulties have not been sufficiently addressed to
conclude that they are outweighed by the benefits that may be associated with
restorative justice approaches. More significantly, they are significant enough that
it is not unreasonable to conclude that they risk perpetuating the inequities of the
current criminal legal system rather than transforming it.
587 Bussman, supra note 494 at 324.
588 Delgado, supra note 107.

